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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter establishes the context and the scope of the thesis. Several topics directly related 
to the research and development activities of the companies are investigated: the financing 
constraints on R&D (chapter 2), the components of R&D that foster the innovative outcome 
of the companies (chapter 3), and the relationship between the performance of R&D and the 
industrial diversification and the globalization of economic activities (chapter 4), as well as 
the internationalization of R&D (chapter 5). This chapter introduces the motivations related to 
this research, defines the research objectives and questions addressed by the dissertation and 
concludes with the outline and the contributions of the thesis.  
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Context and motivations 
Innovation is nowadays recognized as a crucial driver for the European economy. Since the 
Lisbon Agenda, the Members States of the European Union have been aspiring to make 
Europe the most dynamic and competitive economy in the world. The recently adopted 
EU2020 strategy illustrates that a key factor for achieving this common and ambitious 
objective is the focus on comprehensive policies oriented towards the development of a 
European economy that is based on innovation and knowledge. EU2020 emphasizes the 
importance of a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and advocates efforts to increase the 
investments in science, technology and innovation. In this context, this thesis proposes to 
enlighten several channels that favor the emergence and the outcome of creative ideas and 
innovation in general amongst private firms, with a particular focus on European companies.  
 
The first motivation for this thesis resides in the acknowledged gap between EU and US 
private Research and Development1. Recent R&D figures2 stress the inability of Europe to 
reach its R&D target of 3%3 of gross domestic product since it was fixed in 2002 at the 
Barcelona Council. Besides, US companies appear to perform better than their EU 
                                                            
1 See the recent work by Cincera and Veugelers (2011). 
2 EC Key Figures 2011. 
3 Objective related to the Gross Expenditures on R&D (GERD). 
Chapter 2 
Financing constraints 
Research and Development 
hampers 
Fostering components 
of R&D 
Chapter 3  
 
knowledge output 
Chapters 4 and 5 
 
economic output 
Diversification 
Internationalization knowledge 
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counterparts on the same period. In 2009, R&D performed by US private companies consisted 
in more than 2% of the US GDP while business R&D in Europe only accounted for 1.25% of 
EU GDP4. A major factor that may alleviate the size of the R&D expenditures is the difficulty 
for a firm to access sufficient resources to finance its innovative projects. Hence, chapter 2 
aims at assessing the extent to which financing constraints on R&D occur in Europe, with an 
international comparison focusing mainly on the EU-US comparison. While chapter 2 is 
dedicated to the stimulation of R&D expenditures, another concern of the policy makers is to 
ensure that innovative ideas lead to outcomes in terms of products and services and eventually 
boost the growth and the competitiveness of the economy. The motivation of chapter 3 lies in 
the so-called blackbox representation5 of R&D. Indeed, R&D expenditures encompass 
numerous dimensions according to their nature (research versus development, human capital 
versus investments), their objective (product versus process), their funding or their location. 
The importance of specific types of R&D is likely to foster the outcome of the innovative 
process, as measured here by patents. Chapter 3 investigates in this matter the determinants of 
the knowledge production of R&D activities when R&D is disaggregated into several 
components. The evolution over the last decade of innovation, which is recognized as 
becoming increasingly complex, open and internationalized6, motivates the research 
conducted in chapters 4 and 5. Nowadays most of the R&D in the world is performed by 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs)7. The top 1000 EU and the top 1000 non-EU R&D 
spenders represent together about 80% of worldwide business enterprise expenditures on 
R&D8. This growing complexity of the MNEs deserves to be investigated in terms of 
innovative performance. The mergers and acquisitions strategies of the MNEs are primarily a 
matter of competition policies, but they may correlate with an underlying diversification 
process of the companies that affects their R&D performance. A firm that diversifies its line 
of products across several industries or countries is likely to suffer from losses of efficiencies 
due to complexity, especially for high degrees of diversification, but this diversification 
strategy may also benefit to R&D productivity through, for instance, economies of scope 
when the firm is industrially diversified, or home-based augmenting/exploiting strategies for a 
globalized firm. Concerning the internationalization of R&D, the location of R&D centers in 
non European countries may still benefit to European growth and alleviate the fears of doing 
                                                            
4 Eurostat, OECD. 
5 Rosenberg (1982). 
6 Anvret, Granieri, Renda (2010). 
7 UNCTAD (2005). 
8 MEMO/11/705 of the 2011 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. 
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R&D outside rather than inside the European geographic area. This thesis investigates 
whether these diversification and internationalization considerations do benefit to the 
innovation performance of Europe. 
Objectives and research questions  
This thesis investigates, based on quantitative methods, three matters directly related to the 
research and development activities of the companies: 
- the financing constraints on R&D; 
- the components of R&D that foster the innovative outcome of the companies; 
- the relationship between the performance of R&D and the industrial and international 
diversification of economic activities as well as the internationalization of R&D. 
The analysis is empirical and its nature is exclusively micro-economic. A significant work 
that underlies the findings of this dissertation was performed on four datasets which include 
firm-level information related to the innovative activities of the companies. 
Do financing constraints explain a part of the acknowledged R&D gap between Europe and 
the US? A first objective of this thesis is to assess whether there is evidence that European 
companies that are willing to invest in R&D projects are facing financing constraints. 
Financial systems that are more market-oriented (like the US economy) are theoretically more 
likely to see the emergence of financing constraints due to less ability to manage information 
asymmetry problems. Empirical literature over the 80s-90s mainly relies on this explanation 
to justify findings of a sensitivity of R&D to internal funds amongst US firms. However, US 
firms do not suffer, unlike their EU counterparts, from the fragmentation of the European 
financial market, which is pointed out by recent recommendations of the CEPS9. Furthermore, 
the improvement of US equity markets over the past decades is illustrated over time by a 
lower sensitivity of US investments to internal funds for large public firms10. This dissertation 
provides two sets of original results which contribute to the empirical literature on this 
subject. First, our analysis addresses the following question: do the leading innovators in US 
and Europe, which are both likely to rely partially on the market to finance their R&D, differ 
in terms of financing constraints after year 2000? This analysis gives a picture of the 
financing constraints on most R&D in Europe and compares it with the situation in the US. A 
second question that is addressed is whether older firms actually face less severe or no 
                                                            
9 Anvret, Granieri, Renda (2010). 
10 Brown and Petersen (2009). 
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financing constraints, as opposed to younger firms. Our analysis assesses whether the 
constraints faced by the young US and EU leading innovators, i.e. the yollies in Cincera and 
Veugelers (2011), differ from the old ones (ollies). An international comparison is also 
established.  
Does the heterogeneity of R&D activities affect the technology performance of a firm, and if 
so, what are the effects that can be observed for the numerous faces of R&D? A second 
objective of the thesis is to identify the components of R&D activities that are the main 
drivers of the innovative performance of the companies. This performance is assessed by the 
patent applications of the companies. The analysis opposes research to development, product 
to process-oriented activities, human capital to investments, sources of funding and 
subcontractors. On the basis of Belgian data for 2004-2005, hypotheses on the components of 
R&D will be tested. As the technological Belgian landscape is highly internationalized, a 
substantial work was realized on the gathering of patents filed outside Belgium by foreign 
applicants but based on inventions which were likely created in Belgian R&D centers. 
Do diversification strategies of economic activities (industrial and international) and R&D 
internationalization of EU MNEs improve the economic performance of R&D activities? A 
third objective of the thesis is to link R&D productivity with the following strategies of 
European MNEs in the 2000s: industrial diversification of the economic activities, 
globalization of the economic activities and internationalization of the R&D activities. The 
analysis aims at assessing whether these strategies benefit to the performance of innovative 
activities as measured by the production of the MNEs. In order to capture these strategies, an 
original work in two steps is realized. First, information on the subsidiaries of the top R&D 
spenders in Europe is collected. The industries of the subsidiaries and their location are used 
to assess the diversification of the activities of the EU MNEs. Second, additional information 
is gathered on the location of the inventors that contributed to the patents of each European 
MNE as well as each subsidiary identified in the first step. The location of the inventors is 
used as a proxy of the location of the R&D centers of the MNEs. The key dimension of this 
work resides in the consolidation of the information at the level of the European MNEs. 
All these topics have a high degree of relevancy in terms of innovation policies. Hence, each 
chapter of the thesis intends to provide a discussion of the policy implications on the basis of 
our findings. 
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Outline of the thesis and main features 
The structures of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 are similar. They first provide outlines of the literature 
and methodological framework. Data and empirical findings are then reported and discussed. 
Figure 1 presents the outline of the thesis. 
The financing constraints on R&D are investigated in chapter 2. A dataset of companies 
active in R&D is constructed for this purpose. This dataset is based on a compilation of R&D 
scoreboards11 and is used to establish a US-EU comparison in the 2000s. Cash flow data were 
collected using the Compustat database. The findings of this chapter are based on a sensitivity 
analysis of R&D to cash flow using estimates of dynamic R&D equations derived from the 
optimal level of R&D investment when considering a Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) production function of a profit-maximizing firm. Investments of firms that face 
liquidity constraints are assumed to be more likely to be sensitive to the availability of internal 
finance. Estimations of R&D sensitivities are provided for both datasets. The relationship 
between the financing constraints on R&D and the age of the companies is analyzed in an 
additional set of results with parametric as well as non parametric estimations. Nonparametric 
estimations were used as a complementary approach in order to release restrictions in the 
modeling of the R&D accumulation rates and in the shape of the relationship between the 
R&D sensitivity and the age of the companies.  
Chapter 3 measures the knowledge production of R&D expenditures when they are 
disaggregated into the following components: intramural versus extramural expenditures, 
research versus development expenditures, product-oriented versus process-oriented, human 
capital versus investments. Furthermore, the sources of funding are also analyzed, which 
gives another perspective to the analysis performed in chapter 2. The types and location of the 
subcontractors is considered as well. The disaggregated R&D expenditures are implemented 
in a knowledge production function with knowledge outcome measured by the quantity of 
patent applications of the companies. A count data econometric method is used in order to 
assess the elasticity of patents to the R&D components. Hypotheses about the R&D 
components and their role in the R&D-patent relationship are tested on the basis of Belgian 
data from the Belgian R&D survey that was conducted in 2004 and 2005. This survey does 
not provide patent information and required patent matching, which was performed taking 
into account the international nature of Belgian R&D. 
                                                            
11Industrial R&D scoreboards are released by the EC-JRC-Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. 
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Figure 1. Outline of the thesis 
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While chapter 3 gives a glimpse of the international nature of R&D, chapters 4 and 5 
investigate deeper this type of strategy. Estimates of economic production functions that 
include R&D capital are reported. The industrial and international diversification strategies of 
the activities of European MNEs are assessed through their subsidiaries in chapter 4. A 
dataset that covers the period 2000-2008 is constructed based on consolidated data from the 
European R&D scoreboards with their related subsidiaries found in Amadeus database. The 
number of industries and the number of countries covered by the EU MNEs as well as 
Herfindhal-Hirschman indexes are used as interaction effects with R&D in the production 
process. In chapter 5, an extension of the dataset of chapter 4 leads to the construction of an 
additional dataset that includes the location of the inventors related to the MNEs and their 
subsidiaries in order to proxy the location of the R&D activities. The productivity effect of 
different geographic locations is investigated, with a focus on the location of subsidiaries and 
inventors in the US as opposed to EU.   
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by reviewing the main findings of the previous chapters. 
The limitations of the thesis are addressed and policy implications are summarized. Finally, 
extensions of the scope of the analysis and ideas for future research are suggested. 
To our knowledge, the contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. The 
analyses address relevant questions in the literature on the basis of four original databases 
related in different ways to the R&D activities that take place within the companies. The 
construction of these original datasets represents a substantial work that underlies all the 
findings of this dissertation. Econometrics methods are implemented in every chapter in order 
to conduct the quantitative analyses. Chapter 2 contributes to the literature related to the 
financing constraints by investigating the investments in non tangible capital, i.e. R&D capital 
and addressing questions for which there is no evidence in prior literature. An original set of 
results related to the financing constraints provides a global (rather than national) analysis of 
most R&D in Europe and compares it to US R&D in order to update the findings in the 
literature and to enlighten the role of the financial dimension on innovation in the post-Lisbon 
context. Another contribution lies in the nonparametric methods that are used in order to relax 
restrictions on the modeling of R&D and to shape the relationship between the sensitivity of 
R&D to cash flow and the age of the companies. Chapter 3 provides a new and unified set of 
findings that encompass at the same time several dimensions of R&D. To our knowledge, this 
20 
 
is the first analysis on the R&D-patent relationship that implements these dimensions in such 
an integrated framework. Given the high dependency of the Belgian innovation system 
towards the foreign MNEs, another contribution of Chapter 3 resides in the matching process 
that was performed between Belgian R&D and patents related to Belgian inventors in order to 
capture the patents filed outside Belgium but related to inventions created by firms located in 
Belgium (i.e. subsidiaries of foreign groups). Chapter 4 and 5 aim at answering questions 
related to modern topics and provide original and innovative findings regarding the growing 
complexity of the MNEs based on new consolidated data and an original work on the 
subsidiaries and the inventors of the companies.     
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Chapter 2 - R&D and Financing Constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter analyzes the financing constraints on R&D investments. The central question in 
this chapter is whether financing constraints can explain a part of the acknowledged R&D gap 
between Europe and the US. In order to address this question, a dataset is constructed on the 
basis of a compilation of R&D scoreboards. The findings of this chapter are based on a 
sensitivity analysis of R&D to cash flow using estimates of dynamic R&D equations. The 
relationship between the financing constraints on R&D and the age of the companies is 
analyzed in an additional set of results with parametric as well as non parametric estimations. 
European firms appear to be affected by financing constraints in the 2000’s while this is not 
the case for the US companies. The age seems to affect negatively the R&D sensitivity for EU 
and US leading innovators, with higher sensitivities for old and low-tech EU firms than their 
US counterparts. 
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2.1  Introduction12 
 
Recent R&D figures13 stress the inability of Europe to reach its R&D target of 3%14 of gross 
domestic product since it was fixed in 2002 at the Barcelona Council. Besides, US companies 
appear to perform better than their EU counterparts on the same period. In 2009, R&D 
performed by US private companies consisted in more than 2% of the US GDP while business 
R&D in Europe only accounted for 1.25% of EU GDP15.  
The central question in this chapter is whether financing constraints can explain a part of the 
acknowledged R&D gap between Europe and the US. The existence of capital market 
imperfections such as asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers affects the 
capital investment decisions of a firm and introduces possible financing constraints, like credit 
rationing by lenders. Such constraints may actually be even more pronounced in the case of 
intangible investments such as Research and Development since these activities are more 
risky by nature and typically provide less collateral to lenders than capital goods do.  
Observing the sensitivity of R&D investment decisions to cash flow (CF) is a way to reveal 
the existence of financing constraints, assuming that investments of firms that face liquidity 
constraints are more likely to be sensitive to the availability of internal finance. While there is 
a large literature on the relationship between cash flow and ordinary investment, only few 
studies have focused on the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow (Brown and Petersen, 2009). This 
chapter contributes to this literature by providing a new and original US-EU analysis of the 
R&D-CF sensitivity after 2000. 
                                                            
12 This chapter compiles two sets of research about the financing constraints on R&D (US-EU in the 2000’s and 
impact of age in the 2000’s). The findings related to the US-EU comparison in the 2000’s come directly from 
Cincera and Ravet (2010) “Financing constraints and R&D investments of large corporations in Europe and the 
USA”, IPTS Working Paper on Corporate R&D and Innovation, No. 2/2010, European Commission Directorate 
General for Research and Cincera and Ravet (2010) “Financing constraints and R&D investments of large 
corporations in Europe and the USA”,  Science and Public Policy, 37(6), pp. 455-466. These results were 
presented at internal seminars at ULB, workshops, like the 2010 Workshop on Tax Incentives for Research and 
Innovation organized by the European Commission, and conferences amongst which the EC Conference on 
Corporate R&D 2010.  
13 EC Key Figures 2011. 
14 Objective related to the Gross Expenditures on R&D (GERD). 
15 Eurostat, OECD. 
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Another question that is investigated in this chapter is whether older firms actually face less 
severe or no financing constraints, as opposed to younger firms. Cincera and Veugelers 
(2011) show that young leading innovators (yollies) play a more pivotal role in the US than in 
Europe. As young firms are more likely to be subject to information problems, uncertain 
returns and lack of collateral value16, they may have more difficulties to get external finance 
for their investment projects. This would imply that younger firms rely more heavily on their 
internal finance when they finance their R&D projects. This question is investigated by using 
the data on the age of firms used in Cincera and Veugelers (2011). 
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of US and EU R&D active companies in the 
manufacturing and services sectors in the years 2000. We used the successive editions of the 
EU industrial R&D investment scoreboards (2004 – 2008) conducted by the JRC-IPTS of the 
European Commission. According to JRC-IPTS17, these scoreboards are representative of 
about 80 % of all R&D carried out in the private sector in the world. This source is matched 
with the Compustat database in order to gather financial information, including the cash flow 
of the firms. The final sample used in the empirical analysis consists of an unbalanced panel 
of 1962 firms over 2000 – 2007. All variables are presented using constant exchange rates and 
price indexes, and R&D stocks are constructed for each firm on the basis of the perpetual 
inventory method (Griliches, 1979).  
The model used to identify the potential liquidity constraints of the firms is an error correction 
model for R&D investment. This model is derived from the optimal level of R&D investment 
when considering a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function of a profit-
maximizing firm. This model is estimated using econometric methods for panel data. 
Traditional fixed-effect estimators are not suited for this model when the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous and contain random measurement errors. In order to address 
these issues and the dynamic structure of the model, GMM estimators are implemented. These 
estimators allow one to deal with the possibly correlated specific unobserved fixed effects of 
the firms and the weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables. Further results in this chapter 
relate to the impact of the age of the US and EU firms on the financing constraints of the 
firms. The error correction model is estimated by considering different categories of age of 
the firms. A non parametric approach is also used in order to get a better picture of the shape 
                                                            
16 Brown and Petersen (2009). 
17 Background information and methodology of the 2008 R&D Scoreboard: 
http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/research/docs/2008/Methodology.pdf. 
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of the relationship between R&D and cash flow, as well as the relationship between the 
sensitivity of R&D to cash flow and the age of the firms. 
Our findings have important implications for EU R&D policy. First, we show that most of EU 
R&D is significantly sensitive to the availability of internal finance, which is likely to be due 
to the existence of financing constraints on R&D. This is not the case for the US firms. As 
stock markets are likely to be an important source of funds for the companies in our sample, 
this result advocates a better focus on the development and integration of EU equity markets, 
which are highly fragmented. Second, tax policies that affect the after-tax cash flow should 
also have a significant impact on the R&D activities in Europe. Third, given evidence that 
younger firms rely more on their cash flow to finance their R&D projects, EU policies would 
do well relaxing this constraint by providing them an easier acces to external funds and 
eventually encouraging the development of their R&D activities. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews some theoretical aspects of the 
literature on the financing constraints on the investments in R&D as well as the main 
empirical findings of some selected studies. The methodological framework is presented in 
section 2.3. The construction of the dataset and its main features are documented in section 
2.4. The main estimation results are presented and discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 covers 
conclusions and implications. 
 
2.2  R&D and financing constraints 
 
It is widely agreed that given the existence of asymmetric information between firms and 
lenders and other agency costs or moral hazard problems, investments in physical capital and 
more particularly in Research and Development must be primarily funded by internal 
resources of firms. On the theoretical side, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) developed formal models of moral hazard problems in debt and equity markets. On the 
empirical side, since the pioneering work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), many 
studies have examined the extent of liquidity constraints in the financing of physical 
investment. The agency costs between the shareholders and the R&D management, i.e. risk-
adverse R&D managers will under-invest in risky R&D projects and managers tend to spend 
on activities that benefit them, can be avoided by leveraging the firm. However, the costs of 
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the external funds to finance the R&D projects will be higher (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Then, investments in intangibles such as R&D are riskier by essence than ordinary 
investments and R&D managers often have better information regarding the likelihood of the 
success of their R&D projects than outside investors or lenders. Furthermore, R&D 
investments provide less collateral to outsiders since they cannot make accurate appraisals of 
the values associated with this type of investment18. As a result, R&D firms may encounter 
credit rationing by potential lenders and be constrained if they do not have enough internal 
resources to finance their R&D projects19.  
Besides the risks and uncertainties inherent to R&D activities, strategic considerations are 
another source of asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender. Inventors 
may indeed be reluctant to fully or partly disclose to the outside world information as regards 
the contents and the objectives of their technological activities since this knowledge could 
leak out to rivals. This imperfect appropriability of the returns of innovative activities arises 
from the non-rival and partially excludable property of the knowledge good. Non rivalry 
means that the use of an innovation by an economic agent does not preclude others from using 
it, while partial excludability implies that the owner of an innovation can not impede others to 
benefit from it free of charge. 
Another essential characteristic of R&D that makes it different from ordinary investment is 
the presence of high adjustment and sunk costs20. The wages of the R&D personnel for 
instance represent more than 50% of R&D expenditures and training, firing or re-hiring this 
highly specialized personnel embedded in the firm’s intangible asset implies substantial 
costs21. Hence the levels of R&D expenditures associated to any innovation projects are 
unlikely to change substantially from year to year. This feature could make it difficult to 
assess empirically the relationship between possible liquidity constraints and expenses in 
                                                            
18 The output of R&D activities consists of new products and processes, which are typically hard to use as 
collateral. According to Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) who refer to Ackerlof’s (1970) classic example of a 
car market with asymmetric information and adverse selection problems, “A potential buyer of a used car can, at 
relatively low cost, hire a mechanic to assess the car’s true quality. In contrast, a potential investor might have 
to hire a team of scientists to make an accurate appraisal of the potential value of a firm’s R&D projects.” 
19 Capital market imperfections can prevent firms to access to these external funds at least at the same costs than 
the internal resources. As stressed by Harhoff (1998), “If providers of finance face greater uncertainty with 
respect to R&D than to investment projects, they will require a higher lemon’s premium for the former type of 
investment. Hence, even without rationing behaviour on behalf of banks and other financial institutions, there 
will be a premium to be paid for obtaining external funding.” 
20 As emphasized by Arrow (1962), given the time it takes to succeed, a typical R&D project involves important 
fixed set-up costs. This ‘indivisible’ aspect of R&D as an input views R&D activities mainly as a fixed factor of 
production. 
21 In Belgium in 1995, the distribution of intramural R&D expenditures by type of costs was as follows: 58% for 
the R&D personnel, 9% for investment and 33% for the organization of these activities (Cincera, 2005). 
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R&D investments since the changes in the costs of this type of capital can be weak in the 
short term. This also makes lagged variables poor instruments for estimations. Unfortunately, 
there are not many other alternative choices available as instruments for R&D. More 
fundamentally, given these high adjustment costs, a firm may decide to start new R&D 
programs only if she knows that she will have sufficient resources to pursue the R&D from 
the very beginning of the project to its end. In that case, liquidity constraints should not be a 
concern for the decision of the firm to engage in R&D activities. 
There have been only a few studies examining financing constraints and R&D22. Table 1 
provides some features of some selected studies that have investigated the relationship 
between internal finance and R&D. 
Hall (2002) and more recently Hall and Lerner (2010) provide an extended review of the 
literature about financing constraints. According to Hall and Lerner (2010), most authors in 
the empirical literature on financing constraints have been relying on two main approaches 
based on investment equations. The first is to use a neoclassical accelerator model, which can 
be augmented with dynamics and transformed into an error correction model (ECM). The 
second approach is based on an Euler equation (an example is Harhoff, 1998). The authors 
conclude their review stating that there is evidence that “debt is a disfavored source of finance 
for R&D investment […], Anglo-Saxon economies seem to exhibit more sensitivity and 
responsiveness of R&D to cash flow than continental economies […] and this greater 
responsiveness may arise because they are financially constrained, in the sense that they view 
external sources of finance as much more costly than internal”. However, this responsiveness 
may also be related to demand signals in thick financial equity markets. 
Table 1 presents a summary of selected studies that investigate the financing constraints on 
R&D investments using firm-level data. Comparisons between financing constraints faced by 
US firms and European firms, and more specifically French firms, have been investigated for 
mid-80s and early 90s by Hall et al. (1999) and Mulkay, Hall, Mairesse (2001). The paper by 
Hall et al. (1999) indicate that investment and R&D are sensitive to cash flow in the US only 
and show evidence of a positive impact of both investment and R&D in predicting sales and 
cash flow for the US firms while the results are somewhat more mixed in France and Japan. 
                                                            
22 Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) provide reviews of the literature regarding the role of financial 
constraints on firms’ investment activities on fixed capital. Mairesse, Mulkay and Hall (1999) discuss and 
compare alternative modelling specifications, i.e. simple accelerator and error correction specifications, as well 
as panel data econometric methodologies, i.e. traditional between and within firm estimations versus GMM 
estimators, for estimating firms' investment equations. 
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Mulkay, Hall and Mairesse (2001) do not find any significant differences (for France and US) 
in the effects of output on physical and R&D investments. Yet, cash flow or profit appears to 
have a much higher impact on both types of investments in the US than in France. Hence the 
impact of financial factors on investment and R&D does not differ within a country but rather 
across them. This finding indicates that it is the financial market environment specific to a 
country, which matters in explaining the impact of financial factors on investment. 
 
Table 1. Features of some selected studies on R&D and financing constraints 
 Firms Countries Period Model - Econometrics 
Hall (1992) Large manufacturing US 1973-1987 Tobin’s Q 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) Small high-tech US 1983-1987 
Acc., Tobin’s Q – 
Within/FD GMM 
Harhoff (1998) Large manufacturing DE 1990-1994 
Acc., ECM, Euler- FD 
GMM 
Bond et al. (1999) Manufacturing and high-tech UK, DE 
1985-
1994 ECM – GMM SYS 
Hall et al. (1999) High-Tech FR, JP, US 
1978-
1989 VAR – GMM SYS 
Mulkay et al. (2001) Large manufacturing FR, US 1982-1993 
ECM – Within/GMM FD & 
SYS 
Bougheas et al. (2001) Manufacturing IE 1991-1997 Acc. – OLS 
Cincera (2003) Large manufacturing BE 1991-2000 
Acc. and ECM – 
Within/GMM FD & SYS 
Czarnitsky (2006) SMEs manufacturing DE 1994-1998 Tobit 
Savignac (2008) Large manufacturing FR 1997-1999 Bivariate probit 
Aghion et al. (2008) 
SMEs and Large 
manufacturing and 
services 
FR 1993-2004 
Acc./GLS/Tobit/ 
GMM FD 
Brown et al. (2009) High-Tech US 1990-2004 Euler – GMM FD & SYS 
Brown and Petersen (2009) Large manufacturing US 1970-2006 Tobin’s Q – GMM 
Notes: Acc; = accelerator investment model; ECM = Error correction model; GMM FD and SYS = First 
difference and system generalized method of moment estimator; VAR =  Vector Autoregressive Regression. 
Examples of studies focused on US firms are Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994). The study of Hall (1992) explores the relationship between investment, R&D and cash 
flow for US firms by taking into account firms specific unobserved fixed effects and 
simultaneity. The results point to a positive impact of cash flow on both types of investments, 
although more significant for physical investment, hence indicating the presence of liquidity 
constraints in addition to just future demand expectations. On the basis of a sample of 179 US 
small firms in high-tech industries, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) estimate the relationship 
between R&D investment, physical capital and internal finance. The results support the 
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schumpeterian hypothesis, which states that internal finance is an important determinant of 
R&D expenditures. As stressed by Arrow (1962), moral hazard problems hinder external 
financing of highly risky business activities such as innovation. The absence of collateral 
value for investment like R&D creates adverse incentives and selection problems in debt and 
equity markets.  
Examples of studies carried out for European countries are Harhoff (1998), Bond, Harhoff 
and Van Reenen (1999), Czarnitzki (2006), Bougheas, Goerg and Strobl (2001), Cincera 
(2003), Aghion et al.(2008) and Savignac (2008).  
Harhoff (1998) shows evidence for German firms of a large sensitivity of R&D and 
investment to cash flow for accelerator and error-correction equations. Significant results are 
found for small firms only for the latter specification. No conclusion for R&D can be drawn 
from the Euler equation model probably because the sample is too small for a precise 
estimation.  
Results from Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (1999) lead one to conclude that the differences 
between British and German firms in the effects of cash flow cannot be simply explained by a 
greater role of this variable in predicting future sales. On the whole, the empirical findings 
indicate that financial constraints are significant in the UK economy while no effect is found 
for German firms, which can be explained by the institutional differences across the financial 
systems in the two countries23. Furthermore cash flow has an impact on the decision to engage 
in R&D rather than on the levels of R&D expenditures.  
Bougheas, Goerg and Strobl (2001) test the effect of liquidity constraints on the R&D 
investments of Irish companies. They also come up to the conclusion that R&D investments 
in these companies are subject to liquidity constraints. This result is in line with previous 
findings for UK and US companies. 
Using a sample of about 10000 Belgian manufacturing firms active in R&D over the 1990’s, 
Cincera (2003) compares financing constraints on both fixed tangible capital and R&D. The 
empirical analysis is performed on biannual survey data, supplemented with annual accounts 
                                                            
23 Quoting the authors, “Share ownership in Germany tends to be more concentrated than in Britain, which may 
mitigate asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. Bank 
representation on supervisory boards and long-term repeated relationships between banks and firms in Germany 
may mitigate asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. Large German firms are more likely to 
remain unquoted, hostile takeovers are extremely rare, and dividend payout ratios tend to be both lower and less 
rigid in German firms than in British firms.” 
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data. The analysis is founded on two reduced form equations for investment: an accelerator 
and an error correction model. Although the results indicate the presence of financial 
constraints on tangible as well as R&D investment, this effect is unexpectedly not larger for 
R&D. Furthermore, for fixed capital investment, the author investigates the type of firms for 
which these constraints are stronger. The estimates show that young firms, small firms, firms 
that are not part of a multinational company, firms that do not perform R&D on a permanent 
basis, firms that benefit from public funds to support R&D activities, and firms located in the 
Walloon region face higher financial constraints. 
Czarnitzki (2006) uses a modified price-cost margin as a proxy for internal funds of German 
SMEs, while external financing constraints are measured by a lagged credit rating index. 
R&D expenditures of West Germany firms are found to be sensitive to internal and external 
resources while there is no evidence of financial constraints for East Germany firms.  The role 
of public funding is shown as relevant for R&D expenditures in both regions, with a higher 
importance in East Germany.  
Savignac (2008) provides evidence for 1940 French firms about the role of financing 
constraints in the decision to undertake innovative activities. A direct measure for financing 
constraints is obtained from the FIT survey24. The author considers the decision to innovate 
and the likelihood to be financially constrained as two simultaneous issues. In order to 
address this endogeneity of financing constraints to innovation decisions, a recursive bivariate 
probit model is estimated. Results show that the likelihood for a firm to undertake innovative 
activities is decreased by more than 20% when the firm faces financial constraints. 
In a more recent study based on French data, Aghion et al. (2008) found that the share of 
R&D investment over total investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but less if 
firms face tighter credit constraints. According to the authors, “this result is magnified for 
firms in sectors that depend more heavily upon external finance, or that are characterized by 
a low degree of asset tangibility”. 
Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) test the age of the company for a representative sample of 
1347 publicly traded high-tech US companies from 1990 to 2004. Their results show that 
young firms, i.e. firms created less than 15 years ago, that almost entirely finance their R&D 
investment with cash flow or public share issue are financially constrained which is not the 
                                                            
24 The “Financement de l’Innovation Technologique” (FIT) survey is based upon the technological innovation 
concept exposed in the Oslo manual (OECD and EUROSTAT, 1997). 
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case for mature companies. The authors then propose an explanation for the R&D boom in the 
US during the 1990’s (and its subsequent decline) which is mainly attributed (75%) to young 
high-tech companies. Controlling for demand side effects and departing from the idea that 
these firms "typically exhaust internal finance and then issue stock as their marginal source 
of funds", they claim that the shift in the last decade in the supply of both internal and external 
equity to finance R&D relaxed the financing constraints these young US R&D companies 
faced and that restricted their R&D investments. 
Brown and Petersen (2009) provide the first study that analyzes the evolution of the 
sensitivity of R&D to cash flow over time (1970-2006) and include measures of debt and 
stock issues in their model based on Tobin’s Q. Their findings show that the sensitivity of 
total investment (physical and R&D) to cash flow declines over time in the US, with young 
firms displaying a higher sensitivity than mature firms. They attribute this decline to the 
substantial improvement of equity markets in the last decades. Moreover, they argue that the 
dramatic increase over time in R&D’s share of total investment should have led to higher 
R&D to cash flow sensitivities. However, their results do not confirm higher sensitivities and 
corroborate the improvement of equity markets and the fact that public equity finance became 
a closer substitute to internal equity over the investigated period. 
We contribute to this literature by providing two new sets of results that answer questions for 
which there is no prior evidence. The first question is to determine whether the acknowledge 
R&D gap between European firms and US firms may be attributed to the financing 
constraints faced in the European R&D landscape. Especially for companies that use equity 
finance for their R&D investment, the improvement of the US equity markets over the last 
decades (Brown and Petersen, 2009) should have relaxed the dependency of US R&D on the 
internal finance of the companies. On the other hand, European equity markets are known to 
be highly fragmented25 and the lack of a clear functioning internal market in Europe may 
force firms to rely more on their internal funds when they finance their R&D. 
The second question that is investigated is whether young firms face more severe financing 
constraints on R&D than mature firms. This question is addressed by using the data on the 
age of firms used in Cincera and Veugelers (2011). Young leading innovators (yollies) play a 
more pivotal role in the US R&D landscape than in Europe (Cincera and Veugelers, 2011). 
However, information problems, uncertain returns and lack of collateral value are more likely 
                                                            
25 Anvret, Granieri, Renda (2010). 
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to arise amongst young companies than mature companies (Brown and Petersen, 2009). 
Hence, young firms are more likely to be financially constrained. This would imply that 
younger firms rely more heavily on their internal finance when they finance their R&D 
projects. On the other hand, mature firms often have sufficient cash flow for their investment 
and do less depend on equity or debt issue (Brown, Fazzari and Petersen, 2009). Hence, 
increasing the supply of internal funds should have less impact on the R&D decisions of 
mature firms. 
2.3  Methodology 
2.3.1  R&D equation 
 
In order to investigate whether there is evidence that financing constraints on R&D arise 
within the US or EU R&D landscape, we will test the significance of internal funds (as 
measured by the cash flow) in the determination of R&D investments. This section presents 
the investment error-correction equation as well as the econometric methodology to be 
implemented for estimating the relationship between cash flow and R&D investments. As 
stressed by Hall and Lerner (2010), this is a standard methodology based on an investment 
equation. The methodological framework is close to the one used by Harhoff (1998), Bond et 
al. (1999), Mairesse, Mulkay and Hall (1999) and Mulkay et al. (2001). Following the neo-
classical long run model (Jorgenson, 1963), the logarithm of the desired (or long run) stock of 
capital is proportional to the logarithm of output and user cost of capital 
 
itittit uccyc    (2.1) 
 
where c is the logarithm of the stock of R&D, y is the logarithm of the sales and ucc is the 
logarithm of the user cost of capital (UCC). This model can be derived by assuming a profit 
maximizing firm with a CES production function with elasticityσ . 
The user cost of capital,   1/ / /I I I I Iit t t t t t i t tUCC P P r P P P P    , as noted by Mulkay et 
al. (2001), is difficult to measure at the firm level given the absence (in general) of the output 
price tP  and investment price 
I
tP  at such a disaggregated level. This problem is in general 
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addressed by assuming that the variations in the user costs can be represented by time 
dummies and the specific fixed (long-term) effects26 of a firm. 
In order to allow dynamic adjustments of R&D capital, we transform equation 2.1 in an 
autoregressive distributed lag model ADL(2,2). This is a standard specification in the 
literature that is convenient for short period samples as it captures temporal dynamics without 
abusively dropping data in the estimations because of the lag variables. We obtain the 
following equation: 
 
1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2it i t it it it it it itc c c y y y                   (2.2) 
 
Following Bond and Meghir (1994), Harhoff (1998) and Mulkay et al. (2001), this equation 
can be rewritten in an error correction framework: 
 
ititititititittiit yycyycc    2422312110 )(   (2.3) 
 
where 110   , 01   , 102   , 1213    and 1212104   .  
 
3  is the coefficient of the error correction term and is expected to be negative. 4 , if non-
significant, indicates that returns to scales are constant. By applying the usual 
approximation27 1Δ /it it itc R C   , with R being the R&D expenditures and δ the 
depreciation rate of R&D capital, equation 2.3 becomes: 
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Following the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988), if we assume that investments of credit-
constrained firms are more sensitive to the availability of internal finance, equation 2.4 can be 
augmented with cash flow effects (divided by one period lagged C for normalization) to test 
                                                            
26 See, however, Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen (2001) for an application that estimates the user cost of capital. 
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for the presence of financial constraints. Hence, financial constraints can be assessed by 
analyzing the sensitivity of R&D investments to variations in cash flow available to firms:  
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The idea behind the R&D-CF sensitivity is to measure the importance of retained earnings in 
the R&D investment decision. Hall and Lerner (2010) present this measure as an experiment 
that consists in giving additional cash to a company, and observing whether they use it for 
investment or not. If they pass it to shareholders, either there is no good investment 
opportunity, or the cost of capital has not fallen. If the additional amount of cash is used for 
investment, it would mean that the firms has unexploited investment opportunities for which 
external finance is too costly. 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question the monotonicity of the relationship between the 
investment to cash flow sensitivity and the level of financing constraints. However, Bond et 
al. (2003) argue that firms with no financing constraints should still display no excess 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow and that Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critiscism does not 
apply in this case. 
Moyen (2004) runs OLS regressions on simulated data and shows that a sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow can be generated even when there is no financing friction. Her model 
is based on firms that use debt as a substitute for internal finance. This result arises when 
current debt is correlated with contemporaneous cash flow. However, the author argues that 
the conventional interpretation of the investment to cash flow sensitivity of Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (i.e. a sensitivity that reveals financing constraints) still holds for constrained 
firms that do not have “sufficient funds to invest as much as desired. Constrained firms 
without funds to invest more have investment policies that are more sensitive to cash flow 
fluctuations than those of other firms.” 
Furthermore, as claimed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), the interpretation of the 
estimated coefficient associated with the cash flow ratio can be misleading since cash flow 
can be correlated with current profitability. In this case, cash flow will also be a proxy of 
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profit or demand expectations and this variable cannot be interpreted directly as evidence of 
financing constraints28. We follow the view point of Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), which 
states that changes in output, i.e. Δyit and Δyit-1 in equation 2.5, are better proxies for changes 
in demand than the cash flow variable and thus allow to control, even if imperfectly, for the 
expectations role played by this variable in terms of expected demand. Equation 2.5 can also 
be augmented with the Tobin’s q to control for investment opportunities. Another possibility 
is to consider the projections of future profits on past variables and use them as implicit 
proxies for the expectations of future profits (Abel and Blanchard, 1986) or implement a 
structural Euler equation model derived from the intertemporal maximization problem of the 
firms (Bond and Meghir, 1994). However, as pointed out by Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen 
(2001) among others, this last approach, while more appropriate from a theoretical point of 
view, has often failed to produce significant and correctly signed adjustment costs parameters.  
Equation 2.5 can be estimated using a within estimator by taking deviations from individual 
means or by taking all variables in first differences in order to remove the specific unobserved 
effect of the firm, αi, which is assumed to be constant over the period under investigation, and 
which may be correlated with other regressors. The ability of the R&D personnel to find new 
inventions is one example of such an unobserved effect specific to the firm29. These 
unobserved variables are likely to be ‘transmitted’ to the R&D decision since firms with 
higher technological opportunities or abilities of their scientists and engineers will generally 
invest more in research activities. This in turn will imply a (positive) correlation between 
these unobservable variables and the R&D which invalidates the inference that can be made 
from equation 2.5. 
While the within and first differences estimators take care of the biases arising from possible 
correlated effects, it should be noted that these estimators could still be biased for three other 
possibly important reasons. The first source of bias rests in possible random measurement 
errors in the right hand side variables of the equation. These errors typically tend to be 
magnified when applying the first difference or within transformations (Griliches and 
Hausman, 1986). The two other sources of bias refer to the simultaneity between the 
contemporaneous regressors and the disturbances and the endogeneity of the 
contemporaneous regressors and the past disturbances. A solution to these three potential 
                                                            
28 For Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000), however, the theoretical model of Kaplan and Zingales fails to 
capture the approach used in this literature and therefore does not provide a relevant critique. 
29 R&D opportunity or managerial skills may also be mentioned. 
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sources of biases consists of using an instrumental variable approach by choosing an 
appropriate set of lagged values of the regressors for the instruments. This approach can be 
implemented by means of a GMM framework such as the one developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) among others. If the original error term follows a white noise process, then 
values in levels of these variables lagged two or more periods will be admissible 
instruments30. The validity of the instruments is generally verified by the classical Sargan test 
and Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a system GMM 
estimator, which combines the instruments of the first difference equation with additional 
instruments of the untransformed equation in level. Given the higher number of instruments, 
the system GMM estimator can lead to dramatic improvements in terms of efficiency 
compared with the first difference GMM estimator31. The validity of these additional 
instruments, which consist of past first difference values of the regressors, can again be tested 
through Difference Sargan over-identification tests. 
2.3.2  Nonparametric specification 
 
In order to analyze the impact of age on the R&D-CF sensitivity, we propose a nonparametric 
approach that will allow capturing a potential nonlinear pattern between the variables. 
Furthermore, we aim at assessing the relationship between the sensitivity of R&D to cash 
flow and the age of the companies. This approach relies on the direct estimation of the 
dependant variable instead of estimates of parameters on the right-hand side of the equation, 
which allows relaxing restrictions on the modeling of R&D and focuses on the observation of 
data in given dimensional surfaces. Increasing the number of investigated dimensions is made 
difficult because of the sparcity of data in high-dimensional spaces. As in Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (1988), we consider the relationship between the accumulation rate of R&D 
Rt/Ct-1 and the normalized cash flow CFt/Ct-1, with C being the R&D capital stock. Modeling 
this relationship nonparametrically and implementing the age of the firms as an additional 
explanatory variable lead to  
                                                            
30 As noted by Bond et al. (2003), if the error term in levels is serially uncorrelated, then the error term in the 
first difference has a moving average structure of order 1 (MA(1)) and only instruments lagged two periods or 
more will be valid. If the error term in levels already has a moving average structure, then longer lags will have 
to be considered. 
31 More fundamentally, as shown by Blundell and Bond (1998), when the autoregressive parameter is high and 
the number of time periods is low, the first difference GMM estimator can be subject to serious finite sample 
bias as a result of the weak explanatory power of the instruments. 
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 , 1 , 1/ / ,it i t it it i t it itR C m CF C age     , (2.6) 
with i = 1, … , N and t = 1, … ,T. εit is an error term with mean zero.   
 1 2 , 1 , 1 1 2, / | / ,it it i t it i t itm x x E R C CF C x age x       is the conditionnal mean of , 1/it i tR C   
and is an unspecified nonlinear function of the cash flow and the age of the firms. For a more 
concise notation, let r be the accumulation rate of R&D, cf the cash flow variable and A the 
age of the firms. Equation 2.6 can be rewritten as 
 ,it it it it itr m cf A   . 
The conditional expectation of r is 
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The use of kernel estimates for the density functions and a product kernel form for the 
multivariate kernels (i.e. K(u1, … , um) = K(u1) … K(um) ) yield a standard kernel estimation 
of mit (Nadaraya, 1964; Watson, 1964), which is 
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K is a smoothing kernel associated to a bandwidth h. The estimation of m can be seen as a 
weighted local average of the observed accumulation rates of R&D. A larger bandwidth gives 
more weight to observations further away from (x1,x2) and results in a stronger smoothing of 
the estimation. A standard rule of thumb for the bandwidth selection can be derived from 
Silverman (1986): 5/1)(ˆ  NTh  . The estimated conditional variance of the expected 
accumulation rate of R&D is 
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Two types of kernel are used in our analysis: a Gaussian kernel and a Gamma kernel. While 
the Gaussian kernel is standard in kernel estimation, the gamma kernel specification is 
preferred for variables with a non-negative nature (Chen, 2000) as it overcomes a boundary 
bias issue for values near zero. 
The Gaussian kernel is defined as 
   
2( ) /
21, ,
2
X x h
K X x h e
 , 
and the Gamma kernel is 
  / // 1, , ( / 1)
x h X h
x h
X eK X x h
h x h

   . 
where /
0
( / 1) u x hx h e u du
     . 
Based on a direct estimation of derivatives, the following derivative of the expected R&D is 
used to measure the responsiveness of R&D to cash flow: 
   
1
21
21
,ˆ
,ˆ
dx
xxmdxxmD it  
Average derivatives are computed by age along with their corresponding bootstrapped 
confidence intervals32. The average derivatives by age are the weighted sums of the 
derivatives for each x1, with the weights being the estimated density in (x1,x2)33:  
      Tt Ni itit hxAKhxcfKhNThxx 1 1 22112121 ,,,,
1),(ˆ  
The estimated average derivative for an age x2 is then  
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where 
1
),(ˆ)(ˆ 212
x
xxx  normalizes the estimated density for a given age. 
                                                            
32 The boostrap procedure is based on a large number of random resamplings with replacement for each age 
(1000 resamplings in our analysis). 
33 Normalized to 1 by age. 
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2.4  Data 
 
The results presented in this chapter are based on a dataset that covers the period 2000-2007 
and includes information on US and EU firms. R&D equations will be estimated 
parametrically as well as nonparametrically using this dataset. The data of Cincera and 
Veugelers (2011) concerning the age of the firms are used in order to investigate the impact of 
age on the R&D-CF sensitivity. 
In order to estimate the R&D equation, we use data about net sales and R&D from the R&D 
scoreboards while information about cash flow is given by the financial reports of the 
companies. The data come from the five R&D scoreboards issued every year between 2004 
and 2008 by the JRC-IPTS, except for the cash flow variable which comes from the 
Computast database34. Each annual scoreboard provides information on the R&D 
expenditures, net sales, total employees, capital expenditures, operating profit and market 
capitalization of the top firms that were active in R&D during the previous year (e.g. the 2008 
scoreboard provides information on the year 2007 and not 2008). Growth rates of these 
variables are also available for the years before and allow adding more observations over time 
for each firm. R&D data from the Scoreboards represent all R&D financed by the companies, 
regardless of the geographical location of R&D activities. Data are collected from audited 
financial accounts and reports35. 
When stacking the scoreboards together, we obtain a total of 33600 observations (unbalanced 
panel). However many observations are redundant as the information for a same firm and year 
can be provided by more than one scoreboard. For example, the 2007 scoreboard provides 
information about R&D of firm X for year 2006. But if firm X is present in the 2008 
scoreboard, the growth rate of its R&D expenditures between 2006 and 2007 is available in 
the latter scoreboard, which also allows us to retrieve the amount of R&D of firm X in 2006. 
As a consequence, both scoreboards give information on the R&D expenditures of firm X in 
2006. In order to avoid multiple counting of the same observation, we choose to keep only the 
most recent scoreboard as a source for each redundant information. This process results in an 
unbalanced panel of 16553 observations, for 2696 firms’ names. 706 names concern US firms 
and 1438 are related to firms in the EU. 
                                                            
34 Release of 2009. 
35 See Moncada Paternò Castello et al. (2009) for more details. 
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Based on this sample, a matching procedure is conducted with the annual financial reports of 
firms in order to add more information about the cash flow of the companies. The cash flow 
variable that is used in this study is equal to the income before extraordinary items, which 
represents the income of a company after all expenses except provisions for common and or 
preferred dividends, plus depreciation and amortization, which are the non-cash charges for 
obsolescence and wear and tear on property36. The methodology for the matching between 
both databases combines automatic procedures and manual procedures. Automatic procedures 
consist in two steps. First we try to find the financial states of firms whose names are exactly 
the same as the ones in the R&D scoreboards. Second, we match firms’ names after having 
cleaned these names by deleting the following terms: AG, SA, CO, PLC, INC, LTD, SPA, 
BHD and CORP. These terms are the suffixes that appear the most often in the database. This 
automatic procedure does not take into account other less common prefixes or suffixes or 
punctuation differences. A manual procedure compares the remaining unmatched names. 
Out of the 2696 names of the R&D scoreboards, 1962 (73%) were matched, with matching 
procedures consisting in about 36% of automatic procedures, 33% of manual procedures and 
31% of combination of both procedures. Ex post validation of the matching is carried up by 
checking the location and industry of the firms as well as comparing the currency of the 
monetary data and the values of financial data in both sources. 
For the sake of comparison of R&D investment liquidity constraints between Europe and the 
USA, two samples of similar companies have been constructed for the EU and the US. 
Following Moncada Paternò Castello et al. (2009), size as measured by the amount of R&D 
investment in the firm is used as the criteria for matching similar firms. It turns out that the 
sample of the 1962 firms among which 942 are from the EU and 525 from the USA 
comprises firms with different volumes of R&D investment. For the 2008 edition of the 
Scoreboard, the lowest R&D investment for the EU subsample is 4.35 million Euro and that 
for the non-EU subsample 24.21 million. In order to construct sub-samples of comparable EU 
and non-EU companies in terms of the size of their R&D investments, it is preferable to 
consider only companies with R&D above the US threshold. 
Furthermore, in order to trim the dataset from outliers the following procedure has been 
implemented. All observations for which the R&D intensity (defined as the R&D investments 
divided by the firm's net sales) was below 0.1% or above 100% were deleted. This removed 
                                                            
36 Compustat (2009). 
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29 firms for the first threshold (mainly firms from the retail and travel and leisure industry 
sectors) and 93 firms for the second criteria (firms mainly in the pharmaceuticals sector37). 
1% extreme values for the ratio cash flow to R&D capital stock where also removed as these 
observations might refer to errors from the matching procedure. 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models with 
comparisons between the EU27 and the US samples. The Global sample refers to the sample 
including both EU and US firms. The average number of employees is large due to the nature 
of the R&D scoreboards. The median number of employees is about 6000 employees. We 
assume that this is a limitation in our analysis of financing constraints as large firms are 
expected to be less constrained compared to SMEs. However this bias concerns both US and 
European samples. The comparison of Table A.1 in Appendix 1 and Table 2 shows the effect 
of having comparable samples in terms of size. The companies in the matched samples look 
much more similar in terms of the distribution of quartiles and standard errors of the main 
variables used in the regressions38. 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Std.dev. Quantile 25% Quantile 50% Quantile 75% 
Employees Global 22916 48707 1860 6108 22000 
 EU27 25957 55300 2143 6892 24264 
 US 19899 40924 1634 5600 18803 
1/ tt CR  Global 0.237 0.101 0.175 0.213 0.270 
 EU27 0.229 0.103 0.169 0.206 0.257 
 US 0.245 0.099 0.182 0.221 0.283 
1/ tt CCF  Global 0.835 1.277 0.236 0.454 0.932 
 EU27 0.994 1.552 0.262 0.494 1.038 
 US 0.693 0.945 0.210 0.430 0.823 
ty  Global 0.074 0.221 -0.019 0.052 0.138 
 EU27 0.056 0.214 -0.029 0.035 0.110 
 US 0.092 0.225 -0.006 0.069 0.161 
tc  Global 5.879 1.391 4.845 5.572 6.630 
 EU27 5.697 1.456 4.602 5.329 6.434 
 US 6.059 1.300 5.123 5.727 6.777 
Period: 2000-2007. Source: own computation. 
                                                            
37 These firms are research specialized laboratories whose unique activity is R&D. Their sales are therefore very 
limited which explains their very high R&D intensity, i.e. above 100%. 
38 Table A.2 in Appendix 1 presents a measure that consists in the difference between US and EU statistics based 
on the initial sample divided by the difference between the same statistics when using the corrected sample. 
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Information about the age of the companies was collected by Cincera and Veugelers (2011). 
The authors manually collected the first year of the firms’ creation. In case of mergers, the 
age of the merged entity is the one of the oldest of the merged companies.  The final data 
were crosschecked with other databases like Amadeus for the EU companies. As this work is 
also based on the R&D scoreboards, the matching procedure with our dataset is 
straightforward. Table 3 reports some statistics about the age of the firms.  
Table 3. Age of the companies 
 Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
All 74 63 60 1 661 
EU 99 93 74 1 661 
US 55 33 47 3 340 
Source: own computation. 
While the average and median EU firm is almost 100 years old, it appears that US firms are 
much younger, with a median and average age of 33 and 55 years respectively. The oldest EU 
company is the Finnish manufacturer Stora Enso, which was founded in 134739. The oldest 
US firm is Merck and was founded in 1668. 
Average ages by technological sector (i.e. high-, medium- and low-tech sectors) are reported 
in Table 4. For both US and EU datasets, the high-tech40 companies are younger in average 
while the oldest firms seem to be more represented in the lowest technological sectors. This 
illustrates the conclusions drawn by Cincera and Veugelers (2011) with young leading 
innovators (yollies) more present in sectors with high R&D intensity than the old leading 
innovators (ollies). Furthermore, when comparing the US and EU samples, the share of 
yollies in high-tech sectors is higher for the US dataset, which stresses, according to Cincera 
and Veugelers (2011), that “US R&D performance can to a large extent be attributed to 
young leading innovators playing a more pivotal role in the US R&D landscape”. 
Table 4. Average age by technology 
 US (sample) EU (sample) 
High 45 (66%) 73 (46%) 
Medium 82 (28%) 117 (40%) 
Low 74 (7%) 151 (14%) 
Source: own computation. Percentage of firms in brackets (by 
country). 
                                                            
39 Stora Enso is the result of the merger between Enso and Stora. The latter was actually founded in 1347. 
40 High-, medium- and low-tech sectors for ICB industries are defined as in Ortega-Argiles, Potters and Vivarelli 
(2009) and Cincera and Ravet (2011). 
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Each monetary observation was converted into constant euros and prices41. It should be noted 
that monetary values in the R&D scoreboards are already expressed in euros and that a single 
scoreboard uses a fixed exchange rate for each currency to convert data for every periods that 
it covers. This is convenient when analyzing data from one single scoreboard as they are 
unaffected by exchange rate variations in time. However, different scoreboards use different 
exchange rates. As we combine scoreboards from different years, as well as several years 
within each scoreboard, we had to convert the data into constant euros with the following 
procedure. First, we converted the data into original currencies by using the exchange rates 
specific to each Scoreboard. Second, data in original currencies were converted into euros 
using a fixed exchange rate42. Transforming data into constant prices was performed by using 
national GDP price deflators43 with 2007 as the reference year. 
The R&D stock was constructed for both datasets by using the perpetual inventory method 
developed by Griliches (1979). For each firm, the R&D stock at time t is defined by 
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where δ is the depreciation rate of R&D capital and R is the deflated amount of R&D 
expenditures. This expression assumes that the current state of knowledge relies on current 
and past R&D expenditures. Fixing the magnitude of the depreciation rate is not 
straightforward as it is likely to vary in time and across firms (for instance according to the 
technology level). An estimation of the depreciation rate of R&D has been performed by 
Bosworth (1978). The estimated range is 0.1 to 0.15. Hence, most literature assumes a 
depreciation rate of 15%. By testing different values for δ, Hall and Mairesse (1995) find 
small or no changes in the estimation of the R&D capital effect44. Hence we also rely on a 
classical depreciation rate set to 0.15. Initial value of C can be computed by using the 
following expression45 : 
                                                            
41 Exchange rates and deflators were found in Eurostat. 
42 We used the 2007 exchange rates found in Eurostat. 
43 Eurostat GDP deflators. 
44 See also Griliches and Mairesse (1983, 1984). 
45 This expression can be derived from the definition of the R&D stock in equation 2.7, 


0
)1(
s
st
s
t RC  . 
The latter equation leads to 
 

0
00 )1(
)1(
s
s
R
g
C   and thus 2.8. 
44 
 
 
 g
R
C 00  (2.8) 
 
where g is the growth rate of R and is assumed to be constant. The growth rate that is used in 
this study is the sample average46 growth rate of R&D expenditures in the industry47. 
According to Hall and Mairesse (1995), the choice of g affects directly the initial stock but its 
importance declines over time. 
2.5  Results 
2.5.1  EU and US in the 2000s 
 
Table 5 presents the system GMM results as regards the R&D investment error correction 
model when all firms in the dataset are considered. These estimates are obtained from a two-
step procedure and different sets of instruments. Column 2 for instance uses as instruments 
the level of the series lagged two periods and more, combined with the first lag of their first 
difference. The validity of different sets of instruments can be tested through the difference 
between Sargan or Hansen over-identification tests. The null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are valid, i.e. they are uncorrelated with the error terms. Under the null 
hypothesis, the test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with a number of degrees of 
freedom being equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis casts a doubt on the validity of the set of instruments. This appears to always be 
the case for the Sargan test and only for the model in the second column for the Hansen test48. 
The second order correlation test statistics do not suggest any problems with the time 
structure of the sets of instruments. With the exception of column 4, the error correction term 
has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
                                                            
46 The average growth rate for an industry is computed as the average of the distribution of individual growth 
rates inside the range [Q1 – 1.5(Q3-Q1) , Q3 + 1.5(Q3-Q1)] where Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles of 
the distribution.  
47 ICB classification. 
48 As pointed out by Roodman (2006), Sargan's statistic is a special case of Hansen's J test under the assumption 
of homoscedasticity. Therefore, for robust GMM estimation, the Sargan test statistic is inconsistent. 
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Table 5. System GMM two step estimates - all firms 
Instruments set lag(2,.) lag(3,.) lag(4,.) 
21 /  tt CR  -0.059 (0.108) 0.175 (0.071)** 0.400 (0.153)*** 
ty  0.009 (0.112) 0.228 (0.115)** 0.111 (0.119) 
1 ty  0.019 (0.031) 0.037 (0.062) 0.018 (0.084) 
22   tt yc  -0.093 (0.034)*** -0.053 (0.02)*** 0.002 (0.032) 
1/ tt CCF  0.074 (0.033)** 0.061 (0.028)** 0.030 (0.020) 
21 /  tt CCF  0.013 (0.011) -0.009 (0.010) 0.011 (0.019) 
2ty  -0.078 (0.014)*** -0.048 (0.012)*** -0.025 (0.020) 
Obs  3 590  
N  888  
AR(1) -0.46 [0.647] -1.58 [0.115] -1.90 [0.058] 
AR(2) -1.31 [0.190] -1.19 [0.235] -1.18 [0.238] 
Sargan test 2904.02 [0.000] 607.12 [0.000] 370.69 [0.000] 
Hansen test 145.95 [0.000] 77.83 [0.072] 49.68 [0.117] 
Dependent variable: Rt/Ct-1. *** (respectively ** and *): statistically significant at the 1 % (respectively 5 % and 
10 %) level. Estimation performed using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2006); all equations include time dummies; 
Windmeijer corrected standard errors in brackets; P-values in square brackets; AR(1) and AR(2): tests for first 
order and second order serial correlation in the first difference residuals; Two-step estimates; instruments used in 
column s (s=2,3,4): observations dated t-s or earlier for Xt (transformed equation) and t-s+1 for ΔXt (equation in 
level). 
  
The coefficient of output lagged by two periods is negative and significant albeit only 
slightly. This suggests the presence of slightly decreasing returns to scale. Cash flow variables 
have a positive and significant effect on investment (the long-term coefficient is about .489) 
which indicates the presence of liquidity constraints. Finally, the positive and significant 
coefficients associated with the changes in output suggest positive expectations of future 
profitability to the extent that these variables are a proxy of the investment opportunities of a 
firm. 
In Table 6 we compare the presence and extent of R&D financing constraints of EU and US 
firms. Note that the different test statistics vindicate the use of the specification of column 3 
for EU firms and column 4 for US firms. The coefficients associated with the cash flow 
variables are positive and significant for the EU while for the US no evidence of liquidity 
constraints is found. In particular, a one unit increase of the contemporaneous cash flow 
variable yields an increase of the EU accumulation rate of R&D that stands between 0.04 and 
0.07 while US R&D is not significantly affected.  
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In order to assess to robustness of the US-EU comparison, alternative regression analyses 
were performed. The tables reporting the results discussed in this section are available in 
Cincera and Ravet (2010). When a fixed effects model (within transformation) is estimated, 
only EU firms are subject to liquidity constraints; as for the US ones, the coefficients 
associated with the cash flow variables are not significantly different from zero. The Hausman 
test is statistically significant at the 1 % level which rejects the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the unobserved specific effects of the firms and the regressors, hence 
invalidating the random specification. 
The results are obtained from two-step GMM estimators. One-step GMM estimators are 
calculated by weighting the moment conditions with an arbitrary chosen matrix which does 
not depend on estimated parameters while two-step estimators use a weight matrix based on 
the consistent one-step estimation. Arellano and Bond (1991, 1998), Windmeijer (2005) and 
Roodman (2006) have shown that the one-step GMM estimator may be more reliable than the 
two-step one for statistical inference as the latter provide downward biased asymptotic 
standard errors. However, Windmeijer (2005) developed a small-sample correction for the 
standard errors of two-step estimators that allows for more accurate inference. We used this 
correction for the reported two-step estimators. When a consistent one-step estimator is 
implemented for the EU sample, both the Sargan and Hansen tests reject the validity of the 
different sets of instruments used. Yet a positive coefficient is still observed for the EU cash 
flow variables. This is not the case for the US firms which once again do not appear to be 
financially constrained. 
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Estimating a simpler accelerator R&D investment specification leads one to the conclusion 
that only EU firms are sensitive to cash flow variations. We considered alternative 
specifications where only the current value of the cash flow variable, the one-year lagged 
value or the current, one-year and two-year lagged values of this variable are considered 
altogether. These specifications allow one to control for the presence of multicollinearity 
which could alter the estimated coefficients of cash flow variables when different periods of 
this variable are introduced simultaneously in the specification. While the results as regards 
these specifications are not conclusive for the US sample, on the whole, the findings clearly 
indicate that financing constraints are present for EU R&D companies. 
As an additional test, we investigated the role played by the size of the companies. Indeed, 
several studies have shown the central role played by the size of a firm in explaining the 
sensitivity of capital and R&D investment to cash flow variations49. Small firms are more 
dependent upon internal resources since the loan rates charged by commercial banks tend to 
be higher50. Conversely, larger firms can more easily finance capital expenditures from 
internal resources, issuance of equity or debt. In this study, we measure the size of a firm in 
two ways. First, a proxy for size is directly introduced in the specification, i.e. the number of 
employees at time t and at time t-1. Second, the regression is performed on a subset of the 
largest companies, i.e. the ones with more than 1000 employees. Note that this results in a cut 
of the sample by about one half. For the EU companies, the results appear to be in line with 
these theoretical predictions as the magnitude of the estimated coefficient associated with the 
cash flow variables are somewhat smaller as compared with the results when the full sample 
is considered. For the US firms, again, no effect of liquidity constraints is detected except to 
some extent for the specification based on the sub-sample with the largest companies. Yet, in 
this case, the estimated effects appear to be much smaller than the ones obtained for the EU 
subset. 
As an alternative to the cash flow variable, the operating profit of the firm is also considered 
to proxy the internal available financial resources of a firm. This variable is defined as profit 
(or loss) before taxation, plus net interest cost (or minus interest cost) and government grants, 
less gains (or plus losses) arising from the sale/disposal of businesses or fixed assets. Here too 
the main conclusions are not altered when the operating profit is used as an alternative proxy 
for cash flow. 
                                                            
49 See Schiantarelli (1996) for a survey of the empirical literature on this subject. 
50 See, for example, Stoll (1984) for the US credit market. 
49 
 
The last robustness check consists of estimating the R&D investment error correction model 
for the EU-27 sample but without the UK companies. The rationale for this test is that the UK 
financial system may be different than the European continental one and more similar to the 
US one. The results do not change our main conclusion: continental European R&D firms are 
more likely to be hit by financing constraints for their R&D investments than US ones. 
However, the cash flow coefficient is lower (0.02) when UK is removed from the sample, 
which indicates that UK firms contribute to raise the R&D-CF sensitivity of the EU sample. 
2.5.2  Age and financing constraints 
 
This section aims at providing a deeper analysis of the R&D to cash flow sensitivity by using 
a complementary approach (i.e. a nonparametric approach) to the previous results and by 
implementing an external variable related to the age of the companies. As mentioned in 
section 2.3, this information was collected by Cincera and Veugelers (2011). Table 7 provides 
estimates51 of the R&D equation related to US and EU firms in the 2000’s. The cash flow 
coefficients were estimated by splitting the EU and US samples with respect to the age of the 
companies and by estimating the error correction model with a System GMM method. 
Table 7. Results of an error-correction type investment model (System GMM)  
 EU-27 US 
 CFt/Ct-1 CFt-1/Ct-2 CFt/Ct-1 CFt-1/Ct-2 
Age < 30 (145 obs)  (613 obs)  
lag(2,.) 0.005* 0.003 0.004 0.004*** 
lag(3,.) -0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.044*** 
lag(4,.) 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.087*** 
Age > 30 (1530 obs)  (1302 obs)  
lag(2,.) 0.095*** 0.026*** 0.001 0.002*** 
lag(3,.) 0.042*** 0.019*** 0.007* 0.001 
lag(4,.) 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.002 0.004 
Age > 100 (1178 obs)  (666 obs)  
lag(2,.) 0.100*** 0.028*** 0.017*** -0.000 
lag(3,.) 0.050*** 0.032*** 0.012*** -0.002** 
lag(4,.) 0.041*** 0.021** 0.028*** -0.002 
Dependent variable: Rt/Ct-1. Estimations of equation 2.5. *** (respectively ** and *): statistically significant at 
the 1 % (respectively 5 % and 10 %) level. Estimation performed using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2006); all 
equations include time dummies; Windmeijer corrected standard errors in brackets; P-values in square brackets; 
Two-step estimates; instruments used in column s (s=2,3,4): observations dated t-s or earlier for Xt (transformed 
equation) and t-s+1 for ΔXt (equation in level). 
 
                                                            
51 Details of the regressions are presented in Appendix 2. 
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For both EU and US datasets, the oldest companies (i.e. older than 100 years old in this case) 
exhibit a large sensitivity of R&D to cash flow (but only to current cash flow in the US). The 
results suggest that EU firms between 30 and 100 years old rely on their cash flow to finance 
their R&D investments, while the sensitivity is lower for US companies and even non 
significant, except for the lagged cash flow with the lag(2,.) specification of the instruments 
and the current cash flow with the lag(3,.) specification. R&D amongst US firms younger than 
30 years old seem to significantly rely on past cash flow but not current cash flow with a 
coefficient of the lagged cash flow significant for the three sets of instruments. 
A non parametric estimation of the conditional mean of the accumulation rate of R&D was 
performed for the US and the EU datasets. The bandwithes for the cash flow and the age 
variables were computed using the standard rule of thumb 5/1)(ˆ  NTh  . Other bandwithes 
were tested, resulting in a stronger (if h is larger) or weaker (if h is smaller) smoothing. For all 
estimations of the conditional mean, the range considered for the cash flow variable and the 
age variable is a range going from the the first to the last 2 percentiles of the observations. 
The investigated range of the age variable is the same for the US and EU datasets for the 
purpose of the comparison between both sets. A classical gaussian kernel is used for the cash 
flow variable while a gamma kernel is used for the age variable. Gamma and gaussian kernel 
were tested for both variables leading to similar results. 
Three-dimensional representations of the estimations are illustrated in Figure 2. The 
estimations of the accumulation rates of R&D are represented on the vertical axis, given 1600 
different combinations of ages and cash flow ratios. A direct interpretation of these shapes 
may be difficult, but the three-dimensional perspective allows one to visualize the smoothing 
that was performed on the data with bandwidthes h1 and h2 respectively for the cash flow and 
the age variables. 
Figure 3 presents the relationship between the R&D and the cash flow variables for differents 
ages. For both US and EU firms, it appears that younger companies are characterized by a 
higher accumulation rate of R&D. As expected, the relationship between the R&D and the 
cash flow variables seems to be globally positive. The sensitivity of R&D to cash flow seems 
to be stronger for low levels of cash flow. The relationship between R&D and cash flow 
appears to be monotonic for all US companies. The EU shapes suggest a non monotonic 
relationship for younger European companies. However, the likelihood of a high cash flow 
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ratio may be small for young European companies and further results will take into account 
this likelihood in the computation of the average derivatives.  
Figure 2. Estimations of the R&D accumulation rate 
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Figure 3. The relationship between R&D and CF 
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The average derivatives reported in Figure 4 are the weighted averages of the derivatives of 
the estimated functions, with weights being the estimated densities. Figure 4 represents the 
relationship between the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow (i.e. the average derivatives of R&D 
with respect to cash flow) and the age of the companies. The sensitivity of R&D to cash flow 
of US companies is strongly decreasing with age, especially for firms younger than 60 years 
old. The sensitivity of European companies is also decreasing with age for younger firms, but 
it is slightly increasing for older firms. Interestingly, Figure 4 shows a sensitivity of R&D to 
cash flow that is higher for young US firms than young EU firms, while it is higher for old 
EU firms than old US firms.  
 
Figure 4. Average sensitivity of R&D to CF 
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Confidence intervals were computed for each average derivative using bootstrapping 
methods52. Table 8 reports for selected ages the measures of the sensitivities along with their 
95% confidence intervals. The sensitivity of young US firms is above 0.07 while it decreases 
to less than 0.007 when the firm is 169 years old. Young EU firms are also characterized by a 
                                                            
52 The confidence intervals are based on 1000 bootstrapped samples with replacement of the derivatives (with the 
associated density). 
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decreasing sensitivity that goes from 0.03 to 0.017 and that even slightly increases after 
reaching 0.016. After 90 years old, the sensitivity of the EU firms becomes larger than the 
sensitivity of the US firms. 
 
Table 8. US and EU sensitivity and confidence intervals. 
Age 
US 
sensitivity 
CI (95%) 
EU 
sensitivity 
CI (95%) 
6 0.0717 0.0512 0.0882 0.027 0.0172 0.0362 
10 0.0729 0.0525 0.0887 0.0274 0.0199 0.0341 
14 0.0722 0.0515 0.0878 0.0268 0.0208 0.0318 
…   
52 0.0298 0.0217 0.0359 0.0171 0.0128 0.0198 
56 0.0266 0.0195 0.032 0.0167 0.0124 0.0195 
60 0.0241 0.0172 0.0293 0.0165 0.0121 0.0193 
…   
85 0.0177 0.0082 0.0241 0.0165 0.0121 0.0194 
90 0.017 0.0075 0.0233 0.0166 0.0123 0.0194 
94 0.0164 0.0069 0.0226 0.0167 0.0124 0.0195 
98 0.0158 0.0065 0.0218 0.0167 0.0126 0.0195 
…   
161 0.0083 0.0048 0.0116 0.0168 0.0135 0.019 
165 0.0076 0.0043 0.0108 0.0168 0.0135 0.0189 
169 0.0068 0.0035 0.01 0.0167 0.0134 0.0187 
Lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals CI were bootstrapped 
based on 1000 resamplings with replacement. 
 
As the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow may capture future demand growth, we may be 
interested in disentangling this effect from the financing constraints effect. This can be done, 
even not perfectly, by comparing firms with high and low growth anticipations. Assuming 
correct anticipations of future sales growth, Et[ΔYt+1/Yt] = ΔYt+1/Yt, Figure 5 compares firms 
with positive and negative growth in t+1. It appears that the sensitivity is globally lower for 
firms with negative expected growth. The shape of the relationship between the sensitivity 
and the age remains the same for the young US firms but the negative relationship for older 
firms remains only when the growth expectation is positive. The relationship is still negative 
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then slightly positive for EU companies with positive growth expectation. However, the 
impact of the age on the sensitivity seems to be positive for young EU firms with negative 
expectations. Young US companies are still characterized by a higher sensitivity while the 
inverse is not clearly true for older firms with negative growth expectations. 
 
Figure 5. Positive and negative growth expectations 
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Negative growth expectation 
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Figure 6 and Table 9 present the relationship between the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow and 
the age of the firms in the high-tech sectors. The sensitivity is higher for EU firms than US 
firms after 59 years old. The relationship is monotonically decreasing for the US dataset, 
while it is non monotonic for the EU companies. Again, the age appears to have a slightly 
positive impact on the EU sensitivity for high-tech firms older than 51 years old. 
The sensitivity of medium and low-tech companies is presented in Figure 7 and Table 10. The 
EU sensitivity remains higher than the sensitivity of US firms for all ages. The curve of the 
US sensitivity differs from the previous figures as it is increasing for middle aged companies 
between 27 and 93 years old. 
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Figure 6.  High-tech firms 
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Table 9. R&D sensitivity – High-tech firms 
Age US high-tech sensitivity CI (95%) 
EU high-tech 
sensitivity CI (95%) 
5 0.0952 0.0688 0.1136 0.0538 0.0128 0.0909 
…         
20 0.0977 0.0803 0.1094 0.0654 0.0487 0.0822 
….         
55 0.0616 0.0491 0.0728 0.0581 0.0479 0.0728 
59 0.0574 0.0425 0.0702 0.0583 0.0477 0.0735 
…         
101 0.0444 0.0369 0.0507 0.062 0.0516 0.0767 
105 0.0443 0.0384 0.0496 0.0623 0.0521 0.0768 
…         
128 0.0422 0.0407 0.0438 0.0643 0.0548 0.0774 
132 0.0415 0.0397 0.0435 0.0647 0.0553 0.0777 
…         
151 0.0361 0.0319 0.0407 0.0666 0.0574 0.0786 
155 0.0347 0.0301 0.0399 0.0668 0.0578 0.0786 
Lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals CI were bootstrapped based on 1000 resamplings with 
replacement. 
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Figure 7.  Medium/low-tech 
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Table 10. R&D sensitivity – Medium/low-tech firms 
Age US med-low T CI (95%) EU med-low T CI (95%) 
13 -0.0002 -0.0024 0.0022 0.0099 0.004 0.0136 
… 
37 -0.0043 -0.0058 -0.0019 0.0096 0.0061 0.0117 
41 -0.0024 -0.0039 0 0.0094 0.0063 0.0114 
46 -0.0004 -0.0019 0.0018 0.0092 0.0063 0.0112 
51 0.0015 0 0.0035 0.0091 0.0064 0.011 
… 
70 0.0066 0.0035 0.0092 0.0092 0.0067 0.0109 
74 0.0072 0.0035 0.0103 0.0093 0.0069 0.011 
… 
103 0.0081 0.0007 0.013 0.0103 0.0082 0.0119 
107 0.008 0.0004 0.013 0.0104 0.0084 0.012 
… 
150 0.007 0.0018 0.011 0.0119 0.0103 0.0134 
155 0.0068 0.002 0.0107 0.012 0.0105 0.0135 
… 
192 0.0038 0.001 0.0072 0.0127 0.0116 0.0144 
197 0.0033 0.0006 0.0067 0.0128 0.0117 0.0145 
Lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals CI were bootstrapped based on 1000 resamplings with 
replacement. 
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2.5.3  Discussion 
 
The main finding related to the US-EU comparison in the 2000’s is that large European firms 
are subject to liquidity constraints in the financing of their R&D investments, whereas US 
ones do not appear to be financially constrained. This result is robust to different 
specifications of the R&D investment model, sub-samples of data, outliers, and econometric 
methods that address the heterogeneity and possible endogeneity of the variables of interest of 
the firms, i.e. cash flow and R&D. These different robustness checks are presented and 
discussed in Cincera and Ravet (2010). 
The results concerning the age of the companies give another perspective to the US-EU 
comparison. The shape of the relationship between the R&D sensitivity and the age of the US 
companies is clearly decreasing, which implies that older US companies rely less on their 
internal finance for their R&D investments. This may illustrate the fact that older US 
companies do have an easier access to external financing for their R&D investments. The 
decrease in the R&D sensitivity is the strongest for firms under 60 years old. The R&D 
sensitivity of EU companies is also negatively correlated with ages under 55 years old and it 
remains stable or slightly increasing for older companies. The R&D sensitivity to cash flow 
appears to be higher for early aged US firms while the old EU companies rely more on their 
cash flow in order to finance their R&D investments. The pattern remains similar for the high-
tech companies. Concerning the medium- and low-tech firms, the sensitivity is higher in the 
EU dataset for all ages. Hence, the yollies (young leading innovators) of Cincera and 
Veugelers (2011) seem to face financing constraints, but the R&D sensitivity is higher in the 
US than in Europe. The global higher sensitivity of R&D in Europe in the 2000’s seems to be 
primarily attributed to the larger presence of ollies (old leading innovators) in EU as these 
firms appear to rely more on their cash flow than the US ollies to finance their R&D. 
According to Cincera and Veugelers (2011), the few yollies in Europe are less R&D intensive 
than their US counterparts. Hence our results may illustrate the fact that EU yollies do less 
R&D and are conducting less risky activities, which would explain why they are likely to face 
less severe financing constraints. A way to control for this risk would be to compare firms 
with similar R&D intensities. This can be done in our analysis at the sectoral level: when 
comparing US and EU lower-tech sectors (i.e. sectors with medium or low R&D intensities), 
the financing constraints are indeed more severe amongst EU firms. Furthermore, it is not 
clear whether the low representation of young firms within the European innovation leaders 
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(i.e. the top R&D spenders) is due to a low access to external financial resources. We could 
also consider that, given the low representation of young firms within the EU R&D leaders, 
the few EU young firms that are reported in the Scoreboard are the best young innovative 
firms in Europe, hence these yollies are less likely to be constrained than other EU young 
firms which are not included in the scoreboards.  
Different factors may explain the difference between our findings for the 2000’s period and 
the ones in the literature. We briefly discuss them here. In sum, in our view, the main 
explanation for the divergence between these results and previous studies is the period and 
dataset investigated. Our study is actually the only one which uses data after 2000, a period 
during which the world's financial systems have undergone fundamental changes that may 
have affected the EU and the US differently. 
Since the beginning of this decade, within the framework of the Lisbon process of 
transforming the EU into a knowledge-based and more dynamic and competitive economy, 
several product market reforms have been put in place in the EU to catch up with the US, 
especially in the capital market (Cincera and Galgau, 2005). As a result, financial institutions 
face stronger competition and the conditions for borrowing money for investments, in 
particular for intangibles such as R&D, are more difficult. 
The firms in our dataset are mainly large firms with access to equity market. Brown and 
Petersen (2009) use comparable Compustat data to analyze the sensitivity of investment 
(physical and R&D) to cash flow within US firms and observe that the firms in their sample 
mainly rely on equity issues rather than debt as external sources of finance. They argue that 
R&D-intensive companies are known to make little use of debt and are highly dependent on 
the availability of public equity finance. They also stress how the improvement of the US 
equity markets over the last decades tends to decrease the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow. In our view, this sheds a light on the interpretation of our results which are to be related 
to structural differences in the US and EU equity markets, the latter being highly fragmented.  
Furthermore, the first decade of the 21st century has been a period with a lack of regulation in 
lending, one of the fundamental causes of the recent burst of the financial bubble in the US 
and the ensuing financial and economic turmoil in the world. This lack of regulation and the 
risks taken by banks may have alleviated the constraints to get loans for investment projects 
and therefore firms investing in R&D may well have been less concerned by financing 
constraints to fund their R&D investments, especially in the US. 
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R&D activities are riskier by nature and generally provide less collateral to lenders as 
compared to investments in capital goods. As a result, financing constraints may be even 
more pronounced in the case of such intangible investments. However, given the existence of 
high adjustment and sunk costs associated with this kind of investment, firms will engage in 
R&D activities if they do not expect to be seriously affected by financial constraints. As such, 
cash flow effects tend to matter less for large investors than for smaller companies. Moreover, 
the provision of public support to R&D may interfere with the investment decision of a firm 
by alleviating liquidity constraints problems, if present at all. 
The outcome has been factors hampering R&D and innovation activities, exemplified by a 
scarcity of venture capital. And there are indications, corroborated by the empirical findings 
of our study that one of these factors - the difficulty to get access to external sources of 
financing - has affected the EU more than the US in the 2000s. 
2.6  Conclusion and implications 
 
Based on a sample of private companies, this chapter investigates the impact of financing 
constraints on R&D investments in the 2000s. The results, based on an error correction 
equation, have been obtained by using a system GMM estimator, which compared to the usual 
first difference GMM estimator produces in general more precise estimates and reduces the 
possible bias arising from the weak explanatory power of the instruments and high values of 
the autoregressive parameter. A non parametric approach was used to investigate the 
relationship between the accumulation rate of R&D, the cash flow and the age of the 
companies. 
The main question in this chapter was whether financing constraints explain a part of the 
acknowledged R&D gap between Europe and the US. In our view, the answer is yes, though it 
is difficult to extrapolate at a macroeconomic level the extent to which financing frictions 
widen this gap. Our results suggest that only EU R&D companies are facing liquidity 
constraints, not their large US R&D competitors. This finding is robust to alternative 
modeling strategies, econometric methods implemented and data sub-samples. A second 
question was whether older firms actually face less severe or no financing constraints, as 
opposed to younger firms. We provide evidence that confirm that the R&D sensitivity 
decreases with age, especially for young US firms. However, old EU companies seem to rely 
more on their cash flow to finance their R&D investments than old US firms. 
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From a European perspective in terms of policy implications, our results suggest improving 
conditions in the EU for access to external capital, i.e. debt and equity. Policy makers would 
do well providing direct R&D support for EU firms, i.e. tax incentives and R&D subsidies 
and further develop the availability of risk capital. Tax policies that affect the after-tax cash 
flow of the firms are likely to affect the R&D activities of EU companies as they seem to rely 
on the availability of internal finance. The low representation of young companies within the 
top innovation leaders in Europe suggests a need of measures to stimulate R&D activities 
amongst young firms, especially in innovative sectors. On the other hand, well established 
companies (ollies) seem to benefit from more efficient external capital markets in the US than 
in Europe. Indirectly, clearer framework conditions in the EU, in particular for private equity 
should be achieved. Our findings support the view that Europe needs a functioning internal 
market53, which is currently hampered by the fragmentation of EU financial markets. 
However, in terms of direct support, it is not clear whether policy makers should primarily 
allocate public resources to support large firms which are top R&D investors and fewer to 
smaller companies as the former may be less concerned with financing constraints of funding 
their R&D investments than the latter. In order to further investigate this question, it would be 
useful to consider a larger sample which would include, besides large R&D corporations, 
small and medium R&D investors. 
 
 
                                                            
53 Anvret, Granieri, Renda (2010). 
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Chapter 3  - The Productivity of R&D Components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the measuring of the knowledge production of R&D expenditures 
when they are disaggregated into the following components: intramural versus extramural 
expenditures, research versus development expenditures, product-oriented versus process-
oriented, human capital versus investments. The sources of funding and the types of 
subcontractors are also considered. The main question of this chapter is whether the 
heterogeneity of R&D affects the technology performance of the companies, as measured by 
patent applications. A cross-sectional Belgian R&D survey conducted over 2004-2005 is used 
for the purpose of the analysis. Given the high dependency of the Belgian innovation system 
towards the foreign MNEs, a matching process was performed between Belgian R&D and 
patents related to Belgian inventors in order to capture the patents filed outside Belgium but 
related to inventions created by firms located in Belgium (i.e. subsidiaries of foreign groups).  
Estimates of the elasticity of the quantity of patents with respect to the components of R&D 
are provided.  
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3.1  Introduction54 
 
This chapter proposes an empirical study of the relationship between R&D activities and 
patent applications when R&D is disaggregated into several components. This relationship is 
estimated by means of an extended knowledge production function (Griliches, 1979) using a 
representative sample of Belgian manufacturing firms active in R&D in 2004-2005. 
Traditional studies model R&D as a single variable in the knowledge production function and 
ignore its underlying heterogeneity. The main question of this chapter is whether R&D 
heterogeneity affects the technology performance of the companies. The objective is to test 
hypotheses on the role of several R&D components in the process that yields knowledge 
outcomes, which are measured by the patenting activities of the firms. Hence, one novelty of 
this research is to consider different types of R&D activities and sources of financing of these 
intangible investments rather than total R&D expenditures as in previous studies examining 
the R&D-patent relationship55. For instance because of their more fundamental nature, the 
impact of basic and applied research may be different than the effect of development 
activities on the output of the innovative process as measured by patent counts. Another 
interesting question is to look at the sources for the financing of research activities. Public 
funds for R&D may also have a different impact on patenting as compared to the firm’s own 
funds. To our knowledge, this is the first study that gives a comprehensive set of results that 
covers together these dimensions in a R&D-patent relationship. Hence, the integrated 
framework in which the analysis is conducted is a key feature of this chapter. Our findings 
have important implications in terms of innovation policy as the heterogeneity of R&D may 
advocate differenciated public support. 
The Belgian R&D survey that covers years 2004 and 2005 is used in order to conduct our 
analysis. The Belgian innovation system is highly dependent on foreign multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), which could be an important reason for its lower propensity to patent. On 
the one hand, foreign subsidiaries can be specialized in the adaptation to the local market of 
products and processes developed in the first place in the headquarters of MNEs. On the other 
                                                            
54 This chapter presents the results from a research conducted on Belgian R&D and knowledge outcomes. This 
work was realized at the Belspo (Belgian Federal Science Policy) and presented to the Belspo Committee in 
charge of the R&D analyses. The patent information related to the 2005 R&D survey was extracted from 
PATSTAT by Gaétan de Rassenfosse, to which I am grateful for his comments during the research and help in 
the matching procedure. 
55 See for instance Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), Crépon and Duguet (1997a, 1997b), Cincera (1997) or 
Guo and Trivedi (2002). 
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hand, head offices could hoard a significant part of the R&D output of their subsidiaries, these 
firms taking advantage of the local availability of a highly qualified workforce and knowledge 
base. As a result, R&D conducted in Belgium could lead to inventions patented by foreign 
firms within the same MNE. This issue is addressed in this chapter by trying to relate Belgian 
R&D to patents that report at least one Belgian inventor even when they are not filed by a 
firm located in Belgium. 
On the whole the results indicate that R&D activities exhibit slightly decreasing returns to 
scale with respect to patenting and significant differences are observed in the estimated 
impacts of these activities according to their type and source of financing.  
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the main determinants of firms’ 
patenting activities and presents the Belgian technology base. Section 3.3 presents the dataset 
and the extended knowledge production function. Section 3.4 develops the econometric 
framework that is used to estimate the knowledge production functions. The main empirical 
findings are reported in section 3.5. The main conclusions and implications are drawn in 
section 3.6. 
3.2   Patents, R&D and MNEs R&D activities in Belgium 
3.2.1  Determinants of patenting activities and S&T activities 
 
The purpose of our analysis is to provide an overview of the contribution of the components 
of R&D activities to the outcome of the knowledge process as measured by the patent 
applications of the companies. We assume that companies intentionally allocate their R&D 
efforts according to several dimensions. By analyzing the role of these dimensions in the 
framework of a R&D-patents relationship, we aim at validating hypotheses on the faces of 
R&D that yield patenting activities. Belgian data from the Belgian R&D survey are used for 
the purpose of validating or rejecting these hypotheses. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study that provides a comprehensive and simultaneous review of these dimensions in an 
integrated framework.  
The imperfect appropriability of the outcomes of innovative activities has been acknowledged 
since a long time. This appropriability problem arises from the non-rival and partially 
excludable property of the knowledge good. Non rivalry means that the use of an innovation 
by an economic agent does not preclude others from using it, while partial excludability 
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implies that the owner of an innovation can not impede others to benefit from it free of 
charge. This public characteristic of the knowledge good is a source of market failure to the 
extent that firms will invest less in R&D than the socially optimal level56. The literature on 
public R&D discusses several ways to compensate for the imperfect functioning of such 
markets57. Public technology procurement, R&D subsidies or tax breaks for instance increase 
the expected returns by lowering the costs of these activities while R&D collaborations 
facilitate the exploitation of scale economies in R&D and the internalization of the 
externalities generated by these activities. More directly, the intellectual property right system 
with patents, trademarks or copyrights restricts to competitors the exploitation that can be 
made from the knowledge created. Patents for instance are granted as a temporary monopoly 
right for the innovator while at the same time disclosing technical information in the public 
domain. These appropriability and patenting strategies affect the firm’s performance58. 
However, despite several measures taken to strengthen the enforcement of patent rights or to 
reduce the costs of filing a patent, their effectiveness varies considerably across industry 
sectors59. Patenting behaviours are not only linked to the costs of patenting but also to the 
appropriability conditions of the R&D output as well as the nature of these activities, in 
particular the type of research, for example whether it is basic or more applied, tacit or 
codified, product or process oriented. These characteristics will affect the speed of 
technological diffusion or the ability of rivals to invent around a patented invention. The 
sources of financing of these activities, the size, the market share, the technological 
diversification, the degree of internationalization of firms or the importance of entry barriers 
for potential competitors are other determinants that influence the costs of patenting. For 
instance large companies that benefit from public R&D support may be less financially 
constrained while worldwide firms may have to register their patents in several patent offices 
thus increasing the costs of these activities. Firms more exposed to potential competition may 
also have to apply for more patents.  
The R&D efforts can be categorized into in-house or intramural R&D and subcontracted or 
extramural R&D. Veugelers and Cassiman (1999a) investigate the determinants of the 
decision for a firm to produce technology itself (make) or to source it externally (buy). They 
                                                            
56 Indivisibilities and uncertainties (or high risks) associated with R&D activities are two other sources (Arrow, 
1962). 
57 See Geroski (1995) for a discussion. 
58 According to Ceccagnoli (2009), “Stronger appropriability at the firm level, achieved through patent 
protection or the ownership of specialized complementary assets, leads to superior economic performance, as 
measured by the stock market valuation of a firm’s R&D assets”. 
59 See Levin et al. (1987) for a study of differences in appropriability conditions across industries. 
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find that companies that consider internal information as an important source of information 
tend to combine internal and external technology sources (make and buy) rather than sourcing 
exclusively. According to the authors, “strong appropriation, legally or through complexity, 
secrecy or lead-time on competitors, leads the firms to reduce the probability of an exclusive 
external knowledge sourcing strategy”. Furthermore, extramural R&D is characterized by 
major transaction costs and external research facilities tend to provide inputs with a low level 
of specialization into the R&D projects that a firm subcontracts (Geroski, 1995). This 
subcontracted R&D is less likely to lead to successful inventions and patent applications. 
Hence we aim at validating the following hypothesis: 
H1: The main drivers of the patenting activities of a company lie inside its intramural 
R&D activities. 
Concerning the research versus development dichotomy, recent work by Czarnitzki, Kraft and 
Thorwarth (2009) has emphasized the premium of research over development activities in the 
propensity to patent inventions using a sample of Belgian firms. This result stresses the 
importance of research as a driver of innovation. Seminal results by Griliches (1986) also 
indicate a significant impact of research on productivity growth in the US. Frascati manual60 
distinguishes basic research from applied research. The results of basic research are not 
expected to be sold as this type of research is conducted without any application in view. 
However, applied research, i.e. research conducted with a specific objective, is often patented 
according to Frascati manual. On the other hand, patenting activities may also arise from 
development oriented activities as they are “directed to producing new materials, products 
and devices; to installing new processes, systems and services; or to improving substantially 
those already produced or installed”. The manual illustrates the difference between basic 
research, applied research and expreminental development with examples among which this 
one about antibodies: “the determination of the amino acid sequence of an antibody molecule 
is basic research. Investigations undertaken in an effort to distinguish between antibodies for 
various diseases is applied research. Experimental development then consists of devising a 
method for synthesising the antibody for a particular disease on the basis of knowledge of its 
structure and clinically testing the effectiveness of the synthesised antibody on patients who 
have agreed to accept experimental advanced treatment”. Given the literature, research 
activities as well as experminental development activities are likely to lead to patent 
                                                            
60 OECD (2002). 
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applications. However, the degree of novelty related to successful research activities is higher 
and may be illustrated by more patented inventions. Thus our analysis aims at validating the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Research activities and development activities both contribute to the patenting 
activities, with a premium for research activities. 
R&D activities oriented towards new products aim at giving the firm a clear advantage on the 
product market to face its competitors. This type of R&D should lead to higher patenting 
propensities when firms consider patenting as an effective method to protect their new 
products. On the other hand, process-oriented R&D activities are conducted in order to 
improve the production process and decrease the costs of the firm. Firms may be reluctant to 
protect the outcomes of this type of activities as patenting new processes would disclose 
information that would benefit to the production processes of their competitors61. Arundel and 
Kabla (1998) investigate the role of secrecy in the propensity to patent product versus process 
innovations. Their findings confirm that the importance of secrecy to prevent copying 
negatively affects the propensity to patent product innovations, while they suggest that 
secrecy and patenting strategies are complementary for process innovations, depending on 
their quality. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) stress the role of secrecy in most 
manufacturing US industries. They find that firms heavily emphasize secrecy as a strategy to 
protect the profits due to invention while patenting activities are less emphasized in the 
majority of industries. Thus, R&D activities oriented toward process innovations are expected 
to yield fewer patents than product-oriented R&D activities as firms may be reluctant to 
disclose information that could benefit to the production processes of their competitors. If 
secrecy is preferred for such activities, we can expect the following hypothesis to be 
validated. 
H3: The role of process-oriented R&D activities is not a significant determinant of 
patent applications. 
Tacit and experiential skills are embodied in human capital (Penrose, 1959) and R&D 
workers generally benefit from firm sponsored training that raises their productivity, in 
addition to impacting their wages and careers. However, modern and ICT equipment are 
expected to raise the capabilities of R&D. New equipment increase the performance of R&D 
as it allows producing knowledge earlier and faster (Rosenberg, 1974; Nightingale, 2000; 
                                                            
61 See Cohen (1995) for a discussion. 
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Becker et al., 2005). Though, labor-capital substitution can occur when R&D workers are 
replaced by new equipment and a more specific use of the skills of the workers (Baba and 
Nobeoka, 1998; Nightingale, 2000). Thus, we expect both the human capital and equipment 
dimensions of R&D to contribute significantly to the knowledge production process. 
However, because new ideas in a company are expected to arise from the pool of its high 
skilled labor, the role of human capital is expected to be crucial in the knowledge process, 
while the role of investments should be secondary, yet complementary. 
H4: R&D workers and R&D equipment both contribute to the knowledge production 
process, with a premium for R&D workers. 
Concerning the sources of R&D funding, it is expected that external private funds finance the 
intramural R&D projects that are likely to be effective and yield economic returns. 
Furthermore, given the high degree of internationalization of the Belgian technology 
landscape (see section 3.2.2), the external private funding of Belgian R&D should 
substantially reflect the financial support by foreign groups to their Belgian R&D 
subsidiaries. Large foreign companies can be motivated to locate their R&D centers in 
another country for different motives (Belderbos, 2001). From the view point of these MNEs, 
a first motive, which consists in the exploitation of the firm’s technology abroad, means that 
companies adapt their products and processes to suit local markets and manufacturing 
processes and to fulfil local standards or manufacturing conditions. A second motive is the 
sourcing of foreign technology, which explains the founding of basic R&D for world market. 
In this case, firms access distinctive expertise in the local science base and hire skilled foreign 
engineers and researchers62. New established subsidiaries generally focus on the design and 
the development of products to local markets on the basis of the mother company’s existing 
technologies, while R&D activities of acquired subsidiaries are more concerned with applied 
research and scanning of local technologies. Public aids also aim at encouraging efficient 
R&D projects, but government administrations may not always subsidize the most effective 
R&D projects with the highest economic returns given the existence of asymmetric 
information and moral hazard issues63. Moreover, public aids are intended to support long-
term fundamental research and as such it may take some time for the benefits to show up in 
                                                            
62 The notions of Home Base Augmenting (HBA) and Home Base Exploiting (HBE) are often used to 
characterize these motives. For Kuemmerle (1999), HBA sites are more likely to be located near universities or 
public research and technology organizations. HBA units have increasingly been used as part of the MNE’s 
strategy to build up and exploit S&T know-how located beyond the boundaries of the group while the activities 
of HBE sites are more aimed at transferring the knowledge developed within the group. 
63 See Hall (2002) for a survey and a discussion of these questions. 
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the output of R&D activities. Hence the role of public funding in the R&D-patent relationship 
is not clear. Though, we consider here that an efficient public aid policy should be a 
determinant of the knowledge outcome of the firms and aim at validating the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: Private and public funds both finance R&D activities with significant returns. 
Table 11 presents the structure that encompasses the hypotheses that will be tested in this 
chapter. 
Table 11. Hypotheses 
Research and Development 
H1: Intramural H1: Extramural 
Nature 
H2: Research / Development 
Subcontractors 
Orientation 
H3: Product/Process 
 
Costs 
H4: Human capital / Investments 
 
H5: Financing  
 
3.2.2  The Belgian technological base 
 
MNEs largely dominate the Belgian innovation system. The share of subsidiaries of large 
foreign firms in national innovative activities of 54% is by far the largest among the 
industrialized countries (Patel and Pavitt, 1991). In the 1980s, this share was about 40% and 
this suggests that there have been since a long time strong linkages between MNEs and the 
national science and technology base in Belgium. Thus, because of its relative size and the 
ensuing need for a high degree of specialization, the internationalization of the Belgian 
technology base is indisputable. As stressed by Veugelers and Cassiman (1999b) among 
others, external knowledge is an important determinant for the innovation process of firms. 
Increasingly, this knowledge is likely to originate from outside of their national borders, 
especially in a small size economy characterized by a high openness of its S&T system. 
Several studies have quantified the magnitude and direction of technology diffusion through 
different channels across industry sectors and nations and its impact on innovation and 
72 
 
economic performance64. In a survey, Blomström and Kokko (1998) examine the effects of 
knowledge spillovers generated by MNEs. These effects influence domestic firms in the 
MNE’s own industry as well as firms in other sectors. The authors conclude to a positive 
impact of these effects, which vary systematically between countries and industries and 
increase with the local capability and the level of competition65. On the other hand, the effects 
on the home country of MNEs are more difficult to identify. There have been only a few 
studies examining the impact of international spillovers in the Belgian economy. Veugelers 
and Vanden Houte (1990), in an analysis of Belgian data on domestic R&D, find that the 
higher the presence of multinationals in an industry, the weaker will be the innovative efforts 
of domestic firms in that same industry. The study of Fecher (1990) reports a positive impact 
of domestic R&D spillovers on Belgian firms’ productivity performance while no effect of 
international spillovers is found. Veugelers and Cassiman (1999b), find that MNEs are more 
likely to transfer technology to the Belgian economy. However the main conclusion of the 
study is that it is not so much the international dimension of the firms, but rather their access 
to the international technology market that is important for generating external knowledge 
transfers to the local economy. 
Another feature of the Belgian technological landscape is the high concentration of innovation 
activities among a few large firms. Cincera (2005) sheds some light on the patenting activities 
of the top 50 Belgian firms over the 1980-2000 decades and observes that this activity is quite 
concentrated. Indeed, in terms of European patents, the two firms with the highest number of 
patent applications hold 15.6% and 6.4% respectively of the total number of patents applied 
for by Belgian applicants between 1980 and 2000. In terms of US patents, these shares are 
even higher (24.4% and 10.3% respectively). The cumulated share of US patents of the top 50 
Belgian firms is about 78% against 61% for European patents suggesting that patents outside 
the European market are mainly attributed to the largest firms. 
Another specificity of Belgian patenting activities is that a significant number of these 
companies are subsidiaries of foreign MNEs. The high dependency of the Belgian innovation 
system towards foreign MNEs could be an important reason for its lower propensity to 
                                                            
64 See for instance the surveys of Cincera and van Pottelsberghe (2001) and Mohnen (1996) on international 
R&D spillovers. 
65 In Jaffe’s opinion (1986: p.984), “from a purely technological point of view, R&D spillovers constitute an 
unambiguous positive externality. Unfortunately, we can only observe various economic manifestations of the 
firm’s R&D success. For this reason, the positive technologically externality is potentially confounded with a 
negative effect of other’s research due to competition”. 
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patent66. Subsidiaries can be specialized in the adaptation to the Belgian market of products 
and services developed and patented in the first place in the research labs of the multinational. 
These subsidiaries could also be involved in home based augmenting research activities, the 
local availability of a highly qualified workforce and knowledge base being the main reasons 
for their presence in the foreign country. In the first case, one can expect a lower propensity to 
patent for a given amount of R&D since the original invention is already protected. Then, in 
both cases the output of the R&D performed by the subsidiary can be directly patented by the 
multinational in its home country and not in Belgium. Finally, the geographic distance 
between the MNE’s home base and the domestic country can be another reason explaining a 
lower patenting propensity67. These points deserve further attention. In particular, the high 
concentration of technological activities among a few large companies and the presence of 
foreign firms that could bring back to their home country an important part of their research 
output ask for a closer examination of the outcomes of R&D as measured by patenting 
activities as well as the main determinants influencing these activities. 
As regards the degree of internationalization of R&D, technology production has usually been 
centralized in the host country of MNEs. The reduction of the costs of communications and 
control, economies of scale in R&D and a better coordination between central and peripheral 
research labs are often mentioned in the literature to explain this situation (Terpstra, 1985)68. 
However, during the past decades, the involvement of MNEs in overseas R&D has increased 
significantly. Companies all over the world are investing more and more in overseas R&D as 
a tool to increase their competitive advantages and to exploit their resources in order to create 
higher quality products69. MNEs have accelerated the pace of their direct investments in 
overseas R&D, and have established or acquired multiple R&D laboratories abroad and are 
increasingly integrating these laboratories into global R&D networks70. According to 
Granstrand et al. (1992), the reasons for this growing decentralization and internationalization 
                                                            
66 As shown in Capron and Cincera (2000), the R&D productivity index as measured by the ratio of patents on 
R&D expenditures was 95 for Belgium in 1995 against 100 for the EU average. 
67 Maskus (1998), for instance, finds that the number of patents filed by US subsidiaries in host countries 
depends positively from the strength of intellectual property protection in these countries as well as from the 
distance to the USA. 
68 As pointed out by Cantwell and Santangelo (1999), non-codified technological activities that necessitate 
highly tacit capabilities require a higher proximity. 
69 Angel and Savage (1996) and Belderbos (2001) among others, analyze the determinants of the localization of 
Japanese R&D labs abroad; Cantwell and Harding (1998) measure the R&D internationalization of German 
firms; Dunning and Narula (1995) and Florida (1997) examine the R&D activities of foreign firms in the USA 
and Pearce and Papanastasiou (1999) in the UK.  
70 Research joint ventures, firm’s acquisitions and the establishment of greenfield units are the three main ways 
to access a foreign market. 
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of R&D activities can be classified into three main groups of factors: demand-side, supply-
side and environmental factors. The demand-side factors include a greater adaptation of 
products and technologies to local markets, a higher proximity to customers, an increase of 
competitiveness through the transfer of technology and the pressures of subsidiaries to 
enhance their status within a corporation. Among the main supply-side factors, the monitoring 
of the development of technology abroad and the hiring of a foreign and barely mobile highly 
skilled labor can be mentioned. Finally, the environmental factors concern the legislation on 
intellectual property, the provision of R&D incentives by the domestic government, e.g. tax 
advantages and subsidies for R&D, as well as governmental pressures to improve the 
subsidiary’s capabilities beyond the simple assembly of proven products to innovative 
activities. 
Given the high dependency of the Belgian innovation system towards foreign MNEs and the 
related high degree of internationalization of Belgian R&D, it is expected that the share of 
R&D that is financed by foreign funds significantly affects the knowledge production of the 
firms that belong to the Belgian technology base (i.e. firms located in Belgium), given that the 
outcome of Belgian R&D that flows outside Belgium is taken into account. Hence, in order to 
capture the information about inventions produced in Belgium but patented outside Belgium, 
the analysis will rely on patent counts based on inventors located in Belgium (see section 
3.3.2). 
H6: Foreign funds play a significant role in the knowledge production of the Belgian 
technology landscape. 
3.3  Data 
3.3.1  The Belgian R&D survey 
 
The data have been collected as part of the Belgian National R&D biannual survey organized 
jointly by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office and the Regional authorities in charge of 
S&T statistics. The questionnaire that was used for this study covers the 2004-2005 period. 
The survey aims at covering a representative set of firms with R&D activities that are located 
in Belgium. This list of R&D firms is in constant evolution. The questionnaire includes about 
100 variables as regards innovation and economic activities with definitions of R&D activities 
analogous to the ones presented in the Frascati manual. As the purpose of the analysis is to 
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determine the drivers inside the R&D aggregate that significantly affect both patent counts, 
patent data for the firms in the survey are needed. The number of patent applications is not 
available in the 2004-2005 survey though it was reported in previous surveys. Therefore 
patents were manually collected. This allows a direct observation of the patent applications of 
the firms instead of relying on the information that they disclose in the survey. 
The dataset includes observations over the 2004-2005 period and is limited to the firms of the 
R&D survey that do not present missing information for at least one of the following 
variables: share of intramural/extramural R&D, share of research/development oriented R&D, 
share of product/process oriented R&D, share of R&D by type of cost (workers/equipment), 
share of R&D by type of funding, share of R&D by type of subcontractor. We also exclude 
firms that do not perform R&D activities. Following these criteria, we obtain a final sample of 
858 firms, representing 70% of the total R&D covered by the survey.  
 
The empirical framework of this chapter proposes to estimate the elasticity of patents with 
respect to R&D. This relationship aims at investigating the production of innovation to the 
extent that R&D efforts are considered as the inputs that lead to inventions that are likely to 
be patented. As regards the literature71, the elasticity of patents to R&D is expected to be large 
for cross-sectional analyses, which is the case for our datasets. However, empirical findings in 
the literature show that introducing a time dimension and using within-firm variables lead to 
weaker elasticities (Hall et al, 1986; Danguy et al., 2010). It should be noted that recent 
contributions to the literature of the R&D-patents relationship (de Rassenfosse and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2009; Danguy et al. 2010) disentangle the impact of R&D efforts on the 
patents applications into three effects: the research productivity, the appropriability propensity 
and the strategic propensity. As strategic and appropriability propensities are likely to be 
partially industry-specific, our empirical findings use industry effects in the R&D-patents 
relationship in order to capture (even not perfectly) these non-productive components of the 
R&D elasticity of patents. 
                                                            
71 See for examples Pakes and Griliches (1980), Hall et al. (1986), Hausman et al. (1984), Jaffe (1986), Duguet 
and Kabla (1998), Crépon et al. (1998), Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999), Cincera (1997),  Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001), Blundell et al. (2002). 
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Table 12. Sample’s distribution of total R&D expenditures  
by type of activities and source of financing 
 
Total R&D Intramural R&D 70% Extramural R&D 30% 
Intramural Research 43% Development 57% 
Intramural 
Product 68% 
Process 13% 
Other 20% 
Intramural 
Wages 61% 
Investments 8% 
Organization  30% 
Intramural Internal funding 83% External funding 17% 
Extramural 
Other firms 88% 
Research centers 4% 
HEI’s and RTO’s 8% 
858 Belgian R&D firms in 2004-2005. HEIs = Higher Education 
Institutions; RTOs = public Research and Technology 
Organizations. Other product/process includes R&D not dedicated 
exclusively to either product-oriented or process-oriented 
activities. Source: own computation. 
 
Table 12 lists the different components of R&D as well as the distribution of total R&D 
expenditures among them. It follows that the firms of the sample are mainly performing 
development and product research activities. R&D activities are principally financed with the 
firms’ own funds and the share of subcontracted R&D is smaller than the share of intramural 
R&D. Subcontracted R&D is performed mainly in other private companies.  
3.3.2  Matching R&D to patents  
 
The companies of the Belgian R&D survey were associated manually to their patents 
applications. The patents were collected using PATSTAT. A first issue when matching the 
firms in the survey with their patents is that the names of the applicants are not harmonized. 
The VAT registration number would be convenient for the matching as each firm in Belgium 
is identified with this code, but it does not appear in the patents forms. Furthermore, the 
names of the applicants may differ from the names of the firms in the R&D survey when the 
patents were filed through a firm with a different name (e.g. another subsidiary inside the 
same corporate group). The matching is thus not straightforward. A second issue is related to 
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the highly international nature of the Belgian technological landscape72. As stressed in section 
3.2, MNEs may conduct R&D activities in Belgium (which is accounted for in the R&D 
survey) and patent the related inventions outside Belgium via a foreign firm (which is not a 
Belgian applicant). The Baxter Company illustrates this situation. Baxter’s European R&D 
department was located in Nivelle until 2010 and in Braine-l’Alleud afterwards, but the 
patents filed by Baxter are filed by Baxter US and not the Belgian counterpart. The opposite 
situation is also possible, as foreign firms with non Belgian R&D centers can file patents 
using a Belgian subsidiary. An example is Electrolux Home Products Corp. which patents as a 
Belgian applicant but is not included in the R&D survey as it is not conducting any R&D in 
Belgium. A third issue resides in the counting of the patents when one invention leads to more 
than one patent if the company applied at different patent offices, that is, when an invention 
leads to a family of patents. Counting all the observed patents of the family would inflate the 
number of inventions. 
In order to address these issues, the following procedure was implemented73. First, the 
number of patents associated with the companies in the R&D survey is the number of priority 
filings, i.e. the first patent filed for a given invention. This method yields a measure of the 
innovation output of the firms that is not inflated by the patent family size. We count the 
patents filed at the Belgian office, but also at the EPO, USPTO and other patent offices 
reported in PATSTAT. Second, as the R&D survey exclusively concerns the R&D activities 
conducted in Belgium, only priority filings with at least one inventor residing in Belgium 
were taken into account. As reported in Table 13, these first filters lead to a total number of 
priority filings related to 17884 patents in 2000-2005. The period investigated for the patents 
was extended before 2004-2005, i.e. the period of the R&D survey, as a robustness check in 
the identification procedure of the companies in order to ensure that the firms in the survey 
with no observed patent in 2004-2005 did not file other patents in the years before. Each one 
of these 17884 patents was manually categorized into individual applicants, universities 
applicants and other applicants. The last category includes private companies as well as public 
institutions and collective research centers. As none of the firms in the R&D survey is an 
individual or a university, this procedure leaves 11147 patents to be matched. An automatic 
matching procedure comparing the names in the R&D survey with the names of the applicants 
was completed by a manual matching. The manual matching consisted in manual cleaning of 
                                                            
72 See Cincera, van Pottelsberghe and Veugelers (2006) who quantify the international generation of knowledge 
in Belgium using EPO and USPTO patent data. 
73 This work was done jointly with Gaétan de Rassenfosse (University of Melbourne). 
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the names, comparing the addresses of the companies (when available in the patent 
information) as well as collecting the names of the subsidiaries of the firms that may file the 
patents for them. The 858 firms in the final sample represent 36% of all the patents filed by 
non individuals and non universities applicants. When performing the matching for the entire 
R&D survey, this rate increases to 60%. 
Table 13. Matching patents to Belgian R&D 
 
# priority filings in 
2000-2005 
Total 17884 
– Individuals – 5867 
– Universities  – 870 
= Other applicants = 11147 (100%) 
Firms in the surveya 6688 (60%) 
Firms in the sampleb 3962 (36%) 
a) Belgian R&D survey. 
b) Firms with available information on the R&D  
disaggregation. 
 
Table 14 reports the distribution of the patents across patent offices. EPO is the European 
Patent Office, USPTO is the US Patent and Trademark Office and NEXT refers to the 
national patent offices of UK, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (i.e. 
countries geographically close to Belgium). All applicants appear to file their patents mainly 
at the European Patent Office, especially the universities with 62% of their priority filings at 
the EPO. 
Table 14. Belgian priority filings across Patent Offices 2000-2005 
 Belgium EPO USPTO NEXT Other Total 
Individuals 1355 1928 755 1622 207 5867 
  23% 33% 13% 28% 4% 100% 
Universities 18 536 41 254 21 870 
  2% 62% 5% 29% 2% 100% 
Other applicants 1552 4425 1624 3211 335 11147 
  14% 40% 15% 29% 3% 100% 
Total 2925 6889 2420 5087 563 17884 
 16% 39% 14% 28% 3% 100% 
Source: PATSTAT 
 
Table 15 presents the nationality of the applicants that filed a patent with a Belgian 
contribution. These statistics show that 53% of the patents filed by non individuals and non 
universities applicants are located outside Belgium, with 16% of them being US applicants. 
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These statistics illustrate to a certain extent the repatriation of inventions created in Belgium 
by the MNEs through Belgian research centers. 
Table 15. Nationality of applicants 2000-2005 
 Belgium Europe US Other Total 
Individuals 4522 901 301 143 5867 
  77% 15% 5% 2% 100% 
Universities 790 53 17 10 870 
  91% 6% 2% 1% 100% 
Other applicants 5879 3214 1762 292 11147 
  53% 29% 16% 3% 100% 
Total 11191 4168 2080 445 17884 
 63% 23% 12% 2% 100% 
Source: PATSTAT 
 
Table 16 reports the repartition of the firms in the dataset along with their priority filings for 
years 2004-2005, which is the period covered by the survey. 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics of the sample  
 #firms Priority filings 
(2004-2005) 
Industry   
High-tech 327 (38%) 875 (59%) 
Medium/low-tech 531 (62%) 610 (41%) 
Region   
Brussels 63 (7%) 48 (3%) 
Flanders 586 (68%) 1265 (85%) 
Wallonia 209 (24%) 172 (12%) 
Size   
Small 137 (16%) 16 (1%) 
Medium 574 (67%) 352 (24%) 
Large 147 (17%) 1117 (75%) 
Total 858 (100%) 1485 (100%) 
Source: own computation based on a working sample of 858 
Belgian firms. 
 
3.4  Econometric models for count data 
 
The impact of R&D on patenting activities is estimated by means of an extended ‘knowledge 
production function’ (Griliches, 1979). This exercise extends previous work on the R&D-
patent relationship by considering several components of R&D activities, for instance the ‘R’ 
and ‘D’ component, product- versus process-oriented R&D, intramural and subcontracted 
R&D, rather than total R&D expenditures. The distinction between the origin of the 
financing, i.e., internal versus external funding, is also considered. As regards the external 
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funding of R&D, information is available on whether the funds originate from public 
authorities or private sources.  
In order to assess the impact of R&D activities and other technological determinants on firms’ 
patenting, the discrete non-negative nature of patent counts has to be taken into account. For 
instance, because of difficulties and uncertainties inherent to R&D activities, firms do not 
always apply for patents and hence a zero value is a natural outcome of this variable. The 
usual way to deal with the discrete non-negative nature of the patent dependent variable is to 
consider the simple Poisson regression model. Let yi be this variable which represents the 
number of patent applications by firm i, where i = 1,...,N. The yi are assumed to be 
independent and have Poisson distributions with parameters λi. Parameters λi depend on a set 
of explanatory variables, which are in this case the determinants of the knowledge production 
function: 
  ii exp x  
where:  xi represents a set of k explanatory variables, 
  β is the vector of associated coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The dependent patent variable is related to this function through the conditional mean of the 
Poisson model. An advantage of such a specification is that when variables xi are expressed in 
logarithms (as for the R&D expenditures), coefficients are elasticities. The Poisson 
distribution is given by: 
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The coefficients are estimated by the maximum likelihood method and the log-likelihood is: 
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This function is β globally concave, hence unicity of the global maximum is ensured. An 
important property of the Poisson model is the equality between its first two conditional 
moments:  
    iiiii βxyVβxyE  ,|,|  
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In most empirical studies, the equality of conditional mean and conditional variance of the 
dependent variable as implied by the Poisson model appears to be too restrictive. Very often, 
the conditional variance exceeds conditional mean, when estimating a cross-section model 
such as Poisson, which is known as ‘overdispersion’. Two statistical sources can explain 
overdispersion: positive contagion and unobserved heterogeneity (Winkelmann and 
Zimmermann, 1995). For instance, when a firm has made a new important invention (drastic 
invention) which is patented, often this drastic invention is followed by small and continuous 
improvements and/or further developments, which can lead to subsequent patent applications. 
The failure to include individual specific effects is one explanation for unobserved 
heterogeneity. For instance, in the R&D-patent relationship the presence of firms’ unobserved 
effects like the uncertainty inherent to R&D activities, the ability of engineers to discover new 
products or the commercial risk of selling an invention, find expression in the fact that only a 
few successful firms are likely to apply for a large number of patents in a given time period 
while for a majority of firms the importance of patenting may be limited or even nul.  
In order to address these issues, one possible extension of the Poisson model is to include a 
firm unobserved specific effect εi into the λi parameters. This firm-specific effect which is 
assumed to be invariant over time can be treated as random or as fixed. In the case of random 
effects, the Poisson’s parameters become: 
 iii exp~ εβx   
The random terms εi takes into account possible specification errors of i~ . These 
misspecifications may result from the omission of non observable explanatory variables or 
from measurement errors of these variables. The precise form of the distribution of the 
compound Poisson model depends upon the specific choice of the probability distribution of 
exp(εi): 
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where  g(εi) indicates the probability distribution of εi. 
The computation of the compound Poisson’s distribution may be a difficult task - at least from 
an analytic point of view - because of the integral arising in the equation. However, when it is 
82 
 
assumed that exp(εi) follows a gamma distribution with parameters  ii θ, 74 and are 
independent and identically distributed, the computation of the last formula leads to the well 
known negative binomial model. The probability distribution of this model is given by:  
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A parameterization of the variance parameter iθ  is proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (1986): 

1iθ  
The variance-mean relationship implied by this specification allows for overdispersion: 
     2iii yEyEyV   
Furthermore the Poisson model is nested in this negative binomial model, that is when 
parameter α tends to 0, the model converges to the Poisson model.  
 
3.5  Results 
 
 
The estimates of the elasticities of patents with respect to total R&D expenditures are reported 
in Table 17. Poisson and negative binomial estimates are reported. The likelihood-ratio test 
reports that the alpha value for the negative binomial is significantly different from 0, which 
indicates the presence of overdispersion and supports the use of negative binomial models 
rather than Poisson estimations. Furthermore, the predictions of the models suggest that 
Poisson estimators perform more poorly than the negative binomial estimators75. On the 
whole, total R&D activities exhibit slightly decreasing returns to scale with respect to 
patenting76. The negative binomial estimates imply that, when controlling for size, industry 
and region effects, a 1% increase of R&D yields a 0.8% increased number of priority filings. . 
The elasticity is rather high because of the cross-sectional nature of the datasets. A dynamic 
specification of the R&D-patent relationship is expected to provide lower estimates (see 
                                                            
74 If the set of explanatory variables contains a constant term, this assumption is not too restrictive. 
75 Using the “countfit” command in Stata developed by Long and Freeze (made available by the UCLA 
Academic Technology Services), it appears that negative binomial estimations fit the data better. The tests 
significantly reject the Poisson  estimates in favor of the Negative Binomial ones.  
76 This result corroborates previous findings of related studies. See Cincera (1998), for a survey. 
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Danguy et al., 2010 for example). Patents may not be a perfect measure of innovation, 
especially for sectors where secrecy is favored to patenting strategies. Moreover, the elasticity 
of patents to R&D is likely to capture not only research productivity, but also appropriability 
and strategic propensities. However, as our findings are based on firm-level data, the 
implementation of control variables for the different industries is expected to capture partially 
these non productive effects and mostly the differences in patenting strategies that are sector-
specific.  
Table 17. Elasticity of patents to total R&D expenditures 
 
 Poisson Negative binomial 
Intercept -4.905 (1.028)*** -7.422 (0.871)*** 
Total R&D expenditures 0.779 (0.114)*** 0.806 (0.075)*** 
Small size 0.017 (0.430) 0.202 (0.381) 
Large size 0.604 (0.301)** 0.498 (0.269)* 
Flanders 0.012 (0.907) 1.292 (0.526)** 
Wallonia -0.085 (0.961) 1.15 (0.558)** 
Nace industry (2-digit) Jointly significant Jointly significant 
#firms 858 858 
LogL -1246 -646 
Alpha   3.635 (0.544) 
Lik.-ratio test of Alpha = 0   Prob. =  0.000 
Dependent variable: priority filings. Belgian R&D firms over the period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in 
brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
The results as regards the impact of R&D activities and their different components on 
patenting are presented according to the hypotheses that we want to test. Control variables for 
size, industry and region are systematically included in the regressions. The coefficients of the 
components are compared with coefficient tests based on chi-square statistics. 
H1: The main drivers of the patenting activities of a company lie inside its intramural 
R&D activities. 
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Table 18. Hypothesis H1 
Dependent variable : patents  
   
Intramural R&D expenditures 0.699 (0.087)*** 
Extramural R&D expenditures 0.104 (0.045)** 
Intramural R&D 0.691 (0.136)*** 
Extramural R&D   
   Firms subcontractors 0.062 (0.054) 
   Univ. subcontractors  0.105 (0.058)* 
   Research centers subcontractors 0.123 (0.083) 
   Other subcontractors -0.077 (0.103) 
Intramural R&D 0.687 (0.137)*** 
Extramural R&D   
   Belgian subcontractors   
   ■ Regional  0.193 (0.091)** 
   ■ Non regional -0.085 (0.057) 
   Foreign subcontractors 0.116 (0.05)** 
   
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
The distinction between in-house and sub-contracted R&D in Table 18 indicates that it is 
mainly the former activity that contributes to technological output as measured by patents, 
which validates H1. One argument to explain the lower ‘productivity’ of R&D carried out 
outside the firm is the occurrence of major transaction costs. As emphasized by Geroski 
(1995), given these costs, external research facilities will generally provide generic rather than 
specialized inputs into the R&D programmes of their clients. These generic inputs are less 
likely to lead to successful inventions and to patent applications. The higher returns of out-
sourced R&D on own patenting come mainly from Belgian subcontractors that are regionally 
close to firms while interregional collaborations do not seem to provide evidence of patenting 
activities. Non Belgian subcontractors contribute also to the patenting activities of Belgian 
firms. A disaggregation of R&D into the types of subcontractors (firms, universities, research 
centers and others) does not provide significant results, except for the impact of collaborations 
with universities.  
A deeper look at how companies allocate their intramural R&D is presented in Table 19. 
These estimates allow one to test Hypotheses H2, H3 and H4. 
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Table 19. Hypotheses H2-H3-H4 
Dependent variable : patents – NB estimations priority filings 
   
Intramural R&D   
   Research 0.243 (0.056)*** 
   Development 0.248 (0.037)*** 
Extramural R&D 0.165 (0.044)*** 
Intramural R&D expenditures   
   Product oriented 0.236 (0.052)*** 
   Process oriented 0.08 (0.045)* 
   Product & process 0.254 (0.05)*** 
   No specific orientation -0.112 (0.055)** 
Extramural R&D expenditures 0.209 (0.045)*** 
Intramural R&D expenditures   
   Human capital 0.263 (0.154)* 
   Equipment 0.186 (0.048)*** 
Extramural R&D expenditures 0.132 (0.044)*** 
   
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
H2: Research activities and development activities both contribute to the patenting 
activities, with a premium for research activities. 
The results concerning the Research/Development separation indicate that both activities 
yield outcomes as measured by the patents of the companies, which is in line with our 
hypothesis. However, the estimates suggest that the difference between the contribution of ‘R’ 
and ‘D’ is not significantly different77. This invalidates H2 as we expected that the higher 
degree of novelty associated to research activities would be illustrated by more patented 
inventions. However, this result is not surprising since most of the R&D of the firms, 
especially the top patenting firms, in the sample consist of development activities.  
H3: The role of process-oriented R&D activities is not a significant determinant of 
patent applications. 
The estimates in Table 19 validate H3. The low estimated elasticity associated with the R&D 
allocated to process oriented R&D confirm the fact that in many industries, secrecy to protect 
innovation processes is viewed as more effective as compared to patenting78 when firms are 
reluctant to disclose information that could benefit to the production processes of their 
competitors. The differences between the elasticities associated to product and process 
                                                            
77 Coefficient equality test: chi-square = 0.01, probability = 0.93. 
78 See Cohen (1995) for a discussion.  
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activities are significant. However, our results suggest that patenting activities are preferred to 
secrecy for the outcomes of R&D dedicated to a combination of product and process 
activities. 
H4: R&D workers and R&D equipment both significantly contribute to the knowledge 
production process, with a premium for R&D workers. 
Our results give credit to the role of human capital in the knowledge process that leads to the 
creation of new inventions. Indeed,  the coefficient associated to human capital is significantly 
larger79 than the coefficient of R&D equipment, which is significant as well in the R&D-
patent relationship. Hence H4 Is validated. On the one hand, knowledge and high skills 
embodied in R&D workers are expected to be crucial determinants of the production of new 
and succesful inventions. On the other hand, modern and ICT equipment are expected to raise 
the capabilities of R&D and improve its productivity. Both faces of R&D appear to be crucial 
determinants of the patenting activities of Belgian firms.  
Results in Table 20 consider the sources of funding for the R&D activities. These results 
directly relate to our last hypotheses H5-H6. 
H5: Private and public funds both finance R&D activities with significant returns. 
H6: Foreign funds play a significant role in the knowledge production of the Belgian 
technology landscape 
                                                            
79 Coefficient equality test: chi-square = 34.66, probability = 0.000. 
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Table 20. Hypotheses H5-H6 
Dependent variable : patents – NB estimations NegBin 
Intramural R&D   
   Own funds 0.182 (0.049)*** 
   External funds 0.315 (0.04)*** 
Extramural R&D 0.166 (0.037)*** 
Intramural R&D    
   Own funds 0.156 (0.072)** 
   External funds   
   ■ from firms 0.298 (0.079)*** 
   ■ public funds  0.244 (0.076)*** 
   ■ from RTO/HEI -0.084 (0.281) 
Extramural R&D  0.207 (0.047)*** 
Intramural R&D   
   Own funds 0.127 (0.064)** 
   External funds   
   ■ Belgian funds 0.167 (0.069)** 
   ■ Foreign funds 0.261 (0.063)*** 
Extramural R&D 0.194 (0.048)*** 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
 
The contribution of R&D financed by own funds to the outcome of the knowledge process is 
lower than the contribution of R&D funded by external funds (the difference is significant at 
5%). Hypothesis H5 is validated by our results, with external private and public funds both 
financing R&D activities with significant returns. On the one hand, external private funds are 
expected to finance the intramural R&D projects that are likely to be effective and yield 
economic returns. On the other hand, our results concerning public aids suggest that the 
outcome of Belgian R&D is significantly fostered by public funds. This result can be 
interpreted as an efficient identification by public authorities of the firms with promising 
R&D projects. These findings suggest that the lack of public funds would prevent firms to 
start R&D projects with significant returns. Moreover, a non significant elasticity is found for 
the RTOs and HEIs. The non-commercial orientation of the research financed by such 
organizations may account for this result. The geographic location of the external funds 
indicates that both Belgian and foreign funds finance efficient R&D activities. This validates 
hypothesis H6. The estimates suggest that the contribution of R&D financed by foreign 
sources is even significantly higher than the contribution of R&D funded by Belgian 
sources80. This result corroborates that the high degree of internationalization of the Belgian 
                                                            
80 Coefficient equality test: chi-square = 7.04, probability = 0.008. 
88 
 
technology base correlates with a significant role of foreign funding in the performance of 
Belgian technology.  
3.6  Conclusion and implications 
 
This chapter has investigated the impact at the firm level of R&D activities on the outcomes 
of such activities as measured by patents filed by a representative sample of Belgian 
manufacturing companies. A set of cross-sectional results is proposed for 2004-2005 and was 
used to empirically test six hypotheses related to several faces of R&D. The econometric 
results show that the R&D-patent relationship presents slightly decreasing returns to scale. 
While this result confirms the findings of previous studies examining the impact of total R&D 
on patenting, differences are observed in the estimated impacts of these activities according to 
their type and source of financing.  
The findings suggest a major role of intramural R&D expenditures in the innovation process 
and a weaker impact of subcontracted R&D. Research activities play a significant role in the 
innovative process, but we found no significant difference with development activities. 
Strategies based on secrecy for process oriented innovations seem to be illustrated by our 
findings, as the role of product oriented R&D is mainly dominant over process oriented R&D 
in the determination of patenting activities. The findings indicate that human capital is a major 
driver of the innovative process along with ICT equipment. Larger impacts of intramural 
R&D financed by external funds rather than own funds are found. We find evidence that both 
external private and public funds, Belgian or foreign, encourage the emergence of R&D 
activities that yield significant returns.  
Our results have important implications in terms of innovation policy. First, while our 
findings confirm the role of R&D activities in the production of knowledge outcomes, we 
show evidence of high degrees of heterogeneity in the channels through which R&D 
contributes to the technology performance of the companies. This heterogeneity advocates 
differentiated public support to these components given that the patent propensity of each 
R&D component is controlled for. The importance of public aid is supported by our findings 
as we show evidence that public funds are actually helpful in the creation of new inventions. 
Second, the heterogeneity of R&D correlates with differences in the efficiency of the 
protection of R&D activities through patents and should be optimally addressed by IPR 
policies. 
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In order to further investigate the outcomes of the knowledge process, other measures of the 
performance of R&D activities could be considered and would extend the scope of the 
analysis. For instance, other intellectual property rights like copyright and trademarks may be 
worth being implemented in the knowledge production function and related to the 
components of R&D (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007). Moreove, quality indicators81 could be 
considered in order to investigate the impact of R&D components on the quality of patents 
rather than their quantity82. Furthermore, improving the methodological framework with panel 
data analyses would benefit from the dynamics that underlie the evolution of innovative 
activities. A structural model that addresses the dimensions of R&D that foster the knowledge 
outcome could be considered by using simultaneous equations. 
                                                            
81 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel (2003). 
82 See de Rassenfosse and Guellec (2009). 
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Chapter 4  - R&D performance in Europe, industrial and 
international diversification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The main question of this chapter is whether the diversification strategies of the economic 
activities of the R&D leaders in Europe affect, positively or negatively, the performance of 
their R&D activities. We propose an original approach based on the analysis of the 
subsidiaries of EU MNEs. We measure the performance of the firms according to their level 
of industrial diversification and globalization that we proxy with the presence and importance 
of subsidiaries in the EU, North America and Asia-Pacific regions. The sample consists of 
large R&D firms that represent about 80% of total European R&D. In general, the results 
indicate a positive impact from globalization on firms’ R&D productivity, especially in the 
US, while a negative impact for industrial diversification is found.  
  
93 
 
 
4.1  Introduction83 
 
According to Schumpeter's view (1942) on the role played by the size of firms on Research 
and Development (R&D) activities, large R&D firms can be expected to benefit from 
economies of scope by diversifying their research portfolio and the intrinsic technological risk 
of R&D activities. Nakamura (1999) finds evidence of a positive relationship between R&D 
diversification and knowledge spillovers both among research programmes within a firm and 
across firms. This technology diversification is closely related to product diversification as the 
latter strategy allows a better appropriation of the results of diversified R&D activites as well 
as creating a need for a more diversified technology (Granstrand, 1998; Belderbos et al. 
2009). Industrial or product diversification can however increase the agency costs between 
shareholders and managers (Denis et al. 2002) through personal risk reduction, increased 
power and prestige or compensation arrangements for the latter. 
International or global diversification is another source for enhancing R&D productivity. 
Firms delocalizing research facilities abroad can benefit from the availability of the local 
knowledge base and supply of a skilled workforce (Kuemmerle, 1997). Outsourcing R&D 
outside the home country allows firms to exploit existing innovations in local market 
conditions. When the competition on the local market is severe, widening its activities to 
cover additional foreign markets also allows a better appropriation of the economic returns of 
R&D. On the other hand, the diversification of activities can also be detrimental to the R&D 
productivity of firms. Diversified economic and research activities prevent firms from 
exploiting economies of scale and can also increase managerial costs (Asakawa, 2001).  
Both types of diversification, i.e. industrial and international, may even be linked when a 
trade-off between both diversification strategies occurs as a firm expands internationally and 
                                                            
83 The research on the diversification strategies and the subsidiaries of the EU MNEs was conducted with 
Michele Cincera at the EC-JRC-Institute for Prospective Technological Research. The findings presented in this 
chapter are found in Cincera M. and J. Ravet. 2011. Globalisation, industrial diversification and productivity 
growth in large European R&D companies, IPTS Working Paper on Corporate R&D and Innovation, 
No.01/2011. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. We are grateful to 
Pierre Mohnen, Teoman Pamukçu, Betina Peeters, Andrew Toole as well as participants of the 2010 CISS 
Summer School hold in Turunç, Turkey for their useful comments. We are also grateful to participants of the 
Asia-Pacific Productivity Conference 2010 (Taipei, Taiwan), Conference on Corporate R&D 2011 (Seville, 
Spain) and 4th ZEW conference on Economics of Innovation and Patenting (Manheim, Germany).  
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has to concentrate its resources on a narrower range of products in order to develop a 
significant position on the wider market (Belderbos et al., 2009). 
The main question of this chapter is whether the diversification strategies of the economic 
activities of the R&D leaders in Europe affect, positively or negatively, the performance of 
their R&D activities. We propose an original approach based on the analysis of the 
subsidiaries of EU MNEs. Using consolidated data for R&D, labor, sales and physical capital, 
we estimate firm-level production functions augmented with R&D capital stocks (Griliches, 
1979), and we pay particular attention to the partial elasticities of sales to R&D capital. 
Several model specifications are tested in order to measure the impact of both sources of 
diversification, i.e. industrial and global diversification on the productivity performance of 
firms. In doing so, we are also interested in comparing the productivity growth according to 
the three main regions where large EU MNEs delocalize their research and production 
activities, i.e. the EU, North America and the Asia-Pacific region. 
We use two sources of information to construct the database for the empirical study: the 2009 
edition of the EU industrial R&D scoreboard released by the JRC-IPTS and the Amadeus 
database (Bureau van Dijk). The sample consists of the top 1,000 R&D-active MNEs in the 
EU in 2008 with times series covering the 2000-2008 period. The empirical analysis is based 
on 43,966 subsidiaries of these MNEs. We compute different globalization indicators, such as 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes based on the number of countries covered by firms and their 
subsidiaries, their number of employees and net sales. Indicators for industrial diversification 
are constructed on the basis of firms' industrial classifications and subsidiaries. 
The results of the econometric analysis show a positive impact for globalization on R&D 
productivity but a negative impact for industrial diversification. European MNEs with a 
higher share of subsidiaries in the US and Canada and in the Asia-Pacific region globally 
exhibit a higher R&D intensity and productivity performance. These findings have 
implications in terms of managerial practices and give credit to the role of EU innovation 
policies in supporting relevant international S&T collaborations and partnerships as well as 
paying attention to the diversification strategies that affect the performance of EU R&D.  
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews theoretical aspects of the 
literature on the geographic and industrial diversification of firms. Section 4.3 documents the 
data and the empirical framework. The estimated results are presented in section 4.4. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn, and suggestions for future work are made in the last section. 
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4.2  Diversification of activities 
 
Nowadays, a significant portion of companies diversify their productive activities, either 
across multiple lines of business, i.e. product or industrial diversification, across different 
geographic markets, i.e. international diversification or globalization, or both (Denis et al., 
2002). The purpose of this section is to review some of the main theoretical arguments as well 
as empirical findings on the effect of industrial diversification and globalization on R&D 
activities and firms' economic performance. 
Studies in the literature report potential benefits as well as costs for R&D and the economic 
performance of both types of diversification strategies. We define industrial diversification as 
the diversification of the economic activities of a firm across several industries (i.e. product 
diversification). The diversification of a product portfolio may be closely related to the 
diversification of the R&D activities (i.e. technology diversification) for several reasons 
(Granstrand, 1998; Belderbos et al., 2009). First, product diversification allows a better 
appropriation of the results of diversified R&D activities. Second, a diversified product 
portfolio may require more diversified technology activities.  
Industrial diversification is likely to positively affect productivity performance when firms 
benefit from economies of scope (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Porter, 1985) and an excess of 
technological resources. These new technological opportunities are in turn deployed in new 
directions and industries. A classical example to illustrate this concept is the DuPont de 
Nemours company (Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1962), which was created at the beginning of 
the 19th century as a gunpowder mill, invented nylon in 1935 and is now one of the largest 
worldwide chemical companies. 
According to Williamson (1975, 1985), multi-product firms increase the willingness of 
managers to engage in riskier activities such as R&D and innovation, which enhance the 
firm's productivity. Within a multidivisional firm, "corporate managers usually evaluate 
division managers' performance on the basis of both financial performance and other 
relevant information. Top managers generally have access to information that is both more 
abundant and superior to that available in the external capital market. Thus, although the 
number of investment opportunities available within multidivisional firms is limited, at least 
in comparison to the number of opportunities in the external capital market, top 
management's knowledge with respect to each is 'incredibly deep' " (Williamson, 1970: 177). 
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However, other authors in the strategy literature (Burgelman, 1983a and 1983b; Hayes and 
Abernathy, 1980 and Hill et al. 1988) have suggested a negative impact for industrial 
diversification on the propensity of firms to engage in R&D. Division managers operating in 
this type of M-form companies have a tendency to avoid risky strategies, such as R&D, and 
invest in projects with a more immediate financial performance. For instance, Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1989) argue that "in large diversified firms, corporate managers tend to use a 
return-on-investment (ROI) criterion for evaluating division managers' performance84, 
causing division managers to meet short-term ROI objectives by reducing expenditures that 
are not essential for the attainment of short-run returns but are critical to the maximisation of 
organisational efficiency in the long run". A second argument is that when the M-firm is too 
diversified it becomes difficult for the corporate manager to know precisely all the businesses 
in the firm's portfolio. "Even for firms engaged in related diversification, top-level managers' 
ability to gather, process, and interpret the information needed to evaluate divisional 
performance accurately and allocate resources and rewards may be highly limited" 
(Williamson, 1975). Therefore, industrial diversification can potentially benefit corporate 
managers through increased power and prestige, compensation arrangements, or personal risk 
reduction. In this case, industrial diversification is more likely to represent a cost for the 
agency relationship between the managers and shareholders. 
Industrial diversification that is based on high degrees of technology diversification may 
hamper the performance of R&D activities because of a lack of coherence in the technology 
portfolio. Leten, Belderbos and Van Looy (2007) provide evidence of an inverted U-shape 
between technology performance and technology diversification. According to the authors, 
“high levels of diversification may yield few marginal benefits as firms risk lacking sufficient 
levels of scale to benefit from wide-ranging technological capabilities, and firms may 
encounter high levels of coordination and integration costs”. 
As regards the determinants and the impact of globalization on firms' R&D activities and 
productivity performance, theoretical studies (Dunning and Narula, 1995; Kuemmerle, 1997) 
and empirical studies (Kuemmerle, 1999; Kumar, 2001; Von Zedwitz and Gassmann, 2002) 
on the internationalization of R&D over the last two decades have highlighted a shift from the 
so-called home-base exploiting to home-base augmenting R&D strategies. Within such a 
framework, MNEs set up R&D laboratories abroad not only for adapting technologies and 
                                                            
84 Dundas and Richardson (1982). 
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products developed at home to local market conditions, but also to tap into the knowledge and 
technological resources in centers of scientific excellence located worldwide. Such location 
strategies have multiple dimensions: the technological strengths of the countries with respect 
to those of the company (Patel and Vega, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002); institutional factors, 
such as public support for R&D, IPR systems, quality of technological infrastructures; and 
lowering the costs of qualified research, especially in emerging countries (UNCTAD, 2005). 
The empirical evidence on the effects of industrial and global diversification is somewhat 
limited and has produced mixed findings. A study by Denis et al. (2002), based on 44,288 
firm-year observations over the period 1984-1997, showed that an increase in industrial 
diversification negatively affects the excess values of the firms. A positive impact, however, 
was found for globalization, which can be explained by an increase in flexibility to address 
changes in local environments, such as relative prices, differences in tax codes, and other 
institutional differences. Global diversification tends also to positively affect firms' market 
capitalization by exploiting firm-specific assets, e.g. intangible assets such as R&D, 
marketing skills, and management quality, increasing operating flexibility, and satisfying 
investor preferences for holding globally diversified portfolios. Morck and Yeung (1998) also 
found a positive effect for internalization of foreign markets on productivity performance.  
Conversely, because of its higher complexity in terms of management, coordination costs and 
information asymmetries between corporate headquarters and divisional managers, more 
globalized corporations are less efficient and exhibit lower performance. Thus, global 
diversification can also lead to the inefficient cross-subsidization of less profitable business 
units (Meyer et al., 1992), and divisional managers may have incentives to adopt and maintain 
value-reducing diversification strategies, which in turn reduce shareholder wealth (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). 
Given the literature, there are benefits and costs arising from diversification strategies. The 
purpose of our analysis is to measure the net effect of diversification on the performance of 
EU R&D. Hence, the main question of this chapter is whether the diversification strategies of 
the economic activities of the R&D leaders in Europe affect, positively or negatively, the 
performance of their R&D activities. 
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4.3  Empirical framework and data 
4.3.1  Empirical framework 
 
The role of diversification indicators is analyzed based on a Cobb-Douglas functional form 
for the production function of the companies. The use of a Cobb-Douglas form relies on a 
functional form that is first-order flexible85 (Coeli et al., 2005). Adding more flexibility to the 
model, using for instance a translog specification, in order to have a second-order flexible 
function has a cost (more parameters to estimate) and may enhance econometric issues like 
multicollinearity. As we implement R&D capital stock as an input, in addition to traditional 
labor and physical capital stock, as well as additional variables related to diversification 
indicators, we choose to rely on a Cobb-Douglas form in order to have a parsimonious 
number of parameters to estimate. Assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, 
ueKCALY   (4.1) 
 
with L, C and K being factors of production, i.e. respectively labor, physical capital and R&D 
capital. Equation 4.1 taken in logarithm form is: 
 
ititititit uKCLY  )log()log()log()log(   (4.2) 
 
In order to test the relationship between a diversification indicator I and the productivity of 
R&D, we implement an interaction term between I and K, which may reflect a potential 
complementarity between both variables. When controlling for country, industry and time 
effects, equation 4.2 becomes: 
 
)log()log()log()log( itititit KCLY    
ittiiiiitit uindustrycountryIIKK   )log()log( 10  (4.3) 
 
                                                            
85 It presents enough parameters to provide a first order approximation of the function at a single point. 
99 
 
The elasticity of output to R&D capital is: 
0 1log / logd Y d K I    (4.4) 
 
The stocks of R&D and physical capital were constructed by using the perpetual inventory 
method86 (Griliches, 1979). For each firm, the stock of capital at time t is defined by: 
 
ttt InvSTST  1)1(   (4.5) 
 
where δ is the depreciation rate of the capital and Inv is the amount of investment (R&D 
expenditure for R&D stock, or capital expenditures for physical capital stock). The 
depreciation rates were set to 0.15 for R&D and 0.08 for physical capital, which are the rates 
that are usually assumed in the literature87. The initial value of the stock can be computed by 
using the following expression:  
0
0
InvST
g    (4.6) 
 
where g is the growth rate of investment and is assumed to be constant. The growth rate used 
for R&D stock is the average sample growth rate for R&D expenditure, i.e. 7.5%. The growth 
rate for physical capital is the average sample growth rate for capital expenditure, i.e. 11.5%. 
4.3.2  Constructed data set and variables 
 
We use two sources of information for the empirical study. The first one is the 2009 edition of 
the EU industrial R&D scoreboard, released annually by the JRC-IPTS of the European 
Commission. The second data source is the Amadeus database published by the Bureau van 
Dijk. The R&D scoreboard has been issued every year since 2004 and provides data at the 
firm level for the top 1,000 R&D-active firms in the EU-27 and the top 1,000 outside the EU-
27. 
Our analysis focuses on the EU firms in the scoreboard. The information available in the 
R&D scoreboards is consolidated at the group level and includes, among others, R&D 
investments88, net sales, number of employees, capital expenditures, the country where the 
                                                            
86 See section 2.3.1 for a discussion about this method. 
87 See for instance Hall and Mairesse (1995) or Capron and Cincera (1998). 
88 The definition of “R&D” is that used by companies, following accepted international accounting standards 
(IAS38), in accordance with the definitions used in official statistics (as defined in the OECD’s Frascati 
Manual). The term “R&D Investment” is used in the Scoreboard. 
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MNE has its registered headquarters and the main business sector, based on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) at the two digits level, i.e. 45 industry and services sectors89. 
The period covered by the 2009 R&D scoreboard is 2005-2008, but previous R&D 
scoreboards allowed us to extend the observed period for the firms from 2000 to 2008. Each 
monetary observation was converted into constant currency (in euros) and prices. 
The Amadeus database90 contains financial information from 14 million companies in Europe. 
We extracted the following data from Amadeus for the subsidiaries of the EU-27 firms 
available in the 2009 R&D scoreboard: the number of subsidiaries and, for each subsidiary, its 
turnover, number of employees, ownership, location and business sector. The data for these 
subsidiaries are collected by Amadeus only once between 2005 and 2007, and therefore time 
series for these variables are not available. As a result, the dataset used in the empirical 
analysis consists of a panel of firms from the R&D scoreboards over the period 2000-2008 
augmented with a cross-section of their subsidiaries extracted from the Amadeus database. 
The date of the information for these subsidiaries is the most up-to-date over the 2005-2007 
period. 
Table 21 summarizes the main variables and data sources used in this study. 
 
Table 21. Data sources, variables and period covered 
2009 R&D scoreboard Amadeus 
R&D, net sales, employees, 
capital expenditures, 
country, industry (ICB) 
# subsidiaries, 
turnover of subsidiaries, 
# employees of subsidiaries, 
localization of subsidiaries, 
industry of subsidiaries (ICB) 
2000-2008 Most up-to-date information over 2005-2007 
 
The matching between the 1,000 European firms in the R&D scoreboard and their counterpart 
in Amadeus is not straightforward and involves a manual matching procedure considering 
several criteria. Following our criteria, each firm in the scoreboard is matched manually with 
one firm in Amadeus with the same or slightly different name (e.g. Philips Electronics and 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics), located in the same country, with the same status (e.g. Ltd, 
SA, OY) and with consolidated financial data in Amadeus.  
                                                            
89 See http://www.icbenchmark.com/. 
90 Amadeus, September 2009 version. 
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Table 22. Sample of 835 EU R&D companies 
Industry # firms 
R&D 2008 
in mio EUR R&D intensity 2008 
High-tech 385 81173 7.2% 
Biotechnology 52 1296 21.3% 
Semiconductors 19 3270 16.9% 
Pharmaceuticals 50 14433 15.8% 
Telecommunications equipment 26 12013 13.1% 
Software 71 3798 13.1% 
Electronic office equipment 2 303 7.9% 
Electronic equipment 33 974 7.1% 
Leisure goods 9 1892 6.2% 
Aerospace & defence 25 7482 5.9% 
Computer hardware 6 123 5.9% 
Automobiles & parts 40 29564 5.3% 
Electrical components & equipment 26 5239 4.0% 
Computer services 26 786 3.2% 
Medium-tech 243 20589 2.7% 
Health care equipment & services 29 1671 4.7% 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 15 2356 3.7% 
Chemicals 42 7075 3.2% 
Alternative energy 4 286 3.0% 
Industrial machinery 69 3289 2.7% 
General industrials 20 1318 2.4% 
Household goods & home construction 22 1352 2.3% 
Media 12 1292 2.2% 
Food producers 30 1951 1.5% 
Low-tech 207 14828 0.5% 
Banks 2 70 1.9% 
Personal goods 16 963 1.7% 
Life insurance 1 29 1.7% 
Fixed line telecommunications 13 4321 1.6% 
Support services 25 449 1.1% 
Tobacco 2 151 1.1% 
Internet 4 31 0.9% 
Other financials 11 269 0.8% 
Mobile telecommunications 4 334 0.8% 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 4 91 0.7% 
Electricity 15 1449 0.6% 
Construction & materials 26 671 0.5% 
Forestry & paper 6 235 0.5% 
Mining 5 485 0.5% 
Industrial metals & mining 12 859 0.4% 
Industrial transportation 12 432 0.3% 
Nonlife insurance 1 5 0.3% 
General retailers 13 406 0.3% 
Oil & gas producers 9 2458 0.3% 
Gas, water & multiutilities 8 584 0.2% 
Travel & leisure 9 167 0.2% 
Beverages 4 88 0.2% 
Food & drug retailers 5 282 0.2% 
All 835 116590 2.4% 
Source: own computation. 
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We also made use of the information provided in the contact list used by the European 
Commission to contact the firms when assembling the R&D scoreboard91. This allows us to 
compare the city of the firm in the contact list with the city disclosed in Amadeus as a further 
criterion for validating the match. We also compare information as regards sales and 
employees in both databases92.  
Out of the 1,000 EU scoreboards firms in 2008, 55 could not be found in Amadeus93 and 110 
were found but not kept because of unconsolidated accounts or doubts about the matching 
procedure. Our final sample consists of the 835 remaining firms in the R&D scoreboard.  
Table 22 presents an overview of the sample and some aggregate sector figures. We use the 
same classification as Ortega-Argiles et al. (2008) to assign the ICB industry and service 
sectors into high-, medium- or low-tech sectors. 
4.3.3  Subsidiaries and diversification 
 
The Amadeus database records 43,966 subsidiaries affiliated with the 835 EU MNEs in our 
sample. The R&D scoreboard firms hold at least 50% of the ownership of about 93% of these 
subsidiaries and at least 90% of the ownership of 84% of them. Table 23 presents some 
characteristics regarding the subsidiaries of the sample. 
 
Table 23. Subsidiary characteristics 
Industry average #subsidiaries 
average subs. 
Turnover (mil. USDa) 
average subs. 
employees 
High-tech 38 199 436 
Medium-tech 47 237 597 
Low-tech 86 1005 2583 
All 52 410 1015 
Sample: 835 EU R&D companies. a) Amadeus provides data for subsidiaries only in 
US Dollars and not Euros. This will not affect the empirical analysis, as we are only 
interested in the share of the sales across countries and industries. Source: own 
computation. 
 
                                                            
91 This contact list is confidential and the work on this information was performed by Michele Cincera as a 
visiting scientist at the DG-JRC Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, European Commission, Seville. 
92 Comparison is made for 2007 as it is the most recent year available in our version of Amadeus. Correlation 
between employees or sales in both databases is 0.99. The mean sales ratio for scoreboard/sales in Amadeus is 
1.04, with a median of 1. The mean employees ratio in scoreboard/employees in Amadeus is 1.05, with a median 
of 1. 
93 34 of them belong to the financial sector (bank, insurance and other financials) which is not covered in 
Amadeus. 
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We use two types of indicators to identify the level of geographic diversification of firms. The 
first is the number of countries covered by the subsidiaries and the main firm. If all 
subsidiaries are located in the same country as the parent company, it implies no country 
diversification and a value of 1 is given for this indicator. Higher values are related to a 
stronger level of internationalization. The second indicator is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index94 
(HHI) based on the sales and employee shares for the subsidiaries across countries. We 
calculate a HHI based on sales and another based on employees, given that for some 
subsidiaries we have information on the number of employees but not on sales95. The sales-
based HHI for a firm present in C countries is defined as: 
 
2
1  
C
c
c
country
S
S
salesHHI  
 
where salesc represents the sum of the sales of the subsidiaries in country c and S is the sum 
of the sales of all subsidiaries. The employees-based HHI is given by: 
2
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c
c
country
E
E
empHHI  
 
Where empc represents the sum of the employees of the subsidiaries in country c and E is the 
sum of the employees of all subsidiaries. An increase in the HHI implies a more concentrated 
distribution of sales or employees across countries. 
                                                            
94 The indicators to measure the global diversification and industrial diversification used in this chapter are based 
on HHI index. While this index is normally used to measure the level of concentration rather than diversification 
use of the HHI index to measure geographic and or business diversification is also well documented in the 
literature (Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
95 Data on employees are only available for some subsidiaries, while data on sales are only available for other 
subsidiaries. In total, we do not have information on sales or employees for 48% of these subsidiaries. 
In addition, financial information for these subsidiaries is only available for a given year (over 2005-2007). One 
limitation of the study is that it was not possible to collect this information over the period investigated, i.e. 
2000-2008, since 63% of these subsidiaries do not have any BvD ID in the Amadeus Database. The reasons 
explaining why this information is partially available (only for some subsidiaries and only for one year) are 
twofold. First, a large share of these subsidiaries are small companies in terms of size, i.e. in terms of number of 
employees, total revenues or total assets, and therefore no information on sales and on employees is collected by 
Amadeus. The second reason rests in the geographic coverage of the Amadeus database which contains 
information only for companies in both Western and Eastern Europe. Therefore, if a subsidiary is registered in a 
country outside Europe, it is not included in the database. A further complication rests in the fact that the number 
of subsidiaries itself is changing over time through the process of merger and divestiture of the multinational 
companies listed in the R&D scoreboards. 
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Table 24. Average geographic diversification measurements  
Firms #countries HHI sales HHI emp 
High-tech 11 0.61 0.62 
Medium-tech 14 0.56 0.58 
Low-tech 16 0.65 0.64 
All 13 0.61 0.61 
Sample: 835 EU R&D companies. Source: own computation. 
 
The average measurements for these indicators are presented in Table 24. The firms in our 
sample are located on average in 13 countries. Firms in high-tech industries cover fewer 
countries. This may reflect a size effect, as these firms are also smaller on average. HHI 
indicators are close to 0.6. 
Table 25 reports the shares of the subsidiaries in the main geographic areas represented in our 
sample: Europe96, US-Canada, Asia-Pacific97 and the rest of the world. While most of the 
subsidiaries are located in Europe, it appears that the share of European subsidiaries is even 
higher for low-tech industries, with a share that is 10 points higher for the low-tech firms 
(78%) than for the high-tech firms (68%). Higher-tech firms seem to favour US-Canada and 
Asia-Pacific regions when they want to locate their subsidiaries out of Europe. 
 
Table 25. Share of subsidiaries (in %) by regions 
Industry  EU27 US-CA Asia-Pacific RoW 
High-tech  68 13  9  9  
Medium-tech  71 11  8  10  
Low-tech  78 7  5  10  
All  72 11  7  10  
Sample: 835 EU R&D companies. Source : own computation. 
 
As a first measure of industrial diversification, we count the number of industries in which the 
MNE and its subsidiaries are active. We use the information available in the Amadeus 
database only: the NACE code that corresponds to the main industry sector for the 
subsidiaries. The number of sectors is measured according to the 4-digit Nace industry of the 
                                                            
96 European Union (27 Member States). 
97American Samoa, Australia, Brunei, People's Republic of China, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, Kiribati, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, 
Macau, Northern Mariana Islands, Malaysia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Palau, 
Solomon Islands, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Taiwan, Vietnam, Vanuatu and Samoa. 
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subsidiaries but we also calculate a more aggregate indicator based on the 2-digit Nace level. 
We also consider two other measures of industrial diversification: the sales-based and 
employee-based HHI across industries. These indicators are calculated at the 2-digit Nace 
level. The sales-based HHI for a firm present in K industries is defined as: 
2
1  
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where salesk represents the sum of the sales of the subsidiaries in industry k and S is the sum 
of the sales of all subsidiaries. The employees-based HHI is given by: 
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where empk represents the sum of the employees of the subsidiaries in industry k and E is the 
sum of the employees of all subsidiaries. An increase in the HHI implies a more concentrated 
distribution of sales or employees across industries. 
 
Table 26. Industrial diversification measurements 
Industry #Nace 4 digit 
#Nace 2 
digit HHI sales HHI emp 
High-tech 10 6 0.67 0.68 
Medium-tech 14 7 0.59 0.58 
Low-tech 18 9 0.62 0.58 
All 13 7 0.61 0.61 
Sample: 835 EU R&D companies. Source : own computation. 
 
The average measurements of industrial diversification are reported in Table 26. On average, 
the firms in our sample are active in 13 4-digit Nace industries. Firms in low-tech industries 
are active in more industries, and, as in Table 25, a reason for this may be the large size of 
these firms. 
Descriptive statistics 
The 835 firms are observed during the 2000-2008 period, with data missing for some firms. In 
order to remove outliers, the sample was trimmed by dropping observations in the first and 
last centile of sales, labor, physical capital and R&D capital variables. The sample is also 
restricted to observations with no abnormally high R&D intensity, i.e. above the 95th centile, 
which is 1 (100%). The panel is unbalanced with an average observed period of 5 years per 
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firm and a total of 4,230 observations. Because of missing observations for some subsidiaries, 
there are less than 4,230 observations for variables related to the subsidiary country and 
industry. Table 27 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample98. 
 
Table 27. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Med Std dev Min Max 
ln(sales) 4230 6.65 6.64 1.94 .45 11.16 
ln(labor) 4230 8.28 8.34 1.81 3.47 12.46 
ln(physical capital) 4230 5.61 5.56 2.24 .17 11.12 
ln(R&D capital) 4230 4.75 4.48 1.57 1.52 9.68 
R&D/sales 4230 0.08 0.04 0.12 0 .99 
#subsidiaries 4230 52 24 83 1 534 
#countries 4207 13.65 9 14.17 1 126 
HHI countries - sales 3773 0.59 0.56 0.29 0.11 1 
HHI countries - emp 3783 0.59 0.54 0.29 0.08 1 
#nace 4 digit 4190 13.45 9 12.80 1 119 
#nace 2 digit 4190 7.32 6 5.36 1 42 
HHI nace - sales 3821 0.63 0.59 0.25 0.14 1 
HHI nace – emp 3892 0.61 0.55 0.25 0.18 1 
Sample: 835 EU R&D companies. Source : own computation. 
 
 
Table 28 lists the 20 firms in our sample with the highest share of subsidiaries in Asia-Pacific 
for R&D. High-tech industries related to electronic equipment, semiconductors, software and 
telecommunications equipment are the main industries present in this ranking.  
                                                            
98 See Appendix 3 for more detailed statistics. 
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Table 28. Top 20 EU firms with subsidiaries in Asia-Pacific 
Firm %AP ICB 
James Hardie Industries 76% Construction & materials 
Micronic Laser Systems 60% Semiconductors 
Ilog 50% Software 
FRIWO (ex CEAG) 50% Telecommunications equipment 
BE Semiconductor Industries 41% Semiconductors 
Anoto 40% Computer hardware 
AVEVA 40% Software 
EPCOS 39% Electronic equipment 
ASM International 39% Semiconductors 
Rio Tinto 38% Mining 
Aixtron 38% Semiconductors 
ASML 36% Semiconductors 
SAES Getters 36% Electronic equipment 
Oberthur Technologies 36% Electronic equipment 
Novozymes 35% Biotechnology 
Option 33% Telecommunications equipment 
Manz Automation 33% Industrial machinery 
Wavecom 33% Telecommunications equipment 
ARM 33% Semiconductors 
Tekla 33% Software 
Sample: 835 EU R&D companies. Source : own computation. 
 
Interestingly, Table 29 shows a different industrial specialization pattern for the subsidiaries 
present in North America. The most represented industries in the top 20 ranking of firms with 
subsidiaries in US-Canada are the biotechnology and pharmaceuticals industries. 
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Table 29. Top 20 EU firms with subsidiaries in US-Canada 
Firm %US ICB 
Transgene 100% Biotechnology 
Flamel Technologies 100% Biotechnology 
Clipper Windpower 100% Electricity 
Basler 100% Electrical components & equipment 
ExonHit Therapeutics 100% Biotechnology 
Exiqon 100% Biotechnology 
Reed Elsevier 69% Media 
Gas Turbine Efficiency 67% Industrial machinery 
ARC International 65% Semiconductors 
Glunz & Jensen 60% Computer hardware 
Sophos 57% Software 
nCipher 57% Software 
Merial 50% Biotechnology 
Reckitt Benckiser 50% Household goods & home construction 
NicOx 50% Pharmaceuticals 
Boliden 50% Mining 
MediGene 50% Biotechnology 
Antisoma 50% Biotechnology 
AGI Therapeutics 50% Pharmaceuticals 
Plethora Solutions 50% Pharmaceuticals 
Sample: 835 EU R&D companies. Source : own computation. 
 
4.4  Results 
 
Table 30 provides the estimates from equation 4.3 when using the number of EU MNE 
subsidiaries as diversification indicators, as well as the number of countries and the number of 
industries where the firm is active. We use a logarithmic specification for these indicators99. 
Because the diversification indicators are not observed over time, a within or first difference 
transformation would drop one of the variables included in the interaction term. The 
following results are based on pooled-OLS estimates and we try to control for individual 
heterogeneity with sets of industry dummies and country dummies100. Time dummies are also 
included in the estimates. We do not correct variables for the double-counting of R&D in 
other inputs (i.e. labor and capital used for R&D activities) because of data limitation.  
As the estimation of the elasticity of output with respect to R&D capital may be affected by 
the simultaneity in the choices of output and inputs, estimates using predetermined factors of 
                                                            
99 A non-logarithmic specification does not affect the significance or signs of the diversification measurements. 
100 When the model in column 1 of Table 30 is estimated with fixed-effects, the elasticities of labor, physical 
capital and R&D capital are 0.72, 0.15 and 0.12, respectively.  
109 
 
production at time t-1 rather than factors at time t are reported in Appendix 5. Note that since 
the information about the subsidiaries is the most up-to-date available information and is only 
available in the cross-sectional dimension, it is not possible to use lagged periods as 
instruments for this variable. Lagged periods for the number of subsidiaries could be 
implemented as instruments in a GMM system framework in order to tackle potential 
endogeneity issues arising when subsidiaries are created based on high productivity 
performances. Furthermore, structural models could be used in order to add an equation that 
explains the evolution of the MNEs landscape in terms of subsidiaries based on past 
performances and home-based augmenting and exploiting purposes. The lack of time 
dimension and good instruments for the subsidiaries in the dataset hampers the use of 
instrumental methods in this analysis. However, we know that the information related to the 
subsidiaries is dated between 2005 and 2007. Hence, as additional robustness tests we 
considered regressions were early observations for Y, K, C and L are excluded (i.e. 
observations before 2006101 (see Appendix 6)). It follows that these additional results are not 
substantially different from the ones reported in Table 30. 
Table 30. Estimates – Diversification indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) 
log(L)  .65 (.02)***  .65 (.02)***  .64 (.02)***  
log(C)  .24 (.01)***  .24 (.01)***  .24 (.01)***  
log(K)  .11 (.01)***  .09 (.02)***  .16 (.02)***  
log(K) x log(#count)   .01 (.004)**   
log(#countries)   -.06 (.02)**   
log(K) x log(#indus)    -.02 (.01)***  
log(#industries)    .10 (.03)***  
R-sq  .95 .95 .95 
#obs  4230 4159 4148 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 835 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of 
industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent 
standard errors in brackets. ‘Industries’ is the number of 4-digit Nace industries where the firm 
is active. Estimates conducted without observations above 99th percentile of diversification. 
 
According to column 1 in Table 30, the output elasticities of labor, physical capital and R&D 
capital are respectively 0.65, 0.24 and 0.11. Columns 2 and 3 report estimates of the 
                                                            
101 Excluding observations in 2006 yields similar conclusions. 
110 
 
production function augmented with an interaction term between R&D capital and a 
diversification indicator. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant 
when using the number of 4-digit Nace industries as an industrial diversification indicator 
(column 3). However, it appears that the coefficient of the interaction between R&D capital 
and the number of countries covered by the firms is positive and significant (column 2).  
Figure 8 represents the output elasticity of R&D capital with respect to the number of 
countries and 4-digit Nace industries based on the results of columns 2 and 3 in Table 30. The 
pattern by technology level (i.e. sectors classified as high-, medium- and low-tech, based on 
Table 22) is also reported. The curves are not linear as the coefficients are estimated using a 
logarithmic specification for the diversification measures. It appears that there is a positive 
relationship between the elasticity of R&D capital and the number of countries and industries 
for firms in low-technology industries. The relationship between this elasticity and the 
number of industries is negative for higher technology industries. The number of countries is 
negatively correlated with the elasticity of R&D capital for firms in medium-tech industries. 
 
Figure 8. Output elasticity of R&D capital by technology level  
 
 
Note: logarithmic specification in the model estimated for the number of countries and industries. 
 
Table 31 reports the interaction term coefficients from equation 4.3 when using the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman indexes presented in section 4.3.3. Results show that a higher 
concentration of the MNEs across countries is related to lower R&D capital elasticity for 
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
dlogY/dlogK 
dlogY/dlogK 
#countries #industries 
High Tech 
All 
Medium Tech 
Low Tech 
High Tech 
All 
Medium Tech 
Low Tech 
111 
 
firms in low-tech and medium-tech industries, while the effect is positive for firms in high-
tech industries. A higher concentration across Nace industries seems to positively affect the 
R&D capital output elasticity for firms, especially those in high- and low-tech industries. 
 
 
Table 31. Concentration index estimates 
           Countries             Industries 
Firms log(K) x HHI sales log(K) x HHI emp log(K) x HHI sales log(K) x HHI emp
All -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)*** -0.01 (0.02) 
High-tech 0.04 (0.02)* 0.04 (0.02) 0.1 (0.03)*** 0.04 (0.03) 
Medium-tech -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02)*** -0.05 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 
Low-tech -0.15 (0.06)** -0.11 (0.06)* 0.14 (0.06)** 0.01 (0.06) 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 835 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically significant at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including log(L), log(C), log(L) and sets of industry (ICB 
classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in brackets. HHI emp and 
sales are Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes based, respectively, on the number of employees and sales. Estimates 
conducted without observations above 99th percentile of diversification. 
 
To analyze the relationship between the output elasticity of R&D capital and the location of 
the subsidiaries in Europe, US-Canada and Asia-Pacific, estimates of equation 4.3 are 
performed using the share of subsidiaries in these regions as diversification indicators, and the 
results can be seen in Table 32. As shown in column 2, the coefficient of the interaction term 
with the share of European subsidiaries is negative and significant, which indicates a strong 
negative correlation between the R&D capital elasticity and the percentage of European MNE 
subsidiaries located within Europe rather than outside. Column 3 reports a positive and 
significant coefficient for the interaction terms with the share of subsidiaries in North 
America, while column 4 indicates a positive but non significant coefficient for the interaction 
term with the share of subsidiaries in Asia-Pacific. 
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Table 32. Estimates for Shares of subsidiaries in main regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(L)  .65 (.02)***  .64 (.02)***  .65 (.02)***  .64 (.02)***  
log(C)  .24 (.01)***  .24 (.01)***  .24 (.01)***  .24 (.01)***  
log(K)  .11 (.01)***  .20 (.02)***  .09 (.01)***  .11 (.01)***  
log(K) x %EU subs   -.12 (.03)***    
%EU subs   .85 (.13)***    
log(K) x %US subs    .23 (.04)***   
%US subs    -1.4 (.21)***   
log(K) x %AP subs     .05 (.06) 
%AP subs     -.66 (.28)**  
R-sq  .95 .95 .95 .95 
#obs  4230 4207 4207 4207 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 835 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically significant at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of industry (ICB classification), country and time 
dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in brackets. %EU subs, %US subs and %AP subs mean 
shares of subsidiaries in the EU27, US-Canada and Asia-Pacific regions, respectively. 
 
 
Table 33 gives the coefficients of the interaction term by technology level. The coefficient is 
positive and significant for the interaction between the R&D capital and the share of 
subsidiaries in US-Canada for firms in the high-, medium- and low-tech industries. The 
interaction with the share of EU subsidiaries is associated with a negative and significant 
coefficient for high- and low-tech sectors. The coefficient of the interaction term with the 
share of Asia Pacific subsidiaries appears to be positive and significant only for firms in low-
tech industries. 
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Table 33. Estimates for Shares of subsidiaries in main regions by technology level 
Firms log(K) x %EU subs log(K) x %US subs log(K) x %AP subs 
All -0.12 (0.03)*** 0.23 (0.04)*** 0.05 (0.06) 
High-tech -0.07 (0.03)*** 0.17 (0.04)*** -0.07 (0.08) 
Medium-tech -0.001 (0.04) 0.13 (0.07)* -0.01 (0.08) 
Low-tech -0.39 (0.08)*** 0.49 (0.15)*** 0.63 (0.17)*** 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 835 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including log(L), 
log(C), log(K) and sets of industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. 
Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in brackets. %EU subs, %US subs and %AP subs 
mean shares of subsidiaries in the EU27, US-Canada and Asia-Pacific regions, respectively. 
 
4.5  Conclusion and implications  
 
This chapter aims to assess the relationship between both industrial and global diversification 
of large European R&D MNEs and the productivity of their R&D activities. The question 
addressed by our study is whether the diversification strategies of EU MNEs improve the 
economic performance of R&D activities. According to our estimations, the answer is yes for 
international diversification, but no for industrial diversification. By estimating production 
functions including labor, physical capital and R&D capital, we find that the globalization of 
EU MNEs is associated with a higher productivity for R&D capital, while industrial 
diversification appears to hinder R&D productivity. The R&D expenditures considered in this 
study represents about 80% of total European R&D. We propose an original approach to 
assess the effects of these two types of diversification based on the subsidiaries of the firms. 
This chapter also provides recent estimates of output elasticities for large EU firms. 
Our findings suggest that the benefits for R&D activities from European MNE industrial 
diversification strategies, i.e. economies of scope and new technological opportunities 
deployed in new directions, do not compensate for the loss of efficiency, which may be 
related to the greater complexity of corporate management. Furthermore, it supports the idea 
that divisional managers may favour less risky investments and may not optimally invest in 
R&D projects.  
On the other hand, although coordination costs and information asymmetries are expected to 
arise from the globalization of EU MNEs, we show that the geographic diversification 
benefits the R&D productivity of large EU firms. This may be explained by the strategic 
114 
 
locations of the subsidiaries, whose aim is to make use of the knowledge and technological 
resources in centers of scientific excellence located worldwide. 
This chapter also investigates the strategic location of the subsidiaries in Europe, North 
America and Asia Pacific, which are the three main regions for EU firms to locate their 
subsidiaries. EU firms with the highest shares of subsidiaries in North America belong mainly 
to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, while the MNEs mostly present in Asia 
Pacific are related to the electronic equipment, semiconductors, software and 
telecommunications equipment sectors. Figures in Appendix 7 seem to corroborate a positive 
link between a higher R&D intensity for EU firms and the share of subsidiaries in North 
America or Asia-Pacific, while R&D intensity tends to decrease with the share of EU 
subsidiaries. Regarding R&D productivity, we find that a higher share of subsidiaries in 
Europe decreases the output elasticity of R&D capital, while the share of subsidiaries in North 
America positively affects the elasticity. The share of subsidiaries in Asia Pacific seems to 
increase this elasticity only for firms in low-tech industries. 
One issue in the empirical framework is the data limitation regarding subsidiaries only 
observed in a cross-sectional dimension. This prevents the use of within or first difference 
transformations for the production function to capture unobserved individual heterogeneity 
other than industry or country effects, which are taken into account in our estimates. Another 
concern is the causality in the relationship between R&D productivity and diversification. 
While there are theoretical reasons to explain that diversification may enhance or alter the 
productivity of R&D activities, one may also expect firms with a higher R&D productivity to 
adopt a diversification strategy.  
These results have potentially important implications for competition policies and the EU 
2020 strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth recently adopted by the 
European Council102. 
As an acknowledged channel for industrial diversification is through mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) (Porter, 1987), antitrust authorities may be careful regarding decisions allowing 
M&A, as these activities, besides increasing the market power of the merged entities, may 
also reduce their efficiency and economic performance. While combining different companies 
(M&A) may allow them to develop new products more efficiently or reduce production or 
distribution costs, their increased efficiency means the market becomes more competitive and 
                                                            
102 http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council_conclusion_17_june_en.pdf.  
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consumers benefit from higher-quality goods at fairer prices. However, some M&A may 
reduce competition in a market, usually by creating or strengthening a dominant player. This 
is likely to harm consumers through higher prices, reduced choice or less innovation.  
To the extent that industrial diversification is initially mainly pursued through M&A, and that 
increased industrial diversification reduces the efficiency and economic performance of the 
merged entities (for instance, due to less innovation because divisional managers have lower 
incentives to engage in risky activities, and increased power and prestige through 
compensation arrangements), consumers may be harmed by reduced product choice and/or 
quality and eventually higher prices (with less efficient firms being forced at some point to 
increase their prices to compensate for the higher marginal costs resulting from these 
efficiency losses). Furthermore, as these effects may take some time to appear (dynamic 
efficiency - in this case - losses), they could affect the immediate decisions of the competitive 
authorities which would not take them into account, but rather base their decisions on the 
short term visible static efficiency gains of M&As. 
From the firms view point, our results imply that industrial diversification has a cost that is 
likely to be magnified when the levels of diversification are high and marginal benefits of 
diversification strategies are low. Hence, managerial practices should rely on coherent product 
and technology portfolios103. 
As increased globalization appears to have beneficial effects on large European R&D 
companies, this advocates increasing support for international S&T collaborations and 
partnerships, and supports one of the recommendations proposed in the Innovation Union 
Communication: "The European Union's scientific cooperation with third countries must 
become a matter of common concern and contribute to the establishment of a level playing 
field (removing market access barriers, facilitating standardization, IPR protection, access to 
procurement, etc). By 2011, the Commission will propose common EU/Member States S&T 
priorities as a basis for coordinated positions or joint initiatives vis-à-vis third countries, 
building on the work of the strategic forum for international cooperation. In the meantime, the 
EU and Member States should act in a concerted way when engaging in national (regional or 
local) S&T agreements and activities with third countries. The potential of 'umbrella' 
agreements between the EU and Member States with third countries will be explored." 
                                                            
103 See Leten, Belderbos and Van Looy (2007). 
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An interesting extension of the work regarding industrial diversification may be to investigate 
the characteristics of the industries the MNEs are active in. We do not have information about 
the R&D activities conducted by the subsidiaries, but the industrial classification of the 
subsidiaries may give a clue about their role in the group. This approach would also be helpful 
in analysing the relationship between the strategies of vertical integration and the productivity 
of the firms.  
This chapter considered three major regions of EU MNEs’ activities, i.e. EU, North America 
and Asian-Pacific regions. However, R&D and productivities of MNEs are closely related 
with the purposes of their global diversification. It would be interesting to investigate what 
would happen to the results if the purpose difference were taking into consideration. One way 
to address this question could be to enrich the empirical framework by directly estimating an 
equation linking the geographic diversification measure with the motives for doing so104. This 
equation could then be estimated jointly with the productivity performance equation in a 
simultaneous equations framework which would allow for controlling for the possible 
endogeneity between the motives for diversifying and the resulting performance105. 
To better understand the activities of European MNEs outside Europe, it may be worth having 
a closer look at the industrial diversification or concentration strategies in North America and 
Asia Pacific, and their impact on R&D productivity. Moreover, one could investigate the 
efficiency in these regions of the Home-Based Augmenting and Home-Based Exploiting 
R&D strategies for EU MNEs. 
                                                            
104 There is a huge literature dealing with these motives. See Cincera et al. (2010) for a recent review and 
discussion. 
105 A similar equation could also be estimated for the industrial diversification. 
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Chapter 5  - R&D Internationalization of EU MNEs  
and inventor location 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The main question of this chapter is whether the R&D activities that are conducted outside 
Europe still benefit to European growth. If so, how does the regional location of R&D centers 
matter in the production process of EU MNEs? The analysis is conducted on the basis of a 
unique sample of 637 European R&D leaders with information that is consolidated with 
respect to about 8000 worldwide patenting subsidiaries. The assessment of R&D 
internationalization is proxied by the regional repartition of the inventors of each firm. Hence, 
it is assumed that the location of the inventors reveals to some extent the location of the R&D 
subsidiaries of the MNEs. The empirical findings suggest that R&D located in Europe yields 
significant economic results, but a reallocation of R&D located in Europe instead of outside 
Europe seems to be correlated with lower R&D performances in high-tech sectors, but not in 
lower-tech industries. Conversely, a larger share of R&D located in the US seems to improve 
the economic performance of R&D activities within high-tech EU MNEs while the effect is 
negative for lower-tech companies. Nevertheless, the economic performance of R&D centers 
in Europe and US is jointly positive and significant for both regions. 
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5.1  Introduction106 
 
In the current era of increasing globalization, demographic revolutions, climate change, crisis 
recovery and anxiety of sovereign debt insolvency, the world is evolving at exponential speed. 
Adapting to these evolving trends is for Europe a crucial factor to protect its economical 
competitiveness and its position as one of the world powers. In order to answer these 
upcoming challenges in a sustainable way, the European Member States recently adopted the 
European Union (EU) 2020 Strategy placing innovation at its heart. According to the 
European Innovation Scoreboard (2009) the current state of innovation in Europe is worse 
than its main historical competitors, namely the United States of America (US) and Japan. 
However, European innovation indicators remain superior to the ones of emerging countries 
such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). Initially set in March 2002 for the horizon 
2010, the European objective of investing 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Research 
and Development (R&D) had to be postponed to the horizon 2020. Consequently, the EU 
2020 strategy’s flagship that fosters an “Innovation Union”, aiming a sharp growth of R&D 
expenditure, seems adequate to lead the European economy towards its future. 
Nowadays most of the R&D in the world is performed by Multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
The top 1000 EU and the top 1000 non-EU R&D spenders represent together about 80% of 
worldwide business enterprise expenditures on R&D107. The OECD forum of March 2005 
recognized internationalization of R&D as a complex while fundamental feature of 
globalization, significantly impacting economic development and public policy (OECD, 
2005). Since the mid 90s, R&D internationalization extended outside of the Triad (i.e. the US, 
the EU and Japan), spreading to new global players such as the BRIC countries (OECD, 
2008). In these conditions, European MNEs have R&D affiliates branched out across the 
globe. However, the contribution of the different R&D centers to the output of the parent 
company varies.  
The main question of this chapter is whether the R&D activities that are conducted outside 
Europe still benefit to European growth. If so, how does the regional location of R&D centers 
                                                            
106 The research on the inventors is an extension of the work on the subsidiaries that was realized jointly with 
Stephane Jeegers and supervised by Michele Cincera. We also gratefully acknowledge Carine Peeters for her 
comments.   
107 MEMO/11/705 of the 2011 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. 
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matter in the production process of EU MNEs? This chapter provides estimations of the 
elasticity of output to R&D capital considering the geographical location of the R&D 
subsidiaries of EU MNEs. To our knowledge, very few studies have analyzed R&D 
internationalization through the lense of the inventor location108 and our analysis aims at 
contributing to a better understanding of international R&D activities of EU MNEs. 
Our results have important implications in terms of European S&T policies. As the role of 
R&D internationalization is highly relevant in the microeconomic process that yields 
economic performance, comprehensive EU priorities and strategies should integrate the 
international dimension of R&D in order to address the challenges related to the globalization 
of EU MNEs. 
To measure those contributions, we use microeconomic data from the EU Industrial R&D 
Investment Scoreboards, which are yearly published. These reports gather data such as sales 
or R&D investment for the top 1000 European largest R&D spending companies. The 
accounts are consolidated by the parent company. However, the Scoreboards do not provide 
information about the repartition of R&D accross subsidiaries. Hence, considering that most 
of these companies are MNEs with foreign R&D affiliates, the R&D Scoreboards reports do 
not disclose pertinent indicators to assess the R&D internationalization. As a consequence, a 
subsequent objective of our analysis is to pertinently link the share of R&D 
internationalization for each of these European MNEs with their respective consolidated data 
found in the R&D scoreboards. In order to achieve this objective, a unique and original 
dataset has been created, which assesses R&D internationalization through the geographical 
repartition of the inventors that contributed to the patents of the companies.  
 
Matching procedures are used in order to identify the inventors of the firms reported in the 
R&D Scoreboard. First, 635 EU R&D leaders were related to about 8000 worldwide patenting 
subsidiaries. Second, the patenting subsidiaries were linked to their respective patent 
information for the period 2000-2008. Third, the assessment of MNEs’ R&D 
internationalization considers the geographical repartition of the inventors based on their 
country of residence. As a result, the final database gathers consolidated data from the EU 
R&D Scoreboards’ firms with the proxy of their respective R&D internationalization.   
                                                            
108 See the recent work by Harhoff and Thoma (2010) and the survey by Hall (2011). 
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Based on extended forms of the traditional Cobb-Douglas production function, two 
specifications are used in order to investigate the role of the location of R&D centers in the 
performance of R&D activities. These specifications are based on a complementary and a 
substitution effect between the R&D centers. The results highlight the differences in R&D 
productivity between technological clusters, i.e. high-, medium- and low-tech sectors. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature related to the 
internationalization perspective of R&D. Section 5.3 presents the empirical framework and 
the construction of the dataset. Section 5.4 reports and discusses the estimates. Finally, the 
last section concludes the chapter and sums up the main findings. 
5.2  R&D internationalization 
 
On the international perspective of R&D, literature refers to Dunning and Narula (1995) and 
Kuemmerle (1997) regarding the theoretical background. Coe and Helpman (1995) provide 
theoretical clues about the contribution of foreign R&D capital to a country’s total factor 
productivity. These authors also provide empirical results emphasizing the existence of R&D 
international spillovers, based on a proxy of national effective stock of knowledge. R&D, and 
especially its internationalization, represents a quite modern topic. During the 60s and the 70s, 
a desire to centralize R&D in companies’ home laboratories was observed (OECD, 2008). 
This geographical proximity between companies’ headquarters and R&D laboratories was 
driven by firms’ willingness to keep strategic decisions closely related to R&D facilities 
(Kuemmerle 1997). However, since 1980, it became obvious that a growing share of R&D 
was internationalized. This trend accelerated during the 90s and partly reflects the 
globalization of MNEs in developed economies. The spreading of MNEs R&D activities 
internationally began as a result of mergers and acquisitions rather than using foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) to build laboratories abroad (UNCTAD 2005).  
Table 34 shows the geographical repartition of the 700 largest R&D spending firms in 2003 
and 2009. This repartition illustrates the domination of R&D by companies that are home-
based in the Triad. By observing the changes between 2003 and 2009, it can be seen that this 
domination is slightly decreasing with the emergence of MNEs from the rest of the world. 
Table 35 reports the repartition of the R&D based on the EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard (2010). Europe and US companies account for almost two third of worldwide 
R&D. Germany is the top R&D spender in Europe and the European company that does the 
122 
 
most R&D is Volkswagen, which is a German group. France and UK are the second and third 
European countries in the R&D ranking, with the leading companies in these countries being 
Sanofi-Aventis and Glaxosmithkline, which are respectively French and UK pharmaceutical 
groups.  
 
Table 34. Largest R&D spenders in 2003 and 2009 
 Top 700 R&D Spenders 
Year 2003 2009 
 % Number of Companies % Number of Companies 
US 42,3% 296 32,4% 227 
Japan 22,0% 154 21,0% 147 
Europe 26,7% 187 30,6% 214 
Switzerland 2,9% 20 3,0% 21 
South Korea 1,4% 10 2,3% 16 
Taiwan  1,1% 8 2,9% 20 
Rest of the world 3,6% 25 7,9% 55 
Total 100% 700 100% 700 
Sources:  UNCTAD (2005) and EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (2010). 
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Table 35. R&D in the world (2009) 
Countries % of total €422.2bn Number of Companies % of total €422.2bn 
US 34.3% Germany 10.7% 
Japan 22.0% France 5.9% 
Europe 30.6% UK  4.5% 
Switzerland 4.4% The Netherlands 2.3% 
South Korea 2.6% Sweden 1.5% 
Taiwan 1.4% Finland 1.5% 
China 1.3% Italy 1.5% 
Rest of the World 3.4% Denmark 0.8% 
  Other EU 2% 
Source:  EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (2010) 
 
MNEs are key players in R&D and perform the majority of the R&D activities in the world. 
The top 1000 EU and the top 1000 non-EU R&D spenders represent together more than 80% 
of worldwide business enterprise expenditures on R&D109. The companies leading R&D 
internationalization are mostly from the Triad and their internationalization was mainly an 
intra-Triad phenomenon before being recently extended to R&D facilities in the rest of the 
world110.  
The current trend towards a more global expansion of R&D affects the nature of its 
internationalization. Between 1996 and 2002, the share of foreign business R&D affiliates 
significantly grew in developed countries from 11% to 16% and, at the same time, this ratio 
dramatically increased from 2% to 18% in developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005). In 1994, 
R&D spending performed by foreign affiliates represented 12% of total OECD industrial 
R&D spending, which was mainly111 undertaken by only 15 OECD countries112. In 1993, 
foreign affiliates spent 10% ($29 billion) of global business R&D113. In 2002, this part of the 
                                                            
109 MEMO/11/705 of the 2011 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. 
110 OECD (2005). 
111 95% of OECD total industrial R&D. 
112 Australia, Canada, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (OECD, 1998) 
113 UNCTAD(2005). 
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worldwide R&D spending was estimated to be around 16% ($67 billion) of global business 
R&D expenditures.  
Drivers of R&D internationalization 
Drivers of R&D internationalization result from conditions and interactions existing at 
different levels: country, industry and firm levels. Nevertheless, the final choice of locating 
R&D home or abroad arises from companies’ strategies114.  
At the country level, the national or local environment and policies affect the location 
strategies of R&D centers. Moreover, current regional endowments and potential for growth 
have huge impacts on R&D location. The countries’ income characteristics indirectly affect 
factors such as the level of foreign direct investments, the market size and the market growth 
potential, which are recognized as being R&D drivers (Dachs et al., 2010)115. The difference 
in labor costs between home and host countries can be another factor of R&D location, 
though empirical evidence is weak in comparison with other factors. Nevertheless, it still has 
an impact, especially for the location in emerging countries (Cincera et al., 2010). In addition, 
the proximity of countries, a similar technology specialization and the sharing of a common 
language increase collaboration and cross-border R&D investments (Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2001). Finally, government actions and the regional public policies clearly 
impact the attractiveness of R&D location (UNCTAD, 2005; OECD, 2008). 
At the sector level, inherent differences between industries directly affect the degree of R&D 
internationalization. Specific sectoral characteristics, such as R&D intensity, foreign market 
openness (relations with foreign markets for supply, sales, universities) or foreign direct 
investment levels and technological intensity, imply different levels of R&D 
internationalization. The latter phenomenon will be mostly present in knowledge-intensive 
and R&D intensive sectors116. R&D intensive sectors117 will have by definition a higher share 
of R&D abroad (UNCTAD 2005). According to Cohen (2010), current demand and demand 
expectation, technological opportunity and protection of innovation are the leading drivers of 
sector-wide innovation. Knowledge related characteristics are determinant factors118 to 
                                                            
114 Dachs et al. (2010). 
115 See Ekholm and Midelfart (2004), Blonigen (2005) and Jensen (2006) for foreign direct investments and 
Cohen (1995) for market size and market growth. 
116 Dachs et al. (2010). 
117 See for instance the classification used in Ortega-Argiles and al. (2009) based on ICB codes. 
118 Dachs et al (2010). 
125 
 
internationalize R&D, especially knowledge appropriability, tacitness and cumulativeness119. 
At the sectoral level, these factors seem to play a large role in the location decision process. 
This role can be positive or negative depending on industry specificities. According to 
Blomstrom and Kokko (2003), knowledge and foreign technology spillovers are the main 
reason for a country to attract inward FDIs. To some extent, industry’s network relations with 
suppliers, clients and universities can affect the location of their R&D (Marsili, 2001). 
At the firm level, a firm’s decision to locate its R&D abroad is closely related with its strategy 
and its own capabilities. This choice will mainly depend on a trade-off between potential 
advantages and drawbacks of home versus foreign R&D location. Furthermore, the size of the 
company and its experience matter (Dachs et al. 2010). Indeed, large firms, i.e. MNEs, will 
tend to invest much more in R&D and have a broader international perspective of their 
business than local SMEs. The concept of experience encompasses the general capabilities 
and internal knowledge that enables a company to benefit from external knowledge. It refers 
to both its past export experience and its relations with foreign markets. Consequently, these 
two features of a firm’s experience as well as the size of the firm allow exploiting FDIs and 
positively affecting their internationalization potential.  
Aside from firm’s characteristics, Kuemmerle (1997) and Dunning and Narula (1995) stress 
the existence of two main drivers of the company’s decision to internationalize their R&D 
activities. The first benefit for a company to locate its R&D abroad is to tap into the host 
country’s local knowledge. In this home-based augmenting (HBA) or asset-seeking motive 
approach, firms locate a R&D subsidiary abroad to access local technological assets and to 
absorb foreign local knowledge through interactions with scientific excellence of the local 
community. As a result, HBA sites will tend to be located in regional knowledge clusters in 
order to maximize their knowledge spillover absorption potential, thus setting aside the need 
to be located near production facilities or the final market. This supply side approach allows 
the company to better monitor or gain competitive advantages. In this framework, the 
knowledge transfer direction is from abroad towards home. The second benefit is the potential 
for better adapting companies’ products to the foreign demand. This home-based exploiting 
(HBE) or asset-exploiting approach supports companies’ foreign activities by focusing the 
R&D activities on the demand side, market access and cost considerations such as adaptation 
to local demand, “taylorization” of local production, exploitation of foreign immobile input 
                                                            
119 See for each factor respectively Cohen (2010), Cowan and al. (2000) and Marsili (2001). 
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for research or R&D rationalization based on efficiency-seeking production. Within this 
context, HBE sites will tend to be located close to manufacturing plants or commercializing 
facilities. As opposed to HBA, HBE strategies rather direct technology and knowledge flows 
from home to abroad. Dunning and Narula (1995) point out that even if the asset-exploiting 
strategies or HBE R&D represent the majority of R&D internationalization by MNEs, the 
asset-seeking motive or HBA has grown the most rapidly since 1980.  
Patel and Vega (1999) identify four possible MNEs strategies for FDI in R&D based on home 
and host country technological profiles. The authors suggest that the location for foreign 
technological activities of MNEs happens in their core areas where they are strong at home. 
This is mainly done according to the following strategies: “learning-oriented” FDI in R&D 
(myopic learning) and “efficiency-oriented” FDI in R&D (dynamic learning) corresponding 
respectively to HBA and HBE. Their results underline the importance of both strategies and 
illustrate differences across industries120. Le Bas and Sierra (2002), using the same 
classification and methodology, confirm the strong predominance of HBE and HBA 
strategies. However, their results121 suggest that HBA strategies prevail. According to OECD  
(2005), both home base augmenting (i.e. supply related motives) and home base exploiting 
(i.e. demand related motives) incentives coexist while technology-sourcing motives (HBA) 
are rising.  
Impacts of R&D on host and home country  
This section summarizes the arguments of OECD (2005), UNCTAD (2005) and Dachs et al. 
(2010) and introduces the underlying impacts of innovation activities of foreign-owned 
company on host and home countries. 
For the host country, the location of foreign-owned R&D facilities increases its aggregate 
innovation expenditure and its technological capability. Foreign affiliates increase the general 
amount of FDI and may facilitate access to international financing sources. However, threats 
arise for domestic companies from stronger innovation competition by the market entrance of 
foreign R&D subsidiaries. The main concern of the presence of foreign R&D activities is the 
loss of control over domestic innovative capacity and R&D actors. The R&D strategy of 
                                                            
120 According to the authors, HBA strategies tend to be prevalent in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, mining, food 
and materials while metal and electronics industries exploit HBE strategy relatively more. 
121 Le Bas and Sierra (2002) use a dataset of European MNEs while Patel and Vega (1999) analyze US MNEs. 
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foreign MNEs may change the nature of R&D leading to less radical innovation and may not 
comply with national interest or may only search for rents.  
Concurrently, as already stressed in this section, the location of innovation facilities abroad 
that tap into knowledge centers – HBA – may benefit the host country by increasing 
technology intensity and specific knowledge diffusion levels to local stakeholders122 through 
local collaboration and non-compensated spillovers. These centers of knowledge can create 
virtuous circles of clustering leading to high agglomeration effects that boost the regional 
economy. Such effects can slightly decrease when production facilities are separated from 
R&D or when HBE strategies set up low intensity R&D affiliates. Beyond the creation of 
skilled jobs for the local economy, the establishment of R&D facilities may increase the 
average level of competences of the host country’s labor market and potentially lead to more 
competition for skilled labor.  
The home country is indirectly subject to the internalization process of its MNEs. Indeed, the 
decision to locate R&D subsidiaries abroad is strategically taken by the MNEs in order to gain 
substantial benefits from this internationalization and to strengthen their R&D and global 
competitiveness. Hence, the effects on the home country are indirect public effects and often 
difficult to control. Based on increasing HBA strategies, one of the main reasons for R&D 
internationalization is the access to foreign knowledge. Therefore the home country can 
expect to benefit from reverse technological transfer. On the other hand, technological 
diffusion can lead to key technology leakages as well as skilled workers exports, which 
represent potential threats for the home country. MNEs tend to internationalize non-core 
R&D, implying that domestic R&D can focus on further added-value activities at home. 
Although in some cases, home net R&D exporters can see foreign R&D activities as a 
substitute to domestic ones, resulting this time in losses for the home country. Following HBE 
motives, foreign R&D affiliates may expand the market scope for domestic inputs, enhancing 
domestic product exportation, while foreign input price differences can annihilate or reverse 
this effect. 
The capitalization on potential benefits and undergoing potential costs will mainly depend on 
the country’s absorptive capacity, the integration of foreign affiliates and networking. To 
maximize R&D globalization benefits, a country continuously needs to boost its innovative 
                                                            
122 For example: companies’ customers, clients, competitors and surrounding universities. 
128 
 
capacity and attraction towards MNEs as well as skilled workers both domestically and 
internationally.  
Given the literature, they are many channels through which the internationalization of R&D 
may contribute to the economic performance of MNEs. The question that we investigate is 
whether R&D internationalization (in particular R&D located outside Europe) is an efficient 
and significant driver of the economic performance of EU MNEs.  If so, how does the 
regional location of R&D centers matter in the production process of EU MNEs? 
5.3  Empirical framework and data 
5.3.1  Empirical framework 
 
The increasing availability of data allows researchers to apply theoretical frameworks with 
various econometric methods to estimate the impact of R&D expenditure on companies’ 
production. Hall et al. (2010) survey a literature of almost 50 years and summarize the most 
important econometric findings of the returns to R&D123. The authors gathered estimations of 
elasticity, existing spillovers, private and social rate of return of R&D at firm and industry 
levels. In their review of various studies124 made on firm-level datasets, the overall average 
elasticity of output with respect to R&D is estimated to be between 0.01 and 0.25 depending 
on the data and the measurement methods. The authors estimate results of industry-level 
datasets to be in the same range and close to firm-level empirical findings. Moreover, Hall et 
al. (2010) confirm a strong positive R&D rate of return in developed economies. They 
evaluate these rates to average in the ranges of 20% to 30%, with an increase up to 75% in 
some cases. At the industry level, Ortega-Argiles et al. (2009) estimate the elasticity of 
knowledge stocks on productivity to be around 0.125 in average, ranging between 0.07 for 
low-tech to 0.17 in high-tech sectors. 
Similarly to the analysis conducted in chapter 4, we will analyze the role of R&D 
internationalization in the production process based on a Cobb-Douglas functional form for 
the production function.  
                                                            
123 The authors follow selection criteria including accessibility to publication, methodologies and familiarity with 
the work in question. 
124 Based on 21 pooled estimations and 23 temporal estimations (Cf. Hall and al. (2010) - Table 2a & Table 2b). 
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A general Cobb-Douglas production function125 is assumed, 
 eKCALY   (5.1) 
 
where L, C, K represent production factors, respectively labor, physical capital and knowledge 
(R&D) capital. The Cobb-Douglas function can be transformed into logarithm to linearize the 
function. Adding fixed effects for country and industry and time dummies leads to the 
following linear function:  
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )it it it it i i t itY L C K country industry             (5.2) 
In this framework, the output elasticity of R&D capital is: 
log( )
log( )
d Y
d K
  
The stocks of R&D and physical capital were constructed by using the perpetual inventory 
method126 (Griliches, 1979). For each firm, the stock of capital at time t is defined by: 
1(1 )t t tST ST Inv     
 
where δ is the depreciation rate of the capital and Inv is the amount of investment (R&D 
expenditures for R&D stock, or capital expenditures for physical capital stock). The 
depreciation rates were set to 0.15 for R&D and 0.08 for physical capital, which are the rates 
that are usually assumed in the literature127. The initial value of the stock can be computed by 
using the following expression:  
0
0
InvST
g    
where g is the growth rate of investment and is assumed to be constant. Analogously to 
chapter 4, the growth rate used for R&D stock is the average sample growth rate for R&D 
expenditure, i.e. 7.5%. The growth rate for physical capital is the average sample growth rate 
for capital expenditure, i.e. 11.5%. 
                                                            
125 See section 4.3.1 for a discussion about the use of a Cobb-Douglas form. 
126 See section 2.3.1 for a discussion about this method. 
127 See for instance Hall and Mairesse (1995) or Capron and Cincera (1998). 
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Concerning the inventor location, two specifications are tested. Specification 1 assumes that 
the geographical location disparity of the inventors affects the knowledge capital coefficient 
through an additive term Zj representing the share of inventors in region j. This specification 
investigates the reallocation of R&D centers in region j instead of other regions, i.e. a 
substitution effect of conducting research in region j instead of in other regions. 
0 1 2j jZ ZY AL C K e e           
     
Using logarithm and adding individual fixed effects for country, industry and time transforms 
equation 5.2 into the following linear function: 
0 1 2log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )it it it it ij it ij
i i t it
Y L C K Z K Z
country industry
     
 
     
      (5.3) 
In this specification, the elasticity of output to R&D is  
0 1
log( )
log( ) j
d Y Z
d K
    
Specification 2 decomposes the coefficient of the knowledge capital variable into the sum of 
the geographical repartition of the inventors128 as follows:  
j j
j
Z
Y AL C K e

    
This expression considers a complementary approach of the R&D centers that jointly 
contribute to the performance of R&D. Expressing equation 5.2 in a linear form through 
logarithm leads to the following function:  
 
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )it it it j ij it
j
i i t it
Y L C Z K
country industry
   
 
   
   
   (5.4) 
 
In this second specification, the elasticity of output to R&D is  
log( )
log( ) j jj
d Y Z
d K
 . 
                                                            
128 With 1j
j
Z  . 
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5.3.2  Data 
This chapter focuses on the top European R&D MNEs. The database gathers 637 of the top 
1000 largest EU R&D spenders relating each of them to specific patent information.  
Data sources 
The inventor location will be used to assess the internationalization of R&D activities. The 
empirical study mainly uses information from many different sources previously gathered in 
three different databases. The first one is the database used by Cincera and Ravet (2011), 
which is the database presented in chapter 4. The second database results from data collection 
by Thoma et al. (2010). The third database is Espace Bulletin, which is published by the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and gathers information on patent applications. 
The starting point of Cincera and Ravet (2011) database is a matching between two databases. 
The objective of the authors was to retrieve the subsidiaries of the largest R&D MNEs in 
Europe. On the one hand they used the available EU industrial R&D investment 
scoreboards129 that yearly report the top 1000 R&D European MNEs. On the other hand they 
used the Amadeus130 database that reports financial data of 14 million EU companies. They 
matched both manually to find the corresponding subsidiaries of European companies present 
in the 2009 R&D scoreboard. As a result, their database gathers data131 of 835 companies132 
of the EU R&D Scoreboard related to about 44000 subsidiaries. Their dataset covers the 
2000-2008 period. The production output133 (Y), the number of employees (L), the capital 
expenditures and the R&D expenditures have been directly extracted from the EU 
Scoreboards. The authors checked that the resulting data corresponded to a consolidation of 
firm subsidiaries’ information (extracted from Amadeus database134) which also confirmed 
their matching with the subsidiaries.  
The internationalization of R&D is investigated by creating an original dataset that is based 
on the dataset of Cincera and Ravet (2011). The idea is to retrieve information on the patents 
                                                            
129 Annually published by the JRC-IPTS of the European Commission. 
130 Published by Bureau van Dijk. 
131 Datasets include: R&D, net sales, employees, capital expenditures, country, industry (ICB) and subsidiaries 
information (number, turnover, employees, localization, industry). 
132 “55 companies could not find a correspondence in Amadeus and 110 were not kept because of unconsolidated 
account or doubts about the matching procedure”. 
133 The output is measured by the company sales reported in the R&D Scoreboards.  
134 The authors used Amadeus September 2009 version. 
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of the 835 MNEs and their 43,966 subsidiaries, and more precisely on the location of the 
inventors that contributed to the patents. Through the subsidiaries names that were collected, 
their database allows one to have a consolidated list at the MNE level of potential names for 
patent applications. 
The 835 EU firms of Cincera and Ravet (2011) and their 43,966 subsidiaries can be identified 
by their BvD id135, which is an identification number based on the VAT of the companies. In 
order to relate these companies to their patents, the database created by Thoma et al. (2010) 
was used. The authors propose a list of 131,000 applicant names, covering 58,8% of the EPO 
applications between 1979 and 2008. Our interest in their database resides in the work done 
on the identification of the applicants by assigning them a BvD id. Furthermore, the authors 
related each applicant to their granted patents and identification number at the EPO, which 
allows linking the firms in Cincera and Ravet (2011) to their patents. The third database, 
Espace Bulletin, lists information relative to all patent applications at the EPO since 1978. 
Information on inventor location was eventually extracted from Espace Bulletin. 
Matching Process 
Based on the three sources, the matching process consists mainly in coupling data throughout 
“key” variables available in the databases. Table 36 lists the main variables of each of the 
three databases:  
Table 36. Main variables of the databases 
Cincera and Ravet (2011) Thoma and al. 
(2010) 
EPO 
Firm data Firm and patent data Patent data 
R&D, sales, employees, 
industry (ICB), capital 
expenditures, BvDid of the 
firms + subsidiaries 
BvDid, patent publication 
number 
Applicant name, country, 
application date, publication 
number, inventors’ country 
of residence 
Source:  own illustration. 
The matching between the databases of Thoma and al. (2010) and Cincera and Ravet (2011) 
was performed in two steps. First, using a direct matching of the BvD identification numbers, 
the subsidiaries and headquarters of 576 out of the 835 firms in Cincera and Ravet (2011) 
                                                            
135 Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus company code. 
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were found. Second, a manual check of the remaining companies resulted in 61 additional 
matched companies based. Table 37 illustrates the manual matching process. 
 
Table 37. Example of manual matching 
Matching type Source 
 Thoma and al. (2010) Cincera and Ravet (2011) 
Manual Shell International Research Maatschappij 
Behr Thermot Tronik Italia 
Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare 
Royal Dutch Shell 
Behr 
Reckitt Benckiser 
Source:  own illustration. 
The final sample gathers 637 EU R&D Scoreboard companies out of the 835 of Cincera and 
Ravet (2011). These 637 firms and their subsidiaries were linked to around 83000 EPO 
granted patents with application dates within the considered period (2000-2008). As a main 
achievement of this first matching step, each one of the 637 firms is now related to the patents 
that were filed by themselves or their subsidiaries. Out of the 28575 subsidiaries of the 637 
firms, 7897 subsidiaries are reported as having filed a patent at the EPO (patenting 
subsidiaries). The patent application number is the key variable for a direct matching between 
Espace Bulletin and the first matched dataset. This second matching procedure connects the 
patents identification numbers of Cincera and Ravet (2011) to more detailed information on 
the patents included in Espace Bulletin. The patents of the 637 EU MNEs were eventually 
related to about 229,621 inventors who contributed to these patents. Figure 9 illustrates the 
matching process. 
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Figure 9. Mapping of the matching process 
  
Source:  Own illustration 
 
Inventor location 
The location of the inventors is investigated through the patent information supplied by 
Espace Bulletin, which contains the country of residence of the inventors. The assumption 
made here is that the geographical repartition of the inventors over the considered period is a 
proxy of the internationalization of the R&D of each company. Indeed, the repartition of 
inventors across regions is likely to correspond to the geographical repartition of the R&D 
centers used to develop this patent. This idea is similar to recent work by Harhoff and Thoma 
(2010) who investigate the inventor location of EU and US firms. The authors find a strong 
correlation between R&D and inventors and stress the significant contribution of foreign-
located inventors to productivity growth and market value. 
Variables for R&D internationalization are constructed for each firm based on the repartition 
of the inventors across regions as the ratio of its regional inventors on its total number of 
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inventors, expressed in percentage. For instance the inventors’ repartition ratio of the 
company i in region j can be expressed as 
iK
ijk
k
ij
i
inventors
Z
Total inventors


, 
where Ki is the number of patents granted to firm i and inventorsijk represents company i's 
number of inventors who contributed to patent k while residing in region j. Naturally, for each 
firm i, 1ij
j
Z  . The regional clusters are based on the paper of Cincera and al. (2010). The 
authors split the world into 7 regions that are: Europe136, United States & Canada, China, 
India, Japan, other European countries137 and the rest of the world.  
Table 38 illustrates the R&D internationalization of EU MNEs by host country138. The 
average share of inventors located in Germany is 27.24% and is the largest in our sample, 
followed by inventors located in United Kingdom (16.32%) and France (14.5%). US-Canada 
is the first foreign region where inventors of European MNEs are located with a share of 4.7% 
of the inventors. While European industries tend to have most of their inventors located in 
Europe, disparities between industries exist without any intra-technological class trends. On 
the whole, the repartition of inventors in our sample suggests a high concentration of 
inventors (about 90%) located in Europe. This representation of European inventors is higher 
than in Harhoff and Thoma (2010), who use PCT applications and EPO applications of about 
1500 EU business groups. While the European share of inventors seems to be inflated by the 
exclusive use of EPO granted patents, this inflation effect is not expected to vary across firms 
and the distribution of inventors outside Europe may still illustrate the distribution of foreign 
R&D centers. On top of the geographical regions reported in Table 38, three additional 
regions are considered. The region “Non EU27-USC" sums the repartition of inventors 
outside the two most represented regions: EU27 and United States-Canada. This region 
aggregates potential trends of internationalization outside the European Union and North 
America139, some of which could not be shown with individual regions due to small 
inventors’ counts. The regions “Same country” and “Other EU27” are complementary, the 
former representing the ratio of inventors resident in the country of the firm’s headquarter and 
                                                            
136 Europe means here the 27 countries of the European Union 
137 Countries under the “EU non 27” label are:  Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Norway, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. 
138 See Appendix 8 for the repartition by industry. 
139 United States and Canada, “USC”.   
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the latter denoting the ratio of inventors in the European Union while outside the firm’s 
headquarter country.  
Table 38. Sample 637 EU firms: Average regional repartition of patent inventors 
EU15 Germany 27.24% 
United Kingdom 16.32% 
France 14.50% 
Sweden 7.60% 
Italy 6.69% 
Finland 5.03% 
Netherlands 4.30% 
Denmark 3.38% 
Belgium 2.56% 
Spain 2.55% 
Ireland 0.65% 
Austria 0.54% 
Portugal 0.34% 
Luxembourg 0.13% 
Greece 0.02% 
EU27 Hungary 0.41% 
(not EU15) Czech Republic 0.06% 
Slovenia 0.04% 
Latvia 0.04% 
Poland 0.03% 
Estonia 0.03% 
Bulgaria 0.01% 
Slovakia 0.00% 
Cyprus 0.00% 
Lettonia 0.00% 
EU non27 1.79% 
USC 4.72% 
Japan 0.45% 
China 0.02% 
India 0.02% 
ROW 0.54% 
Source: Own computation. 
 
The sample of the 637 selected EU R&D Scoreboard MNEs gathers available data covering 
the 2000-2008 period. Some of these firm data140 is missing for some years for certain firms. 
These data cover in average five years per firm. The regional repartition of patent’s inventors 
                                                            
140 Sales, physical capital, R&D capital, employees and investment. 
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is available for each of these 637 companies. To limit excessive R&D values compared to 
sales, the sample excludes R&D intensity (i.e. the ratio R&D/Sales) superior to one. The final 
sample contains 4165 observations, the physical capital being the variable with the least 
observations. Out of these 4165 observations, 3492 include information for all variables141. 
Some descriptive statistics of the sample’s main variables are presented in Table 39. 
Table 39. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log(Y) 4165 6,96 2,07 0,45 12,71 
Log(L) 4140 8,55 1,91 2,94 13,17 
Log(C) 3507 6,03 2,27 -0,67 11,71 
Log(K) 4164 5,08 1,73 -1,22 10,42 
RD/Y 4165 0,07 0,12 0 0,99 
Total inventors 4165 451,08 1790,34 1 25182 
% EU27  4165 0,92200 0,17242 0 1 
% USA-Canada 4165 0,04684 0,13703 0 1 
% China 4165 0,00024 0,00171 0 0,027 
% India 4165 0,00022 0,00203 0 0,028 
% Japan 4165 0,00444 0,04666 0 1 
% EU non 27 4165 0,02009 0,08071 0 0,870 
% Rest of world 4165 0,00618 0,04061 0 0,667 
% Non EU27-USC 4165 0,03116 0,10182 0 1 
% Same country 4165 0,70924 0,33807 0 1 
% Other EU27 4165 0,21276 0,30079 0 1 
Sample : 637 EU R&D companies. Source: own computation.  
 
Table 40 reports Top 20 available companies from the EU industrial R&D investment 
Scoreboard. Each firm is related to its total number of patents and the sum of their inventors 
in the dataset. The Scoreboard ranking is based on R&D investment in 2008.  
                                                            
141 657 observations are missing for physical capital and 25 for Labor. According to ICB code and Ortega-
Argiles and al. (2009) classification, out of these 3492 observations, 1468 are in high-tech sectors, 1178 in 
medium-tech sectors and 846 in low-tech sectors.  
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Table 40. Top 20 Available EU R&D Scoreboard Companies: R&D Data 
Scoreboard 
Rank Firm 
Number of 
patents 
Number of 
inventors 
R&D 
Investment 
(2008) €m 
R&D 
Intensity 
2008 
1 Volkswagen 1406 3391 5926 5,2% 
2 Nokia 1639 3540 5321 10,5% 
4 Daimler 1522 4887 4442 4,6% 
5 Robert Bosch 6018 16725 3916 8,7% 
6 Siemens 7483 25182 3836 4,7% 
7 GlaxoSmithKline 493 1823 3835 15,2% 
8 AstraZeneca 599 1798 3622 15,9% 
9 Alcatel-Lucent 1078 2429 3167 18,6% 
10 Ericsson 1698 3694 2975 15,7% 
11 BMW 1225 3023 2864 5,4% 
12 EADS 962 2097 2756 6,4% 
13 Bayer 2096 9242 2725 8,3% 
14 Peugeot (PSA) 988 1567 2372 4,4% 
15 Renault 682 1513 2235 6,1% 
16 Boehringer Ingelheim 246 1094 2109 18,2% 
17 Fiat 527 1000 1986 3,3% 
18 Finmeccanica 121 239 1767 13,3% 
19 SAP 64 149 1627 14,1% 
20 Philips Electronics 3231 7084 1613 6,1% 
21 STMicroelectronics 700 1486 1544 21,9% 
Sample : 637 EU R&D companies. Source: own computation.  
 
Table 41 provides some characteristics of the dataset by industry. The industry technological 
distinction has been done according to ICB code and Ortega-Argiles and al. (2009) 
classification. This table accentuates differences across industry especially in terms of 
propensity to patent and R&D intensity.  
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Table 41. Sample 637 EU firms: R&D Data by industry 
Industry - ICB # Firms # Patents # Inventors R&D 2008 €m 
R&D 
Intensity 
2008 
High-tech 286 47316 124179 78625 7,12% 
Biotechnology 49 862 2747 1082 18,13% 
Semiconductors 17 2902 6921 3235 16,89% 
Pharmaceuticals 44 2806 10407 14369 15,90% 
Telecommunications equipment 21 4560 9959 11951 13,16% 
Software 25 184 393 2297 12,79% 
Electronic office equipment 2 345 822 303 7,91% 
Electronic equipment 25 1250 3125 911 7,09% 
Leisure goods 6 3367 7346 1827 6,31% 
Aerospace & defense 20 2928 6252 7420 5,92% 
Computer hardware 5 78 157 76 4,77% 
Automobiles & parts 37 19051 47524 29544 5,27% 
Electrical components & equipment 24 8772 28086 5226 4,00% 
Computer services 11 211 440 384 2,44% 
Medium-tech 206 24686 75031 19973 2,87% 
Health care equipment & services 26 1215 2993 1655 4,70% 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 15 1017 2108 2356 3,66% 
Chemicals 40 10432 39479 7064 3,16% 
Alternative energy 3 51 140 256 3,14% 
Industrial machinery 63 4497 9676 3232 2,71% 
General industrials 18 1892 4475 1306 2,64% 
Household goods & home construction 18 2285 6317 1308 2,38% 
Media 4 813 1863 1042 2,77% 
Food producers 19 2484 7980 1754 1,69% 
Low-tech 145 11892 30411 13304 0,50% 
Personal goods 12 1843 3782 871 1,59% 
Fixed line telecommunications 10 2893 6417 4279 1,66% 
Support services 12 536 1179 320 1,26% 
Tobacco 2 79 198 151 1,10% 
Internet 2 23 73 14 4,15% 
Other financials 9 262 684 152 0,49% 
Mobile telecommunications 3 46 103 324 0,75% 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 4 170 334 91 0,73% 
Electricity 13 688 1772 1418 0,58% 
Construction & materials 22 851 1991 564 0,50% 
Forestry & paper 6 111 261 235 0,47% 
Mining 4 32 85 459 0,53% 
Industrial metals & mining 12 814 2281 859 0,42% 
Industrial transportation 7 1206 4935 347 0,32% 
General retailers 5 255 758 194 0,32% 
Oil & gas producers 7 1387 4032 2298 0,24% 
Gas, water & multi utilities 6 605 1323 570 0,22% 
Travel & leisure 4 64 140 55 0,07% 
Beverages 4 13 29 88 0,19% 
Food & drug retailers 1 14 34 15 0,05% 
All 637 83894 229621 111902 2,51% 
Sample : 637 EU R&D companies. Source: own computation.  
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5.4  Results 
 
Estimates 
The empirical results are presented separately for the two methods explained in the empirical 
framework (i.e. Specifications 1 and 2). A general investigation over the different results 
across both methods is undergone to gather the main trends and provide further clues of the 
impact of R&D internationalization on the R&D performance of EU MNEs.  
The estimates of the non-augmented Cobb-Douglas function are shown in Table 42. 
Table 42. Cobb-Douglas production function 
Variables Industrial Technology Cluster 
All High Medium Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(L) .688(.016)*** .664 (.028)*** .671 (.025)*** .747 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .223(.012)*** .157 (.021)*** .225 (.024)*** .273 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .098 (.011)*** .196 (.020)*** .091 (.015)*** -.010 (.019) 
Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Industry dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Time dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
R-Squared .959 .958 .949 .952 
# Observations 3492 1468 1178 846 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 637 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of industry 
(ICB classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in 
brackets. Dummies are jointly tested for significance level. 
 
Table 42 highlights the importance of industrial technology clustering142, as strong disparities 
of output elasticity of R&D capital are observed. These first results assess the impact of R&D 
capital to output for companies in high and medium technological industries as significantly 
positive, whereas this impact is not significant for the low-tech sectors. Given this disparity, 
further regressions are conducted given this clustering to provide a more accurate analysis of 
the estimated results.  
 
                                                            
142 The Industrial technology clustering is performed according to ICB code and Ortega-Argiles and al. (2009) 
classification. 
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The empirical results are shown separately for the two specifications described in section 5.3 
(i.e. Specification 1 and Specification 2). The first specification measures the impact on R&D 
productivity when a firm increases the share of R&D centers in a given region while 
decreasing it in other regions. This specification assesses the impact of substituting R&D 
centers between given regions. The second specification assesses the importance of the 
regions in the elasticity of output to R&D in a complementary approach.  
The estimates of equation 5.3 (Specification 1) are presented in Table 43 for Europe, US-
Canada and the remaining regions (included in the “Non EU27-USC” region). Estimates for 
technological clusters (high-tech, medium-tech and low-tech sectors) are also provided as the 
first column, describing regressions on the whole sample, reports divergent and often non 
significant results for the three considered regions. Considering the high-tech sector, the 
coefficient of the interaction between R&D and the share of European inventors (regression 2) 
is negative while the interaction with the share of USC inventors has a positive impact on the 
output (regression 6). The estimates for medium-tech companies show a positive interaction 
coefficient between R&D and the share of inventors in Europe (regression 3) and negative 
ones for inventors in US-Canada and other regions (regressions 7 and 11). Concerning firms 
in the low-tech industries, the interaction coefficients are positive for EU and negative for 
USC.  
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Table 43. Results for Specification 1 (substitution effect) 
Geo Variables Industrial Technology Cluster 
All High Medium Low 
E
U
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(L) .688(.016)*** .662 (.028)*** .675 (.026)*** .771 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .224(.012)*** .154 (.021)*** .218 (.025)*** .283 (.018)*** 
Log(K) .038(.032) .324 (.048)*** -.005 (.036) -.188 (.093)** 
ZEU -.334(.169)** .607 (.239)** -.456 (.191)** -1.12 (.445)** 
ZEU *Log(K) .062(.034)* -.134 (.048)*** .109 (.041)*** .172 (.098)* 
U
SC
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(L) .688(.016)*** .662 (.028)*** .674 (.025)*** .764 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .225(.012)*** .154 (.021)*** .221 (.024)*** .290 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .098(.012)*** .190 (.020)*** .100 (.015)*** -.011 (.019) 
ZUSC .292 (.205) -.836 (.305)*** .379 (.230)* 1.262 (.456)*** 
ZUSC *Log(K) -.045 (.420) .190 (.057)*** -.129 (.052)** -.199 (.106)* 
N
on
 E
U
27
-U
SC
 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log(L) .687(.016)*** .664 (.027)*** .670 (.025)*** .755 (.025)*** 
Log(C) .223(.012)*** .156(.021)*** .223(.024)*** .267(.019)*** 
Log(K) .101(.011)*** .198(.020)*** .097(.016)*** -.023(.020) 
ZOthers .626(.253)** .378(.654) .682(.278)** -.861(1.08) 
ZOthers *Log(K) -.140(.054)*** -.102(.152) -.128(.056)** .293(.22) 
 Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 Industry dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 Time dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 R-Squared143 .95 .95 .95 .95 
 # Observations 3492 1468 1178 846 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 637 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically significant at the 
1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of industry (ICB classification), 
country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in brackets. Dummies are jointly 
tested for significance level. 
 
The estimates reported in Table 43 illustrate the relevance of industrial technology clustering 
in the analysis of R&D internationalization. Considering the high-tech sectors, the positive 
interaction coefficient for USC144 combined with negative ones for Europe, illustrate that 
European high-tech companies having higher share of R&D subsidiaries in US-Canada tend 
to have a higher elasticity of output with respect to their investments in R&D capital. Looking 
                                                            
143 The R-Squared values for the 12 regressions range between .949 and .959. 
144 United-States and Canada. 
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at the medium technological industries, the elasticity of output to R&D is higher for 
companies with a larger share of their R&D subsidiaries located in Europe compared to other 
regions. At first sight, estimates for the low-tech sector show some similarity with the 
medium one, predicting a higher elasticity of output to R&D for European companies keeping 
their R&D affiliates in Europe instead of locating them in USC. “Non EU27-USC” relates to 
the five remaining regions presented in section 5.3.2 (CN, IN, JP, EU non 27 and ROW), 
based on a sum of inventors in these regions. Appendix 9 reports estimates for these five 
regions. The interaction coefficient is positive for inventors in China and the Rest of the 
world. The share of inventors located in Japan is positively related to R&D productivity only 
for high-tech firms, while the coefficient of the interaction is negative when considering the 
whole sample. Increasing the share of inventors in “EU non 27” countries (while decreasing it 
in other regions) is related to lower performance of R&D activities. Appendix 10 presents the 
results for “Same country” and “other EU27” areas applying the same technological 
clustering and suggests a non significance for any interaction coefficient. A last fact 
enlightened by the estimates is the increasing impact on output of both labor and physical 
capital inputs when industrial technology decreases. Contrarily to these two inputs (L and C), 
the impact of R&D capital on output is larger in higher-tech sectors. Table 42, Appendix 9 
and Appendix 10 confirm this statement, independently of the geographical specification. 
Previous estimates in Table 43 suggested how a reallocation of R&D centers (as proxied by 
inventors) in a given region instead of other regions affects the performance of R&D. Table 
44 provides estimates of the weights of each region in the decomposition of the elasticity of 
output with respect to R&D activities. This specification yields an overview of the size of the 
regional contributions in the performance of R&D within EU MNEs and considers a 
complementary contribution of the R&D centers located worldwide.  
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Table 44. Specification 2 (complementary effect) 
Variables 
 
Industrial Technology Cluster 
All High Medium Low 
Log(L) .685 (.012)*** .668 (.019)*** .660 (.021)*** .763 (.022)*** 
Log(C) .223 (.011)*** .155 (.018)*** .229 (.019)*** .275 (.019)*** 
Zsame country*Log(K) .096 (.009)*** .195 (.015)*** .089 (.014)*** -.024 (.018) 
Zother EU27*Log(K) .103 (.010)*** .189 (.016)*** .123 (.016)*** -.034 (.020)* 
ZUSC*Log(K) .113 (.014)*** .214 (.023)*** .045 (.026)* .063 (.030)** 
Znon US-EU27*Log(K) .089 (.018)*** .180 (.030)*** .105 (.023)*** .041 (.048) 
Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Industry dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Time dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
R-Squared .959 .958 .951 .953 
# Observations 3492 1468 1178 846 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 637 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates 
including sets of industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. 
Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in brackets. Dummies are jointly tested for 
significance level. 
 
Table 44 reports estimates of Specification 2 using aggregated groups in order to assess the 
role of the inventor location in Europe (in the same country or in another European 
country145), US-Canada and the remaining regions. The results indicate that the R&D 
activities inside the four regions contribute significantly and jointly to the economic 
performance of the MNEs. The coefficients for all regions are not significantly different for 
the high-tech firms. Concerning medium-tech companies, the coefficient related to US-
Canada stands significantly lower than the ones related to the European regions. On the other 
hand, the USC coefficient suggests that only R&D associated with inventors located in US-
Canada affects positively and significantly the output in the low-tech industries. 
                                                            
145 Estimates considering Europe as a single group are available in Appendix 11.  
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Table 45. Specification 2 (8 regions) 
Variables Industrial Technology Cluster 
 All High Medium Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(L) .690 (.012)*** .664 (.019)*** .673 (.021)*** .764 (.022)*** 
Log(C) .221 (.011)*** .161 (.018)*** .216 (.019)*** .271 (.019)*** 
ZSame country*Log(K) .095 (.009)*** .185 (.015)*** .095 (.014)*** -.018 (.017) 
ZOther EU27* Log(K) .103 (.010)*** .178 (.016)*** .128 (.016)*** -.022 (.021) 
ZUSC* Log(K) .109 (.014)*** .198 (.023)*** .070 (.027)** .056 (.030)* 
ZCN* Log(K) -.872(.645) 2.67 (1.04)** -3.38 (.847)*** -4.23 (1.87)** 
ZIN* Log(K) -.125 (.558) 1.56 (1.11) -.637 (.583) 5.66 (4.89) 
ZJP* Log(K) .117 (.032)*** .223 (.048)*** .036 (.041) .752 (.333)** 
ZEUnon27* Log(K) .060 (.022)*** .123 (.038)*** .115 (.027)*** .005 (.079) 
ZROW* Log(K) .172 (.042)*** .449 (.116)*** .229 (.089)*** .055 (.056) 
Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Industry dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Time dummies Yes*** Yes** Yes*** Yes*** 
R-Squared .959 .958 .951 .953 
# Observations 3492 1468 1178 846 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 637 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of industry 
(ICB classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in 
brackets. Dummies are jointly tested for significance level. 
 
Table 45 presents the estimates of equation 5.4 considering 8 regions. The results related to 
the whole sample suggest significant and positive impact of R&D located in the regions 
“Same country”, “Other EU27”, “EU non 27”, US-Canada, Japan and the rest of the world. 
However, while the coefficients differ in size, the differences are not significant at a 5% level. 
This trend holds true for high-tech and medium-tech industries, with a general positive weight 
of R&D capital located in these regions in the contribution to the performance of EU MNEs. 
USC coefficient is lower than European coefficients for Med-tech and is even significantly 
lower than the impact of R&D located in European countries other than the home country. 
Considering this sector, “Other EU27”, “EU non 27” and ROW coefficients range higher than 
0.1, with the latter more than two times higher. The coefficient associated to ROW is 
significantly higher than the others for the high-tech and the medium-tech firms. As in 
previous tests, the low industrial technology cluster does not disclose much interpretable 
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regional information due to lack of significance. The small number of inventors146 of China 
and India does not allow reliable interpretation of the results. On the whole, the findings 
related to this specification stress the significant role of inventors located inside as well as 
outside Europe for high and medium tech companies, but they do not provide much different 
coefficients across the most represented regions of the dataset.  
Discussion  
The range of the estimated output elasticities of R&D capital is similar to the ones in Ortega-
Argiles and al. (2009) and the results compilation of Hall and al. (2010). As regards the 
estimates147 of Ortega-Argiles and al. (2009) using the same industry classification, our 
estimated elasticities range in the same proportion, with slightly higher and lower bounds. 
Other studies’ results compiled by Hall and al. (2010) tend to validate the scope of our 
estimates. The estimates confirm a larger impact of R&D in high-tech industries than in lower 
tech ones, while the estimated impact on output of both labor and physical capital is higher for 
lower technology companies. Moreover, the companies in high technological industries are 
characterized by a relatively higher influence on output of R&D capital than physical capital.  
The results related to the internationalization of R&D are based on the assumption that 
inventor location is a good proxy of this internationalization as it should reveal the location of 
R&D subsidiaries. Regarding the high-tech sector, R&D subsidiaries located in Europe seem 
to reduce the general incidence of R&D capital on output. The opposite trend seems to be the 
norm for the medium technological cluster. The impact of the knowledge capital of R&D 
subsidiaries located in the home country seems to be slightly higher for high-tech MNEs as 
opposed to the medium-tech ones. The low-tech sectors are characterized in most of the 
regressions by a lack of significant coefficients.  
European R&D subsidiaries located in the US and Canada provide quite divergent results for 
different technological clusters. The findings highlight the superior output elasticity of R&D 
capital from high-tech affiliates located in US-Canada rather than in Europe. On the contrary, 
the medium technological cluster is characterized by the opposite effect. Due to lack of 
significance, the low-tech sector provides unclear results with a negative interaction term for 
the first specification but a significant and positive elasticity for the second one.  
                                                            
146 0.11% for both countries. 
147 The authors estimate elasticity of knowledge stocks on productivity to be around 0.125 in average, ranging 
between 0.07 for low-tech to 0.17 in high-tech sectors. 
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The results of the five other regions (i.e. China, India, Japan, EU non27 and RoW) show less 
significance in general for both specifications, especially when the number of observations is 
reduced due to technological clustering. However, some evidence still emerges from the 
estimations. Focusing on Japan, it appears that R&D affiliates of high-tech companies located 
in Japan are characterized by a higher elasticity to R&D capital than their peers located in 
Europe. Analyzing the whole sample for other European countries reveals a minor impact of 
R&D capital on output for firms with higher share of R&D affiliates located in these regions. 
This trend seems to arise from companies in the high-tech sector. Moreover, the med-tech 
cluster reveals ambiguous results and the low-tech sector does not provide significant results. 
As previously stated, estimates for China and India rely on small amount of data, which 
highly influences their sensitivity. Therefore reliable analysis of these two areas cannot be 
provided. Gathering the remaining countries in one group, “Rest of the World” impairs the 
analysis of the estimates of this residual sample due to the intrinsic heterogeneity of this 
group. 
The dataset considers 637 firms of the top 1000 R&D investing European companies. The 
missing companies may represent a bias whereas the sample tends to consider the maximum 
reliable and available data representing European R&D on a micro level. This sample of 637 
firms accounts for an investment in R&D of nearly €112 billion in 2008. In comparison148 the 
top 1000 EU Scoreboard Companies represent €130 billion invested in R&D in 2008.  
One significant innovation of the dataset is to assess the internationalization of R&D 
experimenting new paths whilst providing an original and meaningful approach. However, the 
definition of R&D internationalization based on the inventor location relies on arguable 
assumptions. Indeed, assuming that the share of R&D subsidiaries corresponds to the 
residential place of their inventors in a region remains a questionable hypothesis. Since recent 
studies assess R&D internationalization up to 16% for developed countries (UNCTAD, 2005), 
the dataset seems to overestimate home and European localization of R&D subsidiaries 
against their international counterparts. In our view, this overestimation is primarily due to the 
exclusive use of EPO granted applications. As regards the internationalization strategies on 
the location of R&D centers, these applications are more likely to reflect R&D activities that 
are conducted in foreign countries for the purpose of home-base augmenting R&D strategies 
rather than home-base exploiting strategies. As the latter are implemented in order to adapt 
                                                            
148 The sample of 837 firms of Cincera and Ravet (2011) invested in R&D €116,5 billion in 2008. 
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technologies and products to local market conditions, they may yield patents that are not filed 
at the EPO and, hence, do not affect our internationalization measure. The use of granted 
patents (even if the date of the application is considered here) implies that the total number of 
patents plummets over the end of the investigated period. However, we do not analyze the 
quantity of patents filed by the MNEs but rather the distribution of their inventors across 
countries, which should not be affected by the total amount of patents. Additionally, other 
biases of the dataset are due to uncontrollable surrounding factors linked to data features. As 
can already be seen on the patenting disparities across industry present in the dataset, 
heterogeneous propensities to patent across industries (Danguy and al., 2010) as well as 
international patenting strategies could probably influence the dataset and its downstream 
international repartition of inventors. Still the dataset contains relevant information 
representing an interesting proxy of the international repartition of R&D.  
5.5  Conclusion and implications 
  
Alongside the accelerating globalization of economies, the internationalization of corporate 
R&D seems to grow rapidly in developed countries and to surge in developing countries. 
Historically leading corporate R&D expenditures, Triad MNEs continue to represent most of 
the worldwide investments in R&D. In that context, these MNEs choose between home and 
foreign R&D location considering related potential benefits and drawbacks. There are 
numerous drivers and incentives for R&D internationalization at a national or industry scale. 
At the firm level, the internationalization strategy of MNEs and HBE/HBA strategies are key 
decision factors for the location of their R&D subsidiaries. 
The main question of this chapter was whether R&D internationalization (in particular R&D 
located outside Europe) is an efficient and significant driver of the economic performance of 
EU MNEs. We provide evidence that, while R&D located in Europe shows significant 
performance results, a reallocation of R&D located in Europe instead of outside Europe 
(substitution effect) seems to be correlated with lower R&D performances in high-tech 
sectors, but not in lower-tech industries. Conversely, a larger share of R&D located in the US 
seems to improve the economic performance of R&D activities within high-tech EU MNEs 
while the effect is negative for lower-tech companies. Nevertheless, the economic 
performance of R&D centers in Europe and US is jointly positive and significant for both 
regions (complementary effect). In our view, our results suggest that, for high-tech firms with 
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a high level of R&D concentration inside Europe, increasing the R&D activities in Europe 
yields smaller marginal benefits than increasing R&D activities outside Europe in order to 
exploit foreign technology resources. 
These results have important implications in terms of European S&T policies and advocates 
comprehensive strategies on the internationalization of R&D. As the internationalization of 
R&D is a channel through which the performance of EU MNEs is affected, EU objectives and 
priorities should optimally address the globalization trends of R&D. The support and funding 
of international R&D activities should give firms an easier access to relevant foreign 
knowledge, especially for high-tech companies, and EU policies would do well improving 
instruments that raise the potential benefits of outward foreign direct investments related to 
foreign R&D centers.  
The subsequent objective of the chapter relies on the creation of a unique dataset that gathers 
patent information and companies’ quantifiable data whilst representing a consistent proxy of 
the R&D internationalization of these companies. This proxy is based on the 
internationalization pattern observed in the location of the inventors. The outcome provided 
by this chapter stresses the differences in R&D productivity across different world regions 
and technological sectors. Nevertheless, the considered technological clusters gather 
heterogeneous industries that have specific characteristics. It would be interesting to focus the 
scope of the research on a particular industry or a singular region in order to better evaluate 
the drivers that yield higher performances of R&D centers located abroad. Moreover, 
companies’ strategies appear to have a non-negligible importance on R&D localization and 
R&D investments. This suggests that a wider scope of analysis that encompasses surveys of 
MNEs’ top management could further explain both drivers and impact on the output of R&D 
internationalization. 
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Chapter 6  - Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter concludes the dissertation by reviewing the main findings of the previous 
chapters. Policy implications are summarized and the limitations of the thesis are addressed. 
Finally, extensions of the scope of the analysis and ideas for future research are suggested. 
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In this research, we have analyzed several topics related to the technological activities that 
take place within the companies. The first topic deals with the financing constraints that may 
occur when a firm is willing to conduct R&D activities. The second topic consists in the 
channels through which R&D activities yield knowledge outcomes. The third topic is the 
growing complexity of the MNEs in terms of product diversification (industrial or 
international) and R&D internationalization, and its relationship with the economic 
performance of R&D activities. These topics have a high level of revelancy for policy makers 
and each chapter aims at contributing to the literature of its respective topic.  
Lessons from the financing constraints on R&D and the productivity performance of 
technological activities 
A first objective of this research was to investigate the extent to which R&D, especially in 
Europe, is hampered by the presence of financing constraints. As opposed to ordinary 
investments, R&D investments are riskier by nature and provide outputs consisting of new 
products and processes that are difficult to use as collateral to outsiders. Firms that are willing 
to start R&D projects may be financially constrained when they face lack of internal funds 
and uneasy access to external funds. The presence of financing constraints is tested in this 
research through the measure of the sensitivity of R&D activities to cash flow as a proxy of 
the availability of internal funds. 
The main question of chapter 2 was whether financing constraints explain a part of the 
acknowledged R&D gap between Europe and the US. In our view, the answer is yes, though it 
is difficult to extrapolate at a macroeconomic level the extent to which financing frictions 
widen this gap. Our findings give an assessment of the financing constraints faced by the 
firms in their decisions to invest in R&D over the 2000s on the basis of a dataset of private 
companies that confronts EU to US top R&D spenders. We show evidence of liquidity 
constraints for EU companies but not for their US competitors. The results are based on 
system GMM estimations of dynamic R&D investment equations. A second question was 
whether older firms actually face less severe or no financing constraints, as opposed to 
younger firms. A nonparametric estimation of the accumulation rate of R&D is used as a 
complementary approach in order to assess the relationship between R&D, cash flow and the 
age of the companies without any restriction on the dynamics of the accumulation rate of 
R&D. This approach eventually allows a descriptive view of the effect of the age on the 
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sensitivity of R&D along with confidence intervals computed for this effect. When 
investigating the relationship between the R&D sensitivity to cash flow and the age of the 
companies, we find evidence of a sensitivity that decreases with the age of the companies, 
which is likely to illustrate stronger financing constraints for younger companies. While it is 
not clear whether the low representation of young firms within the European leading 
innovators (i.e. the top R&D spenders) is due to a low access to external financial resources, a 
US-EU comparison indicate that EU yollies are characterized by a lower but still significant 
R&D sensitivity while EU ollies seem to be more financially constrained than their US 
counterparts.  
A second objective of this dissertation was to identify the main drivers of innovative 
performance amongst the several dimensions that characterize R&D activities. Instead of 
considering R&D as a whole entity, the key feature of the analysis resides in the 
disaggregation of R&D. The innovative performance of the firms was measured by means of 
a knowledge production function with outcome of the technological activities being assessed 
by the patents of the companies.  
The main question of Chapter 3 is whether the heterogeneity of R&D activities affects the 
technology performance of a firm, and, if so, what are the effects that can be observed in an 
integrated framework like the one used in our analysis. Chapter 3 reports cross-sectional 
measures of the elasticity of patents to disaggregated R&D within Belgian firms. A Belgian 
R&D survey of firms located in Belgium in 2004-2005 was used to test hypotheses on several 
components of R&D at the firm level. The internationalized nature of Belgian R&D implied 
substantial work that was performed on retrieving priority filings related to Belgian R&D, 
even when applicants are not Belgian. This is likely to occur in the case of repatriation of 
knowledge from Belgian R&D subsidiaries to the foreign owner.  
The findings of chapter 3 identify several drivers of innovative performance within the R&D 
activities of the companies. In-house R&D of Belgian firms is clearly the main determinant of 
their innovative outcomes. Sub-contracted R&D is indeed more likely to provide generic 
rather than specialized inputs into the R&D programmes of the clients, and these inputs are 
less likely to lead to successful inventions and patents applications. While the top patenting 
companies in the samples are mainly conducting development activities, the role of research 
activities still prevails in the determination of the quantity of patents filed by the companies. 
Conversely, the findings about process-oriented R&D seem to illustrate a preference for 
155 
 
secrecy as opposed to disclosure of the innovations achieved by this type of activities. 
Another dimension of R&D that is considered is the role of human capital and R&D 
investment in the innovative performance of the firms. Laboratories and equipments are a 
necessity (depending on the technological sector) to conduct innovative activities and modern 
equipment improve the productive capacity of R&D. On the other hand, new ideas and new 
inventions are born in the pool of human capital that represents most of the R&D expenditures 
of the companies. Our findings confirm the importance of human capital in the technological 
performance and, to some extent, give credit to efficient salary strategies for the hiring of 
researchers as well as education and training of hired R&D workers. Concerning the 
subcontractors, the findings illustrate the significant role of collaborations with universities in 
the production of patents.   
While chapter 2 assesses the impact of financing matters on the size of R&D, chapter 3 
provides findings on the efficiency of different types of funding of R&D activities. R&D 
expenditures funded by own funds or external sources appear to jointly determine the 
outcome of the knowledge process that takes place within Belgian firms, with larger impacts 
of intramural R&D financed by external funds rather than own funds. We find evidence that 
both external private and public funds, Belgian or foreign, encourage the emergence of R&D 
activities that yield significant returns.  
A first look at the importance of R&D internationalization is given in chapter 3, with a highly 
international nature of the Belgian R&D. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate this strategy of MNEs 
along with the diversification of their business activities. Indeed, a significant portion of 
companies diversify their productive activities, either across multiple lines of business, i.e. 
industrial diversification, or across different geographic markets, i.e. international 
diversification or globalization. The assessment of the relationship between these strategies 
and the productivity of R&D was the third and final objective of the thesis. The strategies of 
the MNEs were assessed by analyzing their subsidiaries and the location of the inventors who 
contributed to their patents. Chapter 4 investigates the diversification of economic activities 
(industrial and international) while Chapter 5 analyzes the internationalization of R&D 
Chapter 4 presents the construction of a first dataset consisting in the identification of the 
subsidiaries of the top R&D spenders in Europe in 2008. This first dataset is used as a basis 
for the construction of a second dataset that extends the previous work on the subsidiaries by 
adding consolidated information on the patents of the MNEs (including the subsidiaries) and 
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the location of the inventors. Indicators revealing the diversification and R&D 
internationalization strategies of the companies are based on the industries and countries 
covered by the European MNEs. The combined effect of these indicators with the R&D stock 
on the economic performance is estimated by means of economic production functions 
including labor and physical capital stocks as well as R&D.  
The question addressed by Chapter 4 is whether the diversification strategies (industrial and 
international) of EU MNEs improve the economic performance of R&D activities. According 
to our estimations, the answer is yes for international diversification, but no for industrial 
diversification. We provide recent elasticity measures of output with respect to labor, physical 
capital and R&D stock for EU MNEs. These are respectively 0.65, 0.24 and 0.11. The 
findings about the diversification strategies of economic activities suggest that the role of 
industrial diversification differ from the role of globalization when assessing the economic 
impact of R&D activities.  A firm that diversifies its lines of products across several industries 
implies a greater complexity in terms of management which may lead to loss of efficiency, 
especially for high degrees of diversification. Our findings suggest that the cost of this type of 
diversification on the productivity of R&D is not compensated by the benefits of exploiting 
the economies of scope and having new directions to deploy the resources invested in a 
particular technological field. On the other hand, EU MNEs that diversify their economic 
activities in an international perspective appear to be characterized by a higher productivity of 
their R&D activities. Moreover, a larger share of subsidiaries in the US-Canada region is 
related to a higher performance of R&D activities while a larger presence in Europe leads to a 
lower elasticity of output with respect to R&D capital.  
The main question of Chapter 5 was whether R&D internationalization (in particular R&D 
located outside Europe) is an efficient and significant driver of the economic performance of 
EU MNEs. Our results are based on R&D internationalization indicators as proxied by the 
internationalization in the location of the inventors. R&D located in Europe shows significant 
performance results, but a reallocation of R&D located in Europe instead of outside Europe 
(substitution effect) seems to be correlated with lower R&D performances in high-tech 
sectors, but not in lower-tech industries. Given the high shares of EU inventors that we 
observe, these findings suggest that high-tech firms have smaller marginal benefits from 
increasing their R&D activities in Europe than outside Europe for high levels of technology 
concentration in Europe. Furthermore, a larger share of R&D located in the US seems to 
improve the economic performance of R&D activities within high-tech EU MNEs while the 
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effect is negative for lower-tech companies. This illustrates high marginal benefits for high-
tech firms that conduct HBA and HBE strategies in the US. Nevertheless, the economic 
performance of R&D centers in Europe and US is jointly positive and significant for both 
regions (complementary effect).   
Implications 
This thesis deals with several topics that all have a high level of relevancy in terms of policy 
implications and managerial practices.  
 
- Our results about financing constraints suggest improving conditions in the EU for 
access to external capital, i.e. debt and equity. Policy makers would do well providing 
direct R&D support for EU firms, i.e. tax incentives and R&D subsidies and further 
develop the availability of risk capital.  
- Tax policies that affect the after-tax cash flow of the firms are likely to affect the R&D 
activities of EU companies as they seem to rely on the availability of internal finance. 
Therefore R&D tax-incentives in Europe should be designed and implemented with 
the view of significantly enhancing R&D and innovative activities. 
- The low representation of young companies within the top innovation leaders in 
Europe suggests a need of measures to stimulate R&D activities amongst young firms 
(yollies), especially in innovative sectors as well as measures aimed at improving the 
conditions and the financial factors that favour the development and growth of these 
firms.  
- On the other hand, well established companies (ollies) appear to benefit from more 
efficient external capital markets in the US than in Europe. Indirectly, more favourable 
framework conditions in the EU are desirable, in particular for enhancing the private 
equity market. Our findings support the view that Europe needs a functioning internal 
market, which is currently hampered by the relatively high degree of fragmentation of 
EU financial markets.  
- While the role of R&D activities in the production of knowledge outcomes is 
straightforward, we show evidence of a high degree of heterogeneity in the different 
components of R&D activities and the way they contribute to the technology 
performance of companies. This heterogeneity advocates a differentiated public 
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support to these components provided that the patent propensity of each of these R&D 
components is controlled for. 
- The importance of public aid is supported by our findings as we show evidence that 
public funds are actually effective in the creation of new inventions.  
- The heterogeneity of R&D correlates with differences in the efficiency of the 
protection of R&D activities through patents and should be optimally addressed by 
IPR policies. 
- As a main channel for industrial diversification is through mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) (Porter, 1987), antitrust authorities may be careful regarding decisions 
allowing M&A, as these activities, besides increasing the market power of the merged 
entities, may also reduce their efficiency and economic performance. 
- From the firms view point, our results imply that industrial diversification has a cost 
that is likely to be magnified when the levels of diversification are high and marginal 
benefits of diversification strategies are low. Hence, managerial practices should rely 
on coherent product and technology portfolios149. 
- As increased globalization appears to have beneficial effects on large European R&D 
companies, this advocates increasing support for international S&T collaborations and 
partnerships. 
- Given that internationalization of R&D is a channel through which the performance of 
EU MNEs is affected, EU objectives and priorities should optimally address the 
globalization trends of R&D. The support and funding of international R&D activities 
should give firms an easier access to relevant foreign knowledge and EU policies 
would do well improving instruments that raise the potential benefits of outward 
foreign direct investments related to foreign R&D centers.  
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The main weaknesses of the analyses presented in this dissertation are the following. In 
chapter 2, the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow is used as the only measure of financing 
constraints. As explained in chapter 2, this measure of internal finance and its relation with 
                                                            
149 See Leten, Belderbos and Van Looy (2007). 
159 
 
the financing constraints may be criticized and is likely to capture expected demand growth. 
The implementation of sales growth in the estimated equations is expected to control, even 
imperfectly, for the expectation role of cash flow. As it is inherent to nonparametric methods, 
the nonparametric estimation of R&D is limited in the dimensions that are used and only 
estimations of R&D accumulation rates for several combinations of ages and cash flow are 
reported. Including more dimensions implies more scarcity of data in the higher dimensional 
spaces and a decrease in the achievable rate of convergence of the estimation.  A weakness in 
the analysis conducted in chapter 3 is related to the lack of temporal dimension in the analysis 
because of the data. An expected consequence of the exclusive use of cross-sectional samples 
is the inflated measure of the patent elasticity. A weakness of chapter 4 resides in the absence 
of time-varying data about the subsidiaries, which prevents the use of more sophisticated 
panel data estimates. Furthermore, despite the theoretical arguments about the effects of 
diversification and internationalization, lack of good instruments makes it difficult to assess 
the main direction of the relationships that are established. Concerning the inventor location 
in chapter 5, the exclusive use of EPO applications leads to inflated measures of European 
shares. However this bias is likely to arise for all firms in the sample and should not 
significantly perturb cross-sectional comparisons and firm-level econometric results.    
In order to better understand the relationship between R&D investing behaviors and financing 
constraints, which is analyzed in chapter 2, it would be helpful to know more precisely the 
share of the different sources for the funding of R&D, i.e. internal financing, debt and issues 
of shares on the stock markets. Indeed if firms in the EU are relying less on external sources 
compared with their US counterparts, then this could explain why EU firms are more sensitive 
to liquidity constraints. Another interesting extension of this work would be to investigate 
which component of R&D investment, i.e. the ‘R’ vs. the ‘D’ or the outsourced R&D abroad 
vs. the research carried out in the home country, is more financially constrained. While 
maintaining the important division between European and US companies, which is because of 
the very different business environments for R&D firms in the two regions, it may be worth 
investigating separately groups of firms by sector of economic activity. Quite often, the 
differences in financial constraints and management of R&D resources differ significantly 
from one sector to another. Generally, differences are larger between sectors than between 
regions in the same sector of activity, particularly when considering worldwide-operating 
firms. 
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In order to further investigate the outcomes of the knowledge process, other measures of the 
performance of R&D activities could be considered and would extend the scope of the 
analysis of chapter 3. For instance, other intellectual property rights like copyright and 
trademarks may be worth being implemented in the knowledge production function and 
related to the components of R&D. Furthermore, improving the methodological framework 
with panel data analyzes would benefit from the dynamics that underlie the evolution of 
innovative activities. A structural model that addresses the dimensions of R&D that foster the 
knowledge outcome could be considered by using simultaneous equations.  
An interesting extension of the work of chapter 4 regarding industrial diversification may be 
to investigate the characteristics of the industries the MNEs are active in. We do not have 
information about the R&D activities conducted by the subsidiaries, but the industrial 
classification of the subsidiaries may give a clue about their role in the group. This approach 
would also be helpful in analyzing the relationship between the strategies of vertical 
integration and the productivity of the firms. To better understand the activities of European 
MNEs outside Europe, it may be worth having a closer look at the industrial diversification or 
concentration strategies in North America and Asia Pacific, and their impact on R&D activity 
productivity. Moreover, one could investigate the efficiency in these regions of the Home-
Based Augmenting and Home-Based Exploiting R&D strategies for EU MNEs.  
The analysis of R&D internationalization in chaper 5 is to be related to more specific regional 
investigations in order to stress the strengths of each single region that matters today in the 
globalization process of R&D. It would be worth focusing the scope of the research on a 
particular industry or a singular region in order to better evaluate the drivers that yield higher 
performances of R&D centers located abroad.  
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix 1. Corrected and initial datasets (EU27 and US, 2000-2007) 
 
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics on the initial sample 
 
Variables Region Mean Std.dev. Quantile 25 % Quantile 50 % Quantile 75 % 
21 /  tt CR  Global 0.245 0.112 0.178 0.215 0.277 
 EU27 0.244 0.123 0.172 0.212 0.273 
 US 0.247 0.101 0.182 0.222 0.286 
1/ tt CCF  Global 0.907 1.335 0.256 0.478 1.007 
 EU27 1.061 1.639 0.172 0.212 0.273 
 US 0.692 0.945 0.209 0.430 0.821 
ty  Global 6.963 1.906 5.707 7.017 8.267 
 EU27 6.430 2.089 5.014 6.452 7.816 
 US 7.118 1.677 5.852 7.065 8.284 
tc  Global 5.462 1.602 4.425 5.362 6.391 
 EU27 4.777 1.674 3.570 4.470 5.704 
 US 6.043 1.296 5.115 5.708 6.762 
ty  Global 0.081 0.238 -0.012 0.058 0.145 
 EU27 0.066 0.253 -0.028 0.043 0.133 
 US 0.094 0.236 -0.006 0.070 0.164 
Employees Global 20184 46122 1324 5087 17725 
 EU27 16966 45410 691 3101 11246 
 US 19576 40663 1556 5400 18100 
Source: own computation 
 
Table A.2 Difference between initial and corrected samples150 
 Mean Std.dev. Quantile 25% Quantile 50% Quantile 75% 
tt CR /  0.2 5.5 0.8 0.7 0.5 
1/ tt CCF  1.2 1.1 0.7 3.4 2.6 
ty  5.5 2.3 4.8 3.3 1.6 
tc  3.5 2.4 3.0 3.1 3.1 
ty  0.8 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 
Employees 0.4 0.3 1.7 1.8 1.3 
Source: own computation 
                                                            
150 With ,match EUStatX being a statistic for variable X using the EU corrected sample and ,nonmatch EUStatX  the same 
statistic for the non corrected sample, 





EUmatchUSmatch
EUnomatchUSnomatch
StatXStatX
StatXStatX
abs
,,
,, is the result reported in the table. A 
value superior to one means that the procedure has decreased the distance between US and EU statistics. 
174 
 
Appendix 2. ECM estimations by age (System-GMM) 
 
 CFt/Ct-1 CFt-1/Ct-2 AR(1) AR(2) Sargan Hansen 
EU27       
Age < 30 (145 obs)      
lag(2,.) 0.005 
(0.003)* 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-2.07  
[0.038] 
-1.61  
[0.108] 
119 
[0.009] 
24 
[1] 
lag(3,.) -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-2.22 
[0.027] 
-1.43 
[0.151] 
81 
[0.041] 
22 
[1] 
lag(4,.) 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-2.12 
[0.034] 
-1.27 
[0.203] 
47 
[0.185] 
27 
[0.918] 
Age > 30 (1530 obs)      
lag(2,.) 0.095 
(0.005)*** 
0.026 
(0.001)*** 
-1.21 
[0.227] 
-1.78 
[0.076] 
1330 
[0.00] 
89 
[0.361] 
lag(3,.) 0.042 
(0.005)*** 
0.019 
(0.004)*** 
-2.03 
[0.042] 
-1.30 
[0.195] 
669 
[0.000] 
62 
[0.455] 
lag(4,.) 0.039 
(0.006)*** 
0.032 
(0.008)*** 
-0.19 
[0.848 
-0.35 
[0.725] 
237 
[0.000] 
36 
[0.619] 
Age > 100 (1178 obs)      
lag(2,.) 0.100 
(0.004)*** 
0.028 
(0.001)*** 
-1.09 
[0.276] 
-1.09 
[0.211] 
1154 
[0.000] 
92 
[0.276] 
lag(3,.) 0.050 
(0.005)*** 
0.032 
(0.004)*** 
-1.61 
[0.108] 
0.14 
[0.890] 
580 
[0.000] 
62 
[0.436] 
lag(4,.) 0.041 
(0.007)*** 
0.021 
(0.009)** 
-2.20 
[0.027] 
0.64 
[0.525] 
191 
[0.000] 
24 
[0.971] 
US       
Age < 30 (613 obs)      
lag(2,.) 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.001)*** 
-3.01 
[0.003] 
2.05 
[0.040] 
197 
[0.000] 
79 
[0.660] 
lag(3,.) 0.005 
(0.005) 
0.044 
(0.005)*** 
-3.25 
[0.001] 
1.80 
[0.072] 
110 
[0.000] 
53 
[0.745] 
lag(4,.) 0.014 
(0.010) 
0.087 
(0/013)*** 
-3.39 
[0.001] 
1.72 
[0.086] 
46 
[0.210] 
44 
[0.265] 
Age ≥ 30 (1302 obs)      
lag(2,.) 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.0001)*** 
-1.81 
[0.071] 
-1.17 
[0.240] 
389 
[0.000] 
121 
[0.006] 
lag(3,.) 0.007 
(0.004)* 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-1.72 
[0.085] 
-1.24 
[0.213] 
207 
[0.000] 
77 
[0.081] 
lag(4,.) 0.002 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-1.78 
[0.075] 
-1.23 
[0.218] 
61 
[0.002] 
39 
[0.480] 
Age ≥ 100 (666 obs)      
lag(2,.) 0.017 
(0.001)*** 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-1.15 
[0.250] 
-1.01 
[0.310] 
309 
[0.000] 
110 
[0.034] 
lag(3,.) 0.012 
(0.003)*** 
-0.002 
(0.001)** 
-1.18 
[0.238] 
-1.02 
[0.310] 
177 
[0.000] 
84 
[0.029] 
lag(4,.) 0.028 
(0.009)*** 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-1.30 
[0.194] 
-1.05 
[0.296] 
75 
[0.000] 
59 
 [0.023] 
Dependent variable: Rt/Ct-1. Estimation of equation 2.5. *** (respectively ** and *): statistically significant at the 
1 % (respectively 5 % and 10 %) level. Estimation performed using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2006); all equations 
include time dummies; Windmeijer corrected standard errors in brackets; P-values in square brackets; AR(1) and 
AR(2): tests for first order and second order serial correlation in the first difference residuals; Two-step 
estimates; instruments used in column s (s=2,3,4): observations dated t-s or earlier for Xt (transformed equation) 
and t-s+1 for ΔXt (equation in level). 
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Appendix 3. Detailed regressions on the R&D-patent relationship 
 
Intramural / Extramural R&D expenditures 
 
Dependent variable: patents  
Intercept -6.757 (0.868)*** 
Intramural R&D expenditures 0.699 (0.087)*** 
Extramural R&D expenditures 0.104 (0.045)** 
Small size (< 50 empl.) 0.119 (0.391) 
Large size (>250 empl.) 0.558 (0.265)** 
Flanders 1.155 (0.54)** 
Wallonia 1.024 (0.568)* 
Nace industry (2-digit) Jointly significant 
#firms 832 
LogL -639 
Alpha 3.547 (0.549) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
 
Research / Development 
 
Dependent variable: patents  
Intercept -2.525 (0.886)*** 
Intramural R&D   
   Research 0.243 (0.056)*** 
   Development 0.248 (0.037)*** 
Extramural R&D 0.165 (0.044)*** 
Small size  -0.31 (0.391) 
Large size 0.82 (0.259)*** 
Flanders 0.208 (0.53) 
Wallonia 0.219 (0.564) 
Nace industry (2-digit) joint. sign. 
#firms 797 
LogL -630 
Alpha 4.257 (0.617) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial 
estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the period 2004-2005. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically 
significant at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
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Product / Process 
 
Dependent variable: patents  
Intercept -4.3 (0.824)*** 
Intramural R&D expenditures   
   Product oriented 0.236 (0.052)*** 
   Process oriented 0.08 (0.045)* 
   Product & process 0.254 (0.05)*** 
   No specific orientation -0.112 (0.055)** 
Extramural R&D expenditures 0.209 (0.045)*** 
Small size -0.284 (0.424) 
Large size 1.043 (0.279)*** 
Flanders 1.071 (0.623)* 
Wallonia 0.777 (0.688) 
Nace industry (2-digit) Jointly significant 
#firms 731 
LogL -590 
Alpha 4.582 (0.69) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
 
 
Human capital / Equipment 
  
Dependent variable: patents  
Intercept -4.085 (1.266)*** 
Intramural R&D expenditures   
   Human capital 0.263 (0.154)* 
   Equipment 0.186 (0.048)*** 
Extramural R&D expenditures 0.134 (0.045)*** 
Small size (< 50 empl.) -0.659 (0.587) 
Large size (>250 empl.) 0.821 (0.253)*** 
Flanders 1.09 (0.591)* 
Wallonia 1.431 (0.728)** 
Nace industry (2-digit) Jointly significant 
#firms 795 
LogL -651 
Alpha 4.704 (1.204) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
177 
 
 
 
Financing 
 
Dependent variable: patents (1) (2) 
Intercept -3.941 (0.83)*** -2.443 (1.014)** 
Intra-mural R&D     
   Own funds 0.182 (0.049)*** 0.127 (0.064)** 
   External funds 0.315 (0.04)***   
   ■ Belgian funds   0.167 (0.069)** 
   ■ Foreign funds   0.261 (0.063)*** 
Extra-mural R&D 0.166 (0.037)*** 0.194 (0.048)*** 
Small size (< 50 empl.) -0.775 (0.424)* -0.571 (0.503) 
Large size (>250 empl.) 1.173 (0.286)*** 1.409 (0.36)*** 
Flanders 1.05 (0.613)* 0.566 (0.785) 
Wallonia 0.929 (0.628) 0.654 (0.862) 
Nace industry (2-digit) joint. sign. joint. sign. 
#firms 814 362 
LogL -653 -418 
Alpha 4.863 (0.652) 4.138 (0.621) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
 
Dependent variable: patents  (3) 
Intercept -2.97 (1.059)*** 
Intra-mural R&D expenditures   
   Own funds 0.156 (0.072)** 
   External funds   
   ■ from firms 0.298 (0.079)*** 
   ■ public funds  0.244 (0.076)*** 
   ■ from RTO/HEI -0.084 (0.281) 
Extra-mural R&D expenditures 0.207 (0.047)*** 
Small size (< 50 empl.) -0.498 (0.456) 
Large size (>250 empl.) 1.368 (0.367)*** 
Flanders 0.475 (0.769) 
Wallonia 0.5 (0.834) 
Nace industry (2-digit) Jointly significant 
#firms 362 
LogL -418 
Alpha 4.144 (0.62) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
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Subcontractors 
 
Dependent variable: patents  (1)  (2) 
Intercept -6.529 (1.091)*** -6.622 (1.088)*** 
Intra-mural R&D 0.671 (0.135)*** 0.687 (0.137)*** 
Extra-mural R&D     
   Belgian subcontractors 0.148 (0.092)   
   ■ Regional    0.193 (0.091)** 
   ■ Non regional   -0.085 (0.057) 
   Foreign subcontractors 0.116 (0.054)** 0.116 (0.05)** 
Small size (< 50 empl.) 0.541 (0.678) 0.559 (0.686) 
Large size (>250 empl.) 0.634 (0.322)** 0.674 (0.325)** 
Flanders 1.112 (0.687) 0.935 (0.655) 
Wallonia 1.5 (0.731)** 1.435 (0.706)** 
Nace industry (2-digit) joint. sign. joint. sign. 
#firms 360 360 
LogL -382 -381 
Alpha 2.798 (0.522) 2.719 (0.513) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
 
 
  (3) 
Intercept -6.351 (1.083)*** 
Intra-mural R&D 0.691 (0.136)*** 
Extra-mural R&D   
   Firms subcontractors 0.062 (0.054) 
   Univ. subcontractors  0.105 (0.058)* 
   Research centers subcontractors 0.123 (0.083) 
   Other subcontractors -0.077 (0.103) 
   RTO & HEI   
Small size (< 50 empl.) 0.54 (0.705) 
Large size (>250 empl.) 0.741 (0.329)** 
Flanders 0.602 (0.725) 
Wallonia 1.002 (0.795) 
Nace industry (2-digit) Jointly significant 
#firms 360 
LogL -383 
Alpha 2.856 (0.549) 
Dependent variable: patents (priority filings). Negative binomial estimations. Belgian R&D firms over the 
period 2004-2005. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, resp. ** and *,  means statistically significant 
at the 1%, resp. 5%  and  10% level. 
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Appendix 4. Additional statistics (835 EU R&D MNEs) 
 
Industry #firms #subsidiaries 
av. subs. Turnover 
(mil. USD151) 
av. subs. 
employees 
High-tech 385 38 199 436 
Biotechnology 52 7 28 119 
Semiconductors 19 15 88 308 
Pharmaceuticals 50 23 153 268 
Telecommunications equipment 26 18 112 231 
Software 71 21 23 112 
Electronic office equipment 2 61 79 435 
Electronic equipment 33 24 28 115 
Leisure goods 9 59 154 248 
Aerospace & defence 25 63 816 1686 
Computer hardware 6 20 51 205 
Automobiles & parts 40 91 718 1436 
Electrical components & equipment 26 119 162 390 
Computer services 26 38 193 404 
Medium-tech 243 47 237 597 
Health care equipment & services 29 40 55 163 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 15 34 291 709 
Chemicals 42 70 222 336 
Alternative energy 4 16 175 164 
Industrial machinery 69 36 81 255 
General industrials 20 64 482 1603 
Household goods & home construction 22 44 409 994 
Media 12 36 686 1022 
Food producers 30 53 306 1036 
Low-tech 207 86 1005 2583 
Banks 2 26 123 1028 
Personal goods 16 82 139 369 
Life insurance 1 5 1 0 
Fixed line telecommunications 13 101 508 1424 
Support services 25 46 179 835 
Tobacco 2 383 382 1186 
Internet 4 23 47 62 
Other financials 11 76 1225 1589 
Mobile telecommunications 4 20 1243 943 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 4 119 86 164 
Electricity 15 103 1725 2354 
Construction & materials 26 89 306 910 
Forestry & paper 6 64 542 1137 
Mining 5 34 1027 2149 
Industrial metals & mining 12 55 973 1422 
Industrial transportation 12 120 1097 3686 
Nonlife insurance 1 22 224 102 
General retailers 13 125 764 1950 
Oil & gas producers 9 129 2871 3841 
Gas, water & multiutilities 8 99 1868 2732 
Travel & leisure 9 101 203 1206 
Beverages 4 54 1501 3812 
Food & drug retailers 5 123 9776 43390 
All 835 53 410 1015 
Source: own computation. 
                                                            
151 Amadeus provides data for subsidiaries only in US Dollars and not in Euros. This will not affect our 
econometric analysis as we are interested in the share of the sales across countries or industries. 
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 (continued) 
Countries #firms #countries HHI sales HHI emp 
High-tech 385 11 0.61 0.62 
Biotechnology 52 4 0.72 0.75 
Semiconductors 19 7 0.71 0.66 
Pharmaceuticals 50 10 0.68 0.63 
Telecommunications equipment 26 8 0.72 0.74 
Software 71 10 0.54 0.57 
Electronic office equipment 2 22 0.32 0.30 
Electronic equipment 33 11 0.52 0.58 
Leisure goods 9 16 0.66 0.63 
Aerospace & defence 25 9 0.64 0.63 
Computer hardware 6 11 0.57 0.61 
Automobiles & parts 40 18 0.54 0.57 
Electrical components & equipment 26 18 0.51 0.50 
Computer services 26 12 0.65 0.61 
Medium-tech 243 14 0.56 0.58 
Health care equipment & services 29 15 0.50 0.53 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 15 13 0.52 0.60 
Chemicals 42 17 0.61 0.63 
Alternative energy 4 5 0.69 0.67 
Industrial machinery 69 14 0.53 0.55 
General industrials 20 12 0.71 0.70 
Household goods & home construction 22 17 0.48 0.52 
Media 12 7 0.79 0.77 
Food producers 30 16 0.52 0.47 
Low-tech 207 16 0.65 0.64 
Banks 2 2 0.81 0.96 
Personal goods 16 25 0.54 0.46 
Life insurance 1 1 1.00  
Fixed line telecommunications 13 18 0.62 0.62 
Support services 25 12 0.65 0.62 
Tobacco 2 70 0.67 0.48 
Internet 4 10 0.72 0.62 
Other financials 11 15 0.69 0.52 
Mobile telecommunications 4 10 0.78 0.86 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 4 29 0.40 0.38 
Electricity 15 10 0.76 0.75 
Construction & materials 26 19 0.57 0.60 
Forestry & paper 6 20 0.67 0.66 
Mining 5 10 0.58 0.67 
Industrial metals & mining 12 16 0.54 0.61 
Industrial transportation 12 17 0.77 0.80 
Nonlife insurance 1 2 1.00 1.00 
General retailers 13 9 0.75 0.76 
Oil & gas producers 9 23 0.47 0.56 
Gas, water & multiutilities 8 12 0.75 0.68 
Travel & leisure 9 20 0.81 0.73 
Beverages 4 21 0.43 0.56 
Food & drug retailers 5 9 0.88 0.85 
All 835 13 0.61 0.61 
Source: own computation. 
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 (continued) 
Industry #firms #Nace 4 digit 
#Nace 2 
digit HHI sales HHI emp 
High-tech 385 10 6 0.67 0.68 
Biotechnology 52 4 3 0.72 0.75 
Semiconductors 19 7 5 0.71 0.66 
Pharmaceuticals 50 7 4 0.68 0.63 
Telecommunications equipment 26 8 5 0.72 0.74 
Software 71 7 4 0.54 0.57 
Electronic office equipment 2 20 10 0.32 0.30 
Electronic equipment 33 10 6 0.52 0.58 
Leisure goods 9 13 6 0.66 0.63 
Aerospace & defence 25 19 11 0.64 0.63 
Computer hardware 6 8 4 0.57 0.61 
Automobiles & parts 40 19 10 0.54 0.57 
Electrical components & equipment 26 19 9 0.51 0.50 
Computer services 26 10 5 0.65 0.61 
Medium-tech 243 14 7 0.59 0.58 
Health care equipment & services 29 11 6 0.50 0.53 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 15 12 8 0.52 0.60 
Chemicals 42 17 9 0.61 0.63 
Alternative energy 4 7 6 0.69 0.67 
Industrial machinery 69 13 7 0.53 0.55 
General industrials 20 18 10 0.71 0.70 
Household goods & home construction 22 13 8 0.48 0.52 
Media 12 11 5 0.79 0.77 
Food producers 30 17 8 0.52 0.47 
Low-tech 207 18 9 0.62 0.58 
Banks 2 10 6 0.81 0.96 
Personal goods 16 16 8 0.54 0.46 
Life insurance 1 2 2 1.00  
Fixed line telecommunications 13 27 13 0.62 0.62 
Support services 25 12 6 0.65 0.62 
Tobacco 2 25 13 0.67 0.48 
Internet 4 10 4 0.72 0.62 
Other financials 11 15 9 0.69 0.52 
Mobile telecommunications 4 8 6 0.78 0.86 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 4 17 10 0.40 0.38 
Electricity 15 19 11 0.76 0.75 
Construction & materials 26 20 10 0.57 0.60 
Forestry & paper 6 20 10 0.67 0.66 
Mining 5 11 9 0.58 0.67 
Industrial metals & mining 12 20 10 0.54 0.61 
Industrial transportation 12 17 9 0.77 0.80 
Nonlife insurance 1 9 6 1.00 1.00 
General retailers 13 17 7 0.75 0.76 
Oil & gas producers 9 35 19 0.47 0.56 
Gas, water & multiutilities 8 34 16 0.75 0.68 
Travel & leisure 9 20 10 0.81 0.73 
Beverages 4 10 6 0.43 0.56 
Food & drug retailers 5 17 9 0.88 0.85 
All 835 13 7 0.61 0.61 
Source: own computation. 
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Appendix 5. Estimates using production factors with one lagged period. 
 
 (1) (3) (4) 
log(Lt-1)  .66 (.02)***  .67 (.02)*** .65 (.02)*** 
log(Ct-1)  .24 (.01)***  .24 (.01)*** .24 (.01)*** 
log(Kt-1)  .09 (.01)***  .07 (.02)*** .13 (.02)*** 
log(Kt-1) x log(#count)   .01 (.005)**  
log(#countries)   -.07 (.03)***  
log(Kt-1) x log(#indus)    -.01 (.01)** 
log(#industries)    .08 (.03)** 
R-sq  .95 .95 .95 
#obs  3486 3468 3421 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 835 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of 
industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent 
standard errors in brackets. ‘Industries’ is the number of 4-digit Nace industries where the firm 
is active. Estimates conducted without observations above 99th percentile of diversification. 
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Appendix 6. Estimates over 2006-2008. 
 
 (1) (3) (4) 
log(Lt)  .63 (.02)***  .63 (.02)*** .61 (.02)*** 
log(Ct)  .25 (.02)***  .26 (.02)*** .26 (.02)*** 
log(Kt)  .10 (.01)***  .06 (.02)*** .14 (.03)*** 
log(Kt) x log(#count)   .02 (.01)**  
log(#countries)   -.09 (.04)***  
log(Kt) x log(#indus)    -.02 (.01)** 
log(#industries)    .01 (.05)** 
R-sq  .95 .95 .94 
#obs  2182 2143 2136 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 835 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of 
industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent 
standard errors in brackets. ‘Industries’ is the number of 4-digit Nace industries where the firm 
is active. Estimates conducted without observations above 99th percentile of diversification. 
 
Appendix 7. R&D intensity and share of subsidiaries in the main geographic regions 
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Appendix 8. Descriptive statistics by industry (637 EU R&D MNEs) 
Industry - ICB # Firms # Inventors % Same % EU27 % Others 
High-tech 286 124179 74,33% 20,30% 1,78% 
Biotechnology 49 2747 67,97% 17,91% 7,03% 
Semiconductors 17 6921 61,26% 28,62% 1,50% 
Pharmaceuticals 44 10407 45,74% 40,71% 3,53% 
Telecommunications equipment 21 9959 33,96% 55,86% 2,73% 
Software 25 393 64,63% 21,37% 2,04% 
Electronic office equipment 2 822 52,19% 47,20% 0,12% 
Electronic equipment 25 3125 78,94% 18,66% 0,64% 
Leisure goods 6 7346 70,99% 22,98% 1,21% 
Aerospace & defense 20 6252 59,39% 38,79% 1,20% 
Computer hardware 5 157 82,17% 15,29% 0,00% 
Automobiles & parts 37 47524 88,96% 8,19% 1,16% 
Electrical components & equipment 24 28086 82,97% 13,08% 1,87% 
Computer services 11 440 60,00% 38,64% 1,14% 
Medium-tech 206 75031 75,56% 14,62% 3,26% 
Health care equipment & services 26 2993 71,60% 18,54% 2,91% 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 15 2108 85,67% 10,01% 4,17% 
Chemicals 40 39479 83,27% 9,52% 2,68% 
Alternative energy 3 140 97,14% 0,71% 0,71% 
Industrial machinery 63 9676 76,06% 16,57% 4,21% 
General industrials 18 4475 75,02% 20,18% 1,72% 
Household goods & home construction 18 6317 76,70% 19,46% 1,17% 
Media 4 1863 50,99% 18,09% 3,44% 
Food producers 19 7980 40,41% 29,69% 7,37% 
Low-tech 145 30411 71,23% 20,23% 2,91% 
Personal goods 12 3782 91,01% 4,18% 1,45% 
Fixed line telecommunications 10 6417 52,64% 39,18% 1,99% 
Support services 12 1179 91,86% 5,17% 2,37% 
Tobacco 2 198 36,87% 44,95% 5,05% 
Internet 2 73 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Other financials 9 684 89,62% 8,77% 1,17% 
Mobile telecommunications 3 103 70,87% 24,27% 1,94% 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 4 334 65,27% 19,16% 7,78% 
Electricity 13 1772 71,84% 24,10% 2,88% 
Construction & materials 22 1991 63,69% 26,87% 7,08% 
Forestry & paper 6 261 67,05% 31,42% 0,38% 
Mining 4 85 22,35% 25,88% 23,53% 
Industrial metals & mining 12 2281 75,84% 16,97% 4,73% 
Industrial transportation 7 4935 90,54% 2,53% 3,55% 
General retailers 5 758 95,91% 1,58% 1,19% 
Oil & gas producers 7 4032 46,21% 36,41% 2,55% 
Gas, water & multi utilities 6 1323 76,57% 8,24% 1,44% 
Travel & leisure 4 140 95,00% 2,86% 0,71% 
Beverages 4 29 34,48% 27,59% 0,00% 
Food & drug retailers 1 34 91,18% 5,88% 2,94% 
All 637 229621 74,32% 18,43% 2,41% 
Source:  Own computation.  
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% Inventors 
Industry - ICB EU27 US-CA CN IN JP EUnon27 ROW 
High-tech 94,62% 3,60% 0,11% 0,03% 0,39% 0,91% 0,33% 
Biotechnology 85,88% 7,10% 0,18% 0,00% 1,71% 4,11% 1,02% 
Semiconductors 89,89% 8,61% 0,06% 0,09% 0,25% 0,38% 0,74% 
Pharmaceuticals 86,45% 10,02% 0,00% 0,21% 1,03% 1,81% 0,48% 
Telecommunications equipment 89,82% 7,45% 0,73% 0,00% 0,53% 0,74% 0,72% 
Software 86,01% 11,96% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 2,04% 
Electronic office equipment 99,39% 0,49% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,12% 0,00% 
Electronic equipment 97,60% 1,76% 0,13% 0,03% 0,13% 0,29% 0,06% 
Leisure goods 93,97% 4,82% 0,22% 0,00% 0,53% 0,25% 0,22% 
Aerospace & defense 98,18% 0,62% 0,02% 0,08% 0,14% 0,85% 0,11% 
Computer hardware 97,45% 2,55% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Automobiles & parts 97,15% 1,69% 0,00% 0,02% 0,23% 0,69% 0,22% 
Electrical components & equipment 96,05% 2,08% 0,12% 0,00% 0,36% 1,14% 0,26% 
Computer services 98,64% 0,23% 0,00% 0,00% 0,23% 0,68% 0,23% 
Medium-tech 90,18% 6,56% 0,10% 0,27% 0,94% 1,31% 0,64% 
Health care equipment & services 90,14% 6,95% 0,00% 0,00% 0,50% 2,31% 0,10% 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 95,68% 0,14% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 3,94% 0,24% 
Chemicals 92,79% 4,53% 0,12% 0,01% 1,40% 0,81% 0,34% 
Alternative energy 97,86% 1,43% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,71% 
Industrial machinery 92,63% 3,16% 0,00% 0,03% 0,03% 3,89% 0,26% 
General industrials 95,20% 3,08% 0,00% 0,00% 0,16% 0,74% 0,83% 
Household goods &home construction 96,15% 2,68% 0,03% 0,00% 0,17% 0,44% 0,52% 
Media 69,08% 27,48% 1,02% 0,00% 0,32% 0,70% 1,40% 
Food producers 70,10% 22,53% 0,03% 2,49% 1,42% 0,75% 2,68% 
Low-tech 91,46% 5,62% 0,16% 0,01% 0,93% 1,21% 0,60% 
Personal goods 95,19% 3,36% 0,00% 0,00% 0,87% 0,50% 0,08% 
Fixed line telecommunications 91,82% 6,19% 0,62% 0,02% 0,09% 0,58% 0,69% 
Support services 97,03% 0,59% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,85% 1,53% 
Tobacco 81,82% 13,13% 0,00% 0,00% 1,01% 1,01% 3,03% 
Internet 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Other financials 98,39% 0,44% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,02% 0,15% 
Mobile telecommunications 95,15% 2,91% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,94% 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 84,43% 7,78% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 6,89% 0,90% 
Electricity 95,94% 1,19% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 2,82% 0,06% 
Construction & materials 90,56% 2,36% 0,00% 0,00% 0,05% 4,92% 2,11% 
Forestry & paper 98,47% 1,15% 0,00% 0,00% 0,38% 0,00% 0,00% 
Mining 48,24% 28,24% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 23,53% 
Industrial metals & mining 92,81% 2,46% 0,04% 0,00% 4,21% 0,35% 0,13% 
Industrial transportation 93,07% 3,38% 0,16% 0,00% 1,90% 1,32% 0,16% 
General retailers 97,49% 1,32% 0,00% 0,00% 0,13% 0,53% 0,53% 
Oil & gas producers 82,61% 14,83% 0,00% 0,02% 1,22% 0,67% 0,64% 
Gas, water & multi utilities 84,81% 13,76% 0,00% 0,08% 0,00% 1,36% 0,00% 
Travel & leisure 97,86% 1,43% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,71% 
Beverages 62,07% 37,93% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Food & drug retailers 97,06% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 2,94% 0,00% 
All 92,75% 4,83% 0,11% 0,11% 0,64% 1,08% 0,47% 
Source:  Own computation.  
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Appendix 9. Estimates of Specification 1 (CN, IN, JP, EU non 27 and ROW) 
Geo Dependent Variable 
Industrial Technology Cluster 
All High Medium Low 
C
N
 
 1 2 3 4 
Log(L) .688(.016)*** .660 (.028)*** .682 (.026)*** .744 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .224(.012)*** .161 (.021)*** .219 (.024)*** .274 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .094(.011)*** .188 (.020)*** .091 (.015)*** -.001 (.018) 
ZCN -79.1(11.18)*** -99.7 (46.6)** -5.14 (15.3) 801.8 (206.3)*** 
ZCN*Log(K) 9.38 (1.89) *** 14.1 (5.48)*** -2.66 (3.01) -103.4 (25.7)*** 
IN
 
 5 6 7 8 
Log(L) .688(.016)*** .662 (.028)*** .676 (.026)*** .747 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .224(.012)*** .157 (.021)*** .221 (.024)*** .271 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .098 (.012)*** .195 (.020)*** .091 (.015)*** -.009 (.019) 
ZIN 4.65 (5.61) -.0582 (6.64) -23.5 (11.4)** -110.5 (310.2) 
ZIN*Log(K) -.665 (.863) 1.43 (1.43) 2.37 (1.48) 31.1 (69.8) 
JP
 
 9 10 11 12 
Log(L) .686(.016)*** .664 (.028)*** .672 (.026)*** .749 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .224(.012)*** .157 (.021)*** .221 (.025)*** .271 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .099 (.012)*** .191 (.020)*** .094 (.015)*** -.009 (.019) 
ZJP 1.46 (.654)** -4.74 (1.11)*** -.152 (1.23) 5.95 (5.57) 
ZJP*Log(K) -.288 (.128)** 1.18 (.270)*** -.025 (.224) -.417 (1.15) 
EU
 n
on
 2
7 
 13 14 15 16 
Log(L) .688(.016)*** .665 (.028)*** .672 (.026)*** .744 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .224(.012)*** .157 (.021)*** .224 (.024)*** .276 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .100 (.012)*** .198 (.020)*** .095 (.015)*** -.012 (.020) 
ZEUnon27 .685 (.338)** 1.40 (.759)* .905 (.464)* -1.51 (1.38) 
ZEUnon27*Log(K) -.178 (.071)** -.378 (.173)** -.158 (.091)* .276 (.252) 
R
O
W
 
 17 18 19 20 
Log(L) .689(.016)*** .665 (.028)*** .670 (.026)*** .751 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .222(.012)*** .154 (.021)*** .227 (.024)*** .270 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .096 (.012)*** .193 (.020)*** .089 (.015)*** -.018 (.019) 
ZROW .-544 (632) -2.94 (3.39) -.692 (.854) -5.58 (1.61)*** 
ZROW*Log(K) .205 (.147) .818 (.551) .310 (.331) 1.33 (.353)*** 
 R-Squared .95 .95 .95 .95 
 # Observations 3492 1468 1178 846 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 637 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of 
industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent 
standard errors in brackets. Dummies are jointly tested for significance level. 
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Appendix 10. Estimates of Specification 1 (Same and otherEU27)  
Geo 
 
Variable 
 
Industrial Technology Cluster 
All High Medium Low 
Sa
m
e 
co
un
tr
y  1 2 3 4 
Log(L) .685(.016)*** .664 (.028)*** .663 (.026)*** .747 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .224(.012)*** .157 (.021)*** .226 (.024)*** .276 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .098(.016)*** .197 (.025)*** .072 (.018)*** -.023 (.032) 
Zsame country -.038 (.078) .029 (.119) -.281 (.093)*** -.150 (.186) 
Zsame country*Log(K) -.0002 (.015) -.001 (.022) .029 (.019) .013 (.036) 
O
th
er
 E
U
27
  5 6 7 8 
Log(L) .684(.016)*** .665 (.028)*** .662 (.026)*** .750 (.024)*** 
Log(C) .224(.012)*** .157 (.021)*** .227 (.024)*** .273 (.019)*** 
Log(K) .096(.012)*** .199 (.021)*** .097 (.015)*** -.020 (.019) 
ZotherEU27 -.035 (.083) .042 (.123) .241 (.103)** -.264 (.168) 
ZotherEU27*Log(K) .013 (.163) -.013 (.023) -.011 (.021) .044 (.035) 
 Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 Industry dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 Time dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 R-Squared .95 .95 .95 .95 
 # Observations 3492 1468 1178 846 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 637 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates including sets of 
industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. Heteroskedastically-consistent 
standard errors in brackets. Dummies are jointly tested for significance level. 
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Appendix 11. Additional estimates for Specification 2 
 
Variables Industrial Technology Cluster 
All High Medium Low 
Log(L) .692(.012)*** .663(.019)*** .683(.021)*** .762(.022)*** 
Log(C) .221(.011)*** .160(.018)*** .212(.019)*** .271(.019)*** 
ZEU27*Log(K) .096(.009)*** .184(.015)*** .099(.015)*** -.018(.017) 
ZUSC*Log(K) .109(.014)*** .199(.023)*** .067(.028)** .055(.030)* 
ZCN*Log(K) -.770(.642) 2.568(1.04)** -3.395(.852)*** -4.386(1.80)** 
ZIN*Log(K) -.107(.558) 1.564(1.11) -.509(.585) 5.644(4.89) 
ZJP*Log(K) .116(.033)*** .224(.048)*** .035(.041) .746(.332)** 
ZEUunon27*Log(K) .060(.021)*** .121(.038)*** .111(.027)*** .002(.079) 
Zrow*Log(K) .170(.043)*** .448(.166)*** .238(.089)*** .056(.055) 
Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Industry dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Time dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
R-Squared .959 .958 .951 .954 
# Observations 3492 1468 1178 846 
Dependent variable: log(Y). Sample of 637 EU R&D companies. ***, **, * mean 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Pooled OLS estimates 
including sets of industry (ICB classification), country and time dummies. 
Heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors in brackets. Dummies are jointly tested 
for significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
